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Abstract 
This thesis sets out to provide a systematic study of stakeholder partnership building of BP in 
Colombia and Hoechst in Germany in the context of social risk management. Each company 
built an NGO and a community partnership that became an integral part of firms' strategy. In 
examining and evaluating the two companies and the four stakeholder partnerships, the 
leading research question of how firms build stakeholder partnerships is answered. The 
present study seeks to identify the characteristics of stakeholder partnership building, as well 
as to isolate the similarities and differences of this process. Additionally, it is an attempt to 
define the features of the firms' social risk navigation as context of this research project. 
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the research phenomenon, 
reviews conceptual foundations, and elaborates methodological issues. The case studies of 
BP and Hoechst are subdivided into internal processes of social integration and reintegration 
with regard to the two companies, and external processes of partnership building with regard 
to the four stakeholder partnerships that are chronologically presented in part two. Part three 
conceptualises stakeholder partnership building in terms of navigating social risk and 
partnership alchemy. Finally, part four comprises the research synopsis and reflection. 
Business and society, stakeholder theory, and strategic relationships are the theoretical 
areas that contributed to the framework for analysing partnership building. Two longitudinal 
in-depth case studies provide qualitative data for the processual analysis. The empirical data 
are categorised, aggregated and compared, in order to extract research findings. 
The contribution of this research is the extension of behavioural stakeholder theory. It 
develops is a stakeholder partnership building theory that comprises three parts. First, the 4- 
V 
Ps of stakeholder partnership building are identified. Second, variables are isolated that 
describe these elements of partnership alchemy. Finally, four patterns of stakeholder 
partnership building are identified. As a result, the research presents four propositions for 
partnership building. Based on the analysis of firms' navigation of social risk, a fifth 
proposition distinguishes between firm-specific and partnership-specific partnership building. 
The empirical data provides a contribution to knowledge in its own right by providing detailed 
insight into the practice of social risk management through stakeholder partnership building. 
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Part I Studying Stakeholder Partnerships 
We are searching for dialogue. We need bridges and each bridge needs two 
banks. We would step braver on the bridge if the critique from the other bank hit 
more rather than hurt. In reverse, we would find together, if we did not blame you 
for being ignorant of reality, as if there were a monopoly on the recognition of 
reality. 
Fjodor Dostojewski (1996) 
Dialogue is at the core of each stakeholder partnership which aims to manage social risk. 
Firms have changed their strategies from buffering environmental impact to providing a 
bridge with the environment, and recognising the importance of environmental issues that 
are associated with certain stakeholders. Building bridges is the structuring image which 
characterises building stakeholder partnerships. Thus, finding the right partner and working 
together requires both openness and recognition of the changing business practice as 
regards all partnering stakeholders. 
The first part of this thesis consists of the introduction, literature review and methodological 
overview, which together provide a basis for the research. The introduction imparts 
understanding of the importance of this research, giving a research outline and a reading 
guide for this thesis. The literature review analyses and presents conceptual foundations and 
key issues relating to underlying theories, which lead to an applied framework for analysing 
partnership building. Finally, the third section - research methodological issues - 
concentrates on research methodology, method and design. 
Part I: Studying 
Stakeholder Partnerships 
1. Introduction 2. 
Conceptual Foundations and 
Key Issues 
3. Research Methodological 
Issues 
1.1 What are Firms 
Responsible for 
1.2 Managing Social Risk 
1.3 Towards Stakeholder 
Partnering 
1.4 Analysing Stakeholder 
Partnership Building 
1.5 How to Read this 
Thesis 
2.1 Unfolding Business and 
Society 
2.2 Developing a Stakeholder 
Theory of the Firm 
2.3 Reviewing Strategic 
Relationships 
2.4 A Framework to Analyse 
Stakeholder Partnership Building 
3.1 Research Methodology 
3.2 Mesearch Method 
3.3 Research Design 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
Companies that engage in corporate social responsibility strive to provide more 
than just financial benefits to society. Sometimes referred to as 'stakeholder 
corporations', these companies look for ways that they can provide assistance for 
communities in need, preserve the environment, and invest in human 
development. 
Johnathan Lash (1998) 
By way of introduction to this thesis it is important to consider three essential issues: 
corporate responsibility, managing social risk and stakeholder partnership building. This 
chapter provides an outline of each of these, so as to provide an insight into, and an 
understanding of the context and relevance of the research area. It then sets the boundaries 
of this analysis by presenting key analytical issues such as research objectives, unit and 
level of analysis, research question and expected outcome as well as applied research 
method. The final section provides a guide for how to read this thesis. 
In deciding what firms are responsible for, the introduction focuses on changes in business 
practice. Insight is provided into what corporate social responsibility is and which areas it 
encompasses. New business issues such as globalisation and information technology are 
identified as drivers for the growing importance of social responsibility (Warhurst, 1998b). 
Here, risk management is seen as a means by which social responsibility may be 
implemented. Social risk is produced, and hence, it needs to be managed within modern 
ti 
society. As a result, risk may be seen as a systematic way of dealing with hazards, 
uncertainties and insecurities induced by modernisation (Franklin, 1998). Stakeholder 
partnership building is considered as a way to manage social risk. 
Partnerships are not a new phenomenon. However, relationships between business, society 
and government have undoubtedly entered a new stage and have become crucial for the 
\/ 
long-term survival of business. The shift towards stakeholder partnering not only establishes 
the terminology applied for, this study, but also provides some insight into the history of 
partnerships and the underlying rationale. 
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1.1 WHAT ARE FIRMS RESPONSIBLE FOR 
Table 1 provides selected highlights of critical incidents, new standards, initiatives and 
institutions associated with the role of business in society, and illustrates the importance and 
timeline of these matters. Indeed, critical incidents show that the wider role of business in an 
increasingly global, ecological and social environment clearly does matter, and the new 
standards, initiatives and institutions which have grown show that business is increasingly 
involved in addressing the relevant issues. The table also demonstrates that while ecological 
issues predominate early on, issues concerning human rights and social exclusion have 
assumed equal importance, and all of them are now being approached in a more holistic 
way, under the general heading of sustainability. 
Phase I: 1960 -1983 
Awakening 
Phase II: 1984 - 1994 
Engaging 
Phase III: 1995 -today 
Networking 
Critical 
Incidents 
New 
Standards 
and 
Initiatives 
New 
Institutions 
Nestle Baby Food '70 
Seveso Disaster '74 
Amoco Cadiz Oil '78 
Ford Pinto '78 
US Environmental 
Protection Act '69 
Club of Rome '72 
Brandt Report'80 
Global 2000 Report'80 
Council on Economic 
Priorities '69 
Greenpeace '72 
UNEP '73 
Bhopal '84 Shell - Brent Spar '95 
Chernobyl '86 Saro-Wiwa Execution '95 
Chico Mendes '88 Nike Child Labour '96 
Exxon Valdez '89 Asian Financial Crisis '97 
Responsible Care®'85 
Brundtland Report'87 
UN Summit for 
Children '90 
Rio Earth Summit '92 
Apparel Industry 
Partnership '96 
ISO 14000 '96 
SA 8000 '97 
Triple Bottom Line 
Concept '98 
Third World Network '85 
Caux Round Table '86 
SustainAbility '87 
PW BLF '90 
EBNSC '95 
Warwick Corporate 
Citizenship Unit '96 
Ethical Trading Initiative '97 
World Resource Amnesty Business Business Partners for 
Institute '83 Group '91 Development '97 
W BCSD '91 CEPAA '98 
Table 1 From Awakening to Networking 
Becoming involved with social issues can, inevitably, take a company's eye off the ball and 
risks a drop in productivity. Companies may be ill-suited to such work and there is no legal or 
democratic basis for it. Social investment may be seen as a misuse of shareholders money, 
which should instead be returned to them for their use as they see fit (Levitt, 1983). Such 
views are an integral part of the 1980s shareholder value debate, which succeeded in 
increasing the focus on companies' core business activities, including aligning social 
15 
investment much more closely with business strategy. The idea that business has a broader 
corporate responsibility is strengthened through the development of the global economy. The 
enhanced legitimacy and liberation of private enterprise in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
coupled with an exponential growth in enabling global networking technology, have led to the 
dominance of what may be termed global information capitalism (Meralin & McGee, 1998). 
The Millennium Pool' asked people to describe in their own words how they form 
impressions of individual companies, allowing two mentions each. One in three mentions 
attributes related to business fundamentals, while four in ten mention traits such as brand 
quality, corporate image or reputation. However, a majority of nearly six in ten mention 
factors related to a company's broader responsibilities such as labour practice, business 
ethics, responsibility to the society at large, or environmental impacts. 
How, then, may corporate social responsibility (CSR) be defined, and what are the 
implications for business operations? CSR is neither chequebook philanthropy nor is it 
limited to the study of business ethics. Rather, it arises from a deeply held vision on the part 
of corporate leaders that business can and should play a role beyond just making money 
(Reich, 1998). It embraces an understanding that everything a company does has some 
knock-on effect, whether inside or outside the company, from customers and employees to 
communities and the natural environment. In a nutshell, then, CSR encompasses the 
environment, the workplace, the community, and the marketplace. 
Within these four areas, companies are able to bring about differences in working practice by 
conducting specific programmes and actively becoming involved in monitoring and changing 
the effects of their operations. The thinking behind companies becoming involved in these 
issues represents a marked departure from traditional ways of doing business. This 
fundamental shift in thinking and acting is underscored by a series of new beliefs common to 
most socially responsible businesses such as (Waters, 1995): 
  Employees are most productive when they do meaningful jobs at fair wages, in a 
healthy environment, when they are empowered to have a say, and are respected for 
their contributions, and have a good balance between work and family life. 
' The Millennium Pool is an opinion research poll carried out by Environics International Ltd. in co-operation with 
The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum in London and The Conference Board in New York. 
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  Companies function best in the long run when the community they are in is healthy, 
has a below average crime rate, adequate education and health care, available skilled 
labour, and robust economic activity. 
  Companies that treat the environment with respect in all aspects of their operations 
may be seen to have reduced waste output, and at the same, have produced higher 
quality products and services, high resource efficiency, reduced costs of regulatory 
compliance. They have also tended to experience a low incidence of litigation, and 
enjoy a high degree of loyalty both customers and business-to-business clients. 
  Companies must take a long-term view of their operations and make decisions. That 
is, they need to consider a more holistic view of the world. Sometimes this means 
forgoing short-term profits in favour of long term benefits. 
 A company's reputation is becoming more and more important as consumers and 
investors consider reputation and performance as just important as price in making 
purchasing decisions. (Waters, 1995) 
Some of these beliefs may be a seen to pertain somewhat to a new age, and may even 
seem at odds with more traditional beliefs. Of course, it should not be forgotten that 
profitability is also a sign of social responsibility, in that it allows, for instance, a business to 
provide sustainable jobs for employees, good returns for investors and prosperity for the 
communities in which they operate. Therefore, why should one now bother with all these 
corporate responsibility concerns if profitability provides jobs and prosperity anyway? 
Several separate but interlinked forces have combined over the past years to bring business 
to where it is now (Castells, 1998): 
DEREGULATION AND GLOBALISATION - has provided business with many opportunities. 
Amongst these has been the ability to compete in most of the world's markets; the ability to 
raise funds from numerous competing sources. Of equal importance has been the 
opportunity to buy supplies from anywhere in the world. The effects of these changes have 
included more competitive local markets, cross-cultural business investments and 
transactions, and many factories are located so as to make use of cheap labour. 
RAPID ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY - have succeeded in allowing 
information 
to be relayed around the globe almost instantaneously and with minimal costs. There are 
few 
areas of our society that have not been affected by the remarkable changes that 
have 
occurred in communication technology and those that are still developing - e. g. 
the Internet. 
THE RISE IN THE POWER OF THE CONSUMER - the combination of the three forces above has 
resulted in what many have termed 'the information age'. 
With access to; instant, free 
17 
information from a variety of sources, a multitude of service and product providers; a 
multitude of global investment opportunities and the unopposed spread of capitalism as the 
dominant economic structure; the rise in the power of the consumer may be seen to have 
been unrestrained. 
The net outcome is that people now live in a world where corporations are more overtly 
consumer and employee orientated, given that consumers and employers hold the ultimate 
power in the system. Hence, the answer to the question of 'Why social responsibility now? ' is 
that consumers and employees are now well informed about the challenges facing the world, 
and have less faith in government's ability to change things. Furthermore, they acknowledge 
the corporation as the most powerful social construct of the present era and, most 
importantly, they are willing to reward corporations who are responsive to their concerns. 
In addition, it is worth noting that many large firms who have become converted to this new 
way of thinking require their suppliers to provide details of their policies with regard to social 
responsibility. Herein lies the most powerful force for change, as it is by these actions that 
large corporations can effectively exclude suppliers from the marketplace if they are not 
socially responsible. Child labour and diversity are important issues within this context. 
Regardless of the importance and impact of social responsibility, the fact remains that 
corporate responsibility is likely to become a more significant issue in the 21st century. The 
ramifications of not addressing best practice in the four areas of environment, workplace, 
marketplace and community range from poor media coverage to exclusion from some 
marketplaces. 
peril. 
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1.2 MANAGING SOCIAL RISK 
Changes to transnational companies (TNC) portray to a great extent global economic cycles, 
trends, and crises, as well as political, social and cultural change. Over the past 20 years, 
the reputation of TNCs has fallen steadily, primarily because of disconnection from society 
and the risks that business produces and imposes on society. In the next 50 years the global 
population will grow by at least 60 per cent. To stand still, in unit terms, global gross 
domestic product must increase by 60 per cent by 2050. Social progress relies on economic 
progress which, in turn, depends on TNCs (Gibson-Smith, 1998). Examples for today's social 
risk areas are: 
  Damage to health, safety and environment from production processes and products; 
  Perceived risks that new technologies in R&D pose; 
  Waste disposal; 
  Behaviour of TNCs in less developed countries; 
  Profit making from harming the society and/or environment; 
  Misleading advertising, downplaying risks; and 
  Environmental compatibility of the industry. 
Consequently, one of the underlying drivers for corporate responsibility is the need to 
manage a company's strategic risk in terms of mutual impact from and to society. Scientific 
and industrial developments will inevitably result in risks and hazards of considerable 
proportion. Meanwhile, the tangibility of need suppresses the perception of risks, but only the 
perception, not their reality or their effects; risks denied grow especially quick and well (Lash 
et al., 1996; Löfstedt & Frewer, 1998). In contrast, Beck (1992) states that "the devil of 
hunger is fought with the Beelzebub of multiplying risks" (p. 43). He developed the 
sociological interpretation of a risk society. The intermingling of continuity and discontinuity is 
discussed with examples of wealth production and risk production. In other words, the gain in 
power from techno-economic progress is increasingly overshadowed by the production of 
risk. According to Beck et al. (1994), today's society is no longer concerned exclusively with 
making nature useful, or with realising mankind from traditional constraints, but primarily with 
problems resulting from techno-economic development itself. 
Beck's concept of a risk society implies that hazardous side effects are likely to pollute the 
source of wealth. Therefore, what becomes clear in risk discussions are the fissures and 
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gaps between scientific and social rationality in dealing with the hazards potential of 
civilisation. Beck (1992) proposes that the insecurity within has industry intensified: no one 
knows who will be affected next by the anathema of ecological and social morality. Positive 
arguments, or at least arguments capable of convincing the public, become a prerequisite for 
business success, while arguments of accountability require accountable actions. This is the 
effect of the reflexive modernity, an ecological and social enlightenment, as referred to by 
Beck (1998) and Giddens (1999a). 
The idea of risk appears to have taken hold in the 16th and 17th centuries, and was first 
coined by Western explorers as they set off on their voyages across the world. The word risk 
seems to have come into English through Spanish, where it was used to refer to sailing into 
uncharted waters (Giddens, 1999b). Originally, the term was closely aligned with the notion 
of space. Later, it became transferred to time, as used in banking and investment, - to mean 
the calculation of the probable consequences of investment decisions for borrowers and 
lenders. It subsequently came to refer to a wide range of other situations of uncertainty. This 
research simply defines risk as exposure to change. It is the probability that some future 
events, or set of events, will occur. Risk is a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced by modernisation (Franklin, 1998). 
Social risk management as the context of this research - sometimes referred to as 
navigating social risk - is at present a collective term for a variety of activities concerned with 
avoiding, reducing and controlling risks as well as improving benefits (Waring & Glendon, 
1998). In the extensive field of risk management, four key dimensions may be identified: 
hazards or threats, risk contexts, risk management objectives, and risk management 
methods. Integration of different risk management functions, disciplines and activities 
remains weak or non-existent in most organisations (Waring & Glendon, 1998). Senior 
management of organisations tends to have a poor understanding of the scope of social risk 
management, implications for strategic risks and the organisational and resource 
requirements for addressing these adequately (De'Ath, 1997). However, increased 
awareness of social risk issues and implications is likely to lead to more organisations 
adopting an integrated approach to social risk management, including stakeholder 
partnership building. 
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1.3 TOWARDS STAKEHOLDER PARTNERING 
The focus of strategy needs to be much broader than the traditional product/market 
approach of Adam Smith's day. Strategy now engages managers in considering a complex 
array of factors, of which the social context in which the company operates is an integral 
part. Furthermore, it requires the value-generating function of the company to be thought of 
as constituting a set of relationships - with employees, customers, suppliers and community 
interests as well as shareholders - which can add or subtract value and from which the 
company derives its ability to go on creating value. 
Partnerships between individuals within societies or even across societies are not a new 
phenomenon within the globalizing world, nor indeed a unique phenomenon within Europe. 
However, the dynamic political, social, economical and ecological environment and the 
interconnectedness of each of its elements provides a compulsion towards what is known as 
stakeholder partnership building. This process of change is not a radical one, nor is it a 
revolution, or indeed limited specifically to certain spheres of our societal life; rather, it is 
endemic. Although in some areas stakeholder partnerships are already emerging, others are 
unsuspecting with regard to the value that such engagements can add to the quality of life 
and societies' prosperity (Nelson & Zadek, 2000). 
The etymology of the word 'partner' or 'partnership' is relatively young. The word partner has 
its origin in English, emerging around the first half of the 19th century. The word derives from 
the Latin term 'partionarius', which describes individuals and/or groups that are linked 
because they have a stake in something that they are involved with (Mackensen, 1985). 
Since then, the concept of partnership has developed on three levels. The oldest notion of 
partnerships is the relationship between individuals, like marriage and friendship. Second, 
there is the legal connotation of partnership as the basis for the formation of commercial 
organisations. Partnerships between various individuals, groups or institutions of the wider 
society make up the third level, which depicts the area of stakeholder partnerships. The 
three sectors that come together are business, government and civil society. Pluralistic 
societies such as Germany have a longstanding history in engaging various entities of 
society for problem solving and the search for consensus. 
21 
Aristotle (384-322 BC) saw in human nature individuals that are living in a community in 
which everyone is interconnected. In his Politics Aristotle called it 'zoon politicon': people 
living in overlapping spheres pertaining to family, community, and state. A good government 
of the state as well as the economy is based on a realistic recognition and integration of this 
underlying political principle. Aristotle considers monarchy, aristocracy and democracy as 
good forms of governance. However, on the basis of its centralism, monarchy and 
aristocracy have not typically allowed for social partnerships until the last century. 
The philosophical ideas for social partnerships developed further in the 18th century around 
the notion of the social contract. Social contract focuses on a community or group of rational, 
self-interested individuals who are presumed to consent to the terms of a hypothetical 
agreement because it is in their rational interest to do so (Cooper & Argyris, 1998). The 
concept of a social contract or covenant goes back to Socrates and the Greek Sophists and 
even earlier. The Old Testament refers to a covenant between God and every living things 
which spans all generations (Genesis 9). Social contract is associated with political theory as 
a device for understanding the role of government within a society. The use of social contract 
in political theory reached its apex in the enlightenment writings of John Locke, Thomas 
Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999). 
In his treatise on this, Rousseau envisions a moral community in which natural freedom and 
equality is transferred to civil society, based on the consent of the governed and reflected in 
the general will of the people. More recently, Rawls (1973) uses the idea of social contract 
as the foundation for his influential book, A Theory of Justice. In 1986, Gauthier, in Morals by 
Agreement, develops a rational choice argument, namely that self-interested parties will 
want to participate in a social contract recognising certain principles of co-operation. 
Gauthier recognises the implications of his work for socio-economic life by stating that 
"market interactions are a network of contractual arrangements, and that this network is itself 
founded on an overall social contract, expressive of the two-sided instrumentality that 
constitutes society from the standpoint of economic man" (1986, p. 318). An integration of 
these principles in society would initiate the change from the pursuit of social justice to some 
sort of communitariarism (Etzioni, 1995). 
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At the end of the 18th century, England had a strong and divided class structure, France after 
its 1789 revolution, begun to integrate social responsibility into governance - the early 
beginnings of social partnerships in Europe. Germany at this time carefully observed the 
radical changes in its neighbourhood. The German monarchy was afraid of losing its power. 
Revolutions and tumults were aimed at changing the government system. Governments 
became less able to handle the impact of the industrial revolution and the deriving new 
economic conditions on society. It was at the end of the 1 9th century that the first stakeholder 
partnerships were institutionalised and the social welfare state was born. Bismarck, the (Iron) 
Chancellor of Prussia, is often seen as the father of this development. 
After the Second World War and the end of Hitler's dictatorship, Europe was politically 
divided into Eastern- and Western-Block countries. Whereas in the West the free market 
system succeeded, communism was the ultimate objective of the East. However, the 
Eastern-Block countries evolved into a totalitarian system, which provided little ground for 
social partnerships based on individualism. Western countries, predominately Germany, 
France and Sweden developed the free market system into a social market system. Within 
this context, many of the currently existing institutionalised forms of social partnerships 
emerged. Unions are strong in Europe, codetermination of employee representatives on 
company's decision-making, citizen initiatives and movements, NGOs, professional 
association, European Union, lobbyists, charities and foundations are only a few general 
examples. 1989, the year in which the Berlin Wall came down through peaceful revolution, is 
another milestone on the way towards stakeholder partnerships. 
However, not only was the political system in Europe in a process of radical change. The 
whole world changed and is still changing. Seeking to apprehend world structures is akin to 
catching reality in flight. Huntington (1997) called it The Clash of Civilization. Others discuss 
postmodernism, reflexive modernity or risk society. Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) talk 
about the production of risk that influence society rather than traditional natural risks that can 
be controlled. One needs to be able to manage possible negative impacts of risks rather 
than merely striving for the achievement of market efficiency. Stakeholder partnership 
building might be a way of navigating social risk and achieving sustainability. 
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Nowadays, stakeholder partnership participants come together specifically to achieve social 
benefits through joint actions. This is accomplished in part by enabling individual partners to 
pursue their own interests, which may include the direct or indirect commercial interest of 
participating companies, as well as the interests of other partners. Partnerships seek to 
explore new approaches to addressing social and economic problems and opportunities, 
often changing and challenging traditional rules and patterns of interaction between different 
actors, and thereby establishing new methods of working and taking the fullest advantage of 
available resources and competencies. 
Participants are drawn from two or more of the following: public bodies at the local, national, 
or international levels; private sector entities, ranging from individual companies to business 
associations; and civil society, ranging from local community initiatives to trade unions, 
academic institutions and national and international NGOs. Partnership participation is 
voluntary in the sense that it is based on the active decision by each partner to engage, 
rather than the imperative of statutory compliance. However, some partners may be 
pressured to join the stakeholder partnership for reasons of crisis management, conflict 
avoidance or peer pressure rather than an entirely self-motivated desire to participate. There 
is a resource contribution and associated risk or costs on the part of each partner and each 
partner benefits in some defined way. 
Thus, stakeholder partnerships may be seen to be, in effect, a collaboration between 
individuals and/or organisations from some combination of public, business and civil 
constituencies who engage in voluntary, mutually beneficial, innovative relationships to 
address common social aims through combining their resources and competencies. 
Establishing and sustaining mutually beneficial stakeholder partnerships is rarely simple, 
especially with non-traditional allies. Some of the operational challenges include bridging 
diversity, assessing value-added aspects, attracting and sustaining business interest and 
addressing power. Stakeholder partnerships also raise dilemmas with regard to more 
strategic issues such as learning from experience, maintaining dynamism and innovation, 
and the role of the state and traditional partners since partnerships raise questions of 
accountability and representation. Some of these operational and strategic challenges are in 
the centre of the analysis of stakeholder partnership building. 
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1.4 ANALYSING STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP BUILDING 
The classic Ford Pinto case, the Bhopal disaster in India and the more recent Brent Spar 
affair involving Shell are but three examples where stakeholders have played a leading role 
in firms' strategic development. Business in consensual societies (e. g., Japan and Germany) 
has tended to take a broad view of stakeholders - at least with regards to owners, 
employees and customers. In Scandinavia and the Netherlands business has been 
especially sensitive to environmental stewardship. In less consensual societies and more 
individualistic economies (e. g., America and 1980s Britain) the balance of stakeholders has 
tended to give primacy to owners and shareholders, with mixed results. 
In 1996, two years after Jürgen Dormann became CEO of Hoechst, he announced that the 
company's performance would now be measured through shareholder value. In 1997, John 
Brown, CEO of British Petroleum (BP), underlined in a policy statement that BP, as part of 
society, wants to contribute to its positive development. These two firms seem to be moving 
from different performance orientations and stakeholder management history to a similar 
practice of managing social risk. In the 1990s, both companies faced critical incidents 
because they were detached from the society. Hoechst, having its operations in Germany, 
faced a series of chemical accidents and changed from a chemical to a life sciences 
company. BP, with its operations in Colombia faced accusations of human rights abuses and 
environmental damages. The company changed from a technology to a society driven 
company. Hoechst and British Petroleum (BP) built stakeholder partnerships that enabled 
the companies to manage their induced social risk, become part of society, and a 
sustainable company with long-term prosperity. 
Stakeholder research focused primarily on stakeholder identification, salience and influence 
strategies to develop a stakeholder theory of the firm. Stakeholder partnerships are a 
phenomenon for which only little empirical evidence and theoretical constructs exist. This 
research seeks to amplify existing stakeholder research by presenting a longitudinal 
comparative processual analysis of stakeholder partnerships from Hoechst and BP that are 
able to provide insight into how firms build partnerships with stakeholders. In each case, two 
stakeholder partnerships are studied - one with NGOs and one with communities. The 
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companies represent stakeholder partnership building within different regional and industrial 
context of social risk management. A qualitative case study analysis - interviews, archival 
data, observations, field visits and various publications - investigates stakeholder 
partnerships on a macro-organisational level by considering the social and individual level as 
well. The research focuses on (1) the purpose - the means and ends - of stakeholder 
partnerships, (2) the covenant between the collaborating partners, (3) the power relationship 
- the base and the balance - between the partners, and (4) the evolution process of the 
stakeholder partnerships. The research question is: 
How do firms build stakeholder partnerships for the management of social risk? 
  What are the defining characteristics of a firm's social risk navigation? 
  What are the defining characteristics of stakeholder partnership building? 
  What are the similarities and differences of stakeholder partnership building? 
The descriptive, processual analysis of stakeholder partnership building is embedded in the 
context of social risk issues such as sustainable development, human rights, environmental 
damage and community development. The purpose of this study is to describe stakeholder 
partnerships emerging in different contexts; to analyse the process of stakeholder 
partnership building; and to interpret differences and similarities of stakeholder partnership 
building processes depending on the context of managing social risk in different industries 
and different parts of the world. For the interpretation of similarities and differences in 
stakeholder partnership building it is important to understand the context of firms' navigating 
social risk in terms of a set course, the connecting processes with society, and social capital 
as an out come of the risk management process. The proposed underlying rationale is that 
firms are able to manage social risk by gaining access to knowledge and building required 
competencies through stakeholder partnership building. The research seeks to demystify the 
rhetoric of stakeholder capitalism (Plender, 1998; Hutton, 1999) and figures out the 
perspective for firms to consider stakeholders as an environmental driving force for strategy. 
Research inferences are summarised in terms of the 4-Ps of stakeholder partnership 
building: (1) the purpose of partnerships; (2) the pact between partners, (3) the power 
relationships within partnerships, and (4) the processes of the evolution of partnerships. This 
descriptive research defines variables of stakeholder partnership building that can be tested 
and applied with respect to a wider population and within different context. 
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1.5 HOW TO READ THIS THESIS 
The structure of this thesis is based on guidelines proposed by Phillips and Pugh (1994). 
The four parts of the thesis - theory, data, analysis and conclusion - can be depicted as 
follows: 
PART I 
Studying Stakeholder Partnerships 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 3: Method & Methodology 
Part II 
Practice of Social Risk Management 
Chapter 4: BPX in Colombia 
Chapter 5: Hoechst in Germany 
PART IV 
PART III 
Research Synopsis and Refection 
Conceptualising Stakeholder Partnership Building 
Chapter 9: Research Synopsis 
Chapter 6: Navigating Social Risk 
Chapter 10: Research Reflection 
Chapter 7: Partnership Alchemy 
Chapter 8: Inferences for Partnership Building 
Figure 1 How to Read this Thesis 
Part one comprises three chapters dealing, in turn, with the area of analysis, the underlying 
theory, and the applied method and methodology for studying stakeholder partnerships. 
Following the introduction, chapter two reviews the literature, setting out key theoretical and 
conceptual arguments. It evaluates research in the areas of business and society, 
stakeholder theory and strategic relationships. Chapter three introduces research 
methodological issues. It identifies the philosophical and sociological orientations of the 
research and develops a conceptual perspective that guides empirical analysis. It explains 
and justifies the research approach and design, explaining the research timetable and 
stages, and then deals in turn with the practical process used in the data collection methods. 
General methodological issues, particularly those associated with interpretation, replicability 
and validation, are also discussed. 
The empirical data collected for this research project is described in part two of this thesis as 
the practice of social risk management. Chapter four focuses on BPX (British Petroleum 
Exploration) in Colombia and its management of social risk in a less developed country. 
Chapter five describes Hoechst in Germany and its management of social risk in a 
/ 
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developed country. Both chapters follow a predominantly chronological ordering of events 
and actions divided into three sections: the integration or reintegration of business into 
society, a NGO partnership and a community partnership. At the end of each section, 
defining characteristics are summarised. 
In order to conceptualise stakeholder partnership building, part three of this thesis analyses 
the inferences of the driving characteristics of stakeholder partnership building for the 
management of social risk. Chapter six discusses the control variables of stakeholder 
partnership building within the context of navigating social risk. The following chapter is the 
core of this conceptualisation. Chapter seven presents the partnership alchemy, the findings 
of the four analysed processes of stakeholder partnership building. The inferences for 
stakeholder partnership building are summarised in chapter eight. These findings are based 
on the theoretical and philosophical assumptions discussed in part one of this thesis. The 
discussion revolves around a consideration of four defining areas of partnership: purpose, 
pact, power relationships, and process of partnership evolution. 
Finally, part four presents the research synopsis in chapter nine, and a reflection on research 
is provided in chapter ten. The research synopsis summarises the main contribution of this 
research and identifies the major limitations of this study. The methodological problems 
experienced, and the theoretical concerns related to the further development of a 
stakeholder theory of the firm, as well as implications for policy and practice, are discussed 
under the heading of research reflection. Moreover, further research directions are identified. 
The appendices, included in the last section of this thesis, provide the reader with a glossary 
of applied terms, the interview schedule and framework and a list of interviewees in each 
company. 
I 
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Chapter 2 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND KEY ISSUES 
If the unity of the corporate body is real, then there is reality and not simply legal 
fiction in the proposition that the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not 
merely for its individual members, that they are [ ... ] trustees for an institution with 
multiple constituents rather than attorneys for the stockholders. 
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. (1932) 
There are three underlying theoretical areas that establish the conceptual foundations for 
studying stakeholder partnership building, and these are as follows: business and society, 
stakeholder theory and strategic relationships. The following chapter reviews the history and 
influential ideas of these conceptual foundations. These theoretical developments provide 
key issues which allow the framework applied to this stakeholder partnership research to be 
analysed. Because theoretical concepts have developed over time, building on and 
extending existing concepts rather than competing with them, the literature review presents 
the applied theories as a developing argument. 
The theoretical area of business and society refers to the field of management study that 
describes, analyses, and evaluates firms' complex societal and ecological links. In particular 
the concepts of corporate social responsibility, corporate social performance and social 
capital are elaborated. 
Stakeholder theory is a set of propositions that suggest that managers of firms have 
obligations to some groups of stakeholders. Stakeholder theory is usually juxtaposed with 
stockholder theory. Stakeholder thinking, perspectives of stakeholder theory and stakeholder 
engagement are the areas for detailed review in this chapter. 
Strategic relationships are an integral part of most organisational activities in today's 
complex, uncertain environment. Meanwhile, collaborative strategies are the basis for 
stakeholder partnership building. Thus, partnerships can be described using networking 
processes that are conceptualised within a relational view of the firm. Within this context, 
partnerships may be seen as trust-based collaborations between individuals and/or social 
institutions with different objectives that can only be achieved jointly. 
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2.1 UNFOLDING BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 
2.1.1 Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
In 1916, Clark provides one of the earliest considerations of firms' economic and social 
responsibility. Furthermore, the acceptance of social responsibility by manager is the subject 
of an article by Dodd in 1932. Influential references of the 1930s and 1940s include 
Barnard's (1938) 'The Functions of the Executive', and Kreps' (1940) 'Measurement of the 
Social Performance of Business'. 
The publication by Bowen (1953) of his landmark book 'Social Responsibilities of the 
Businessman' is argued to be the beginning of a modern period of literature about corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). Bowen argues that 'businessmen' have an obligation "to pursue 
those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable 
in terms of the objectives and values of our society" (1953, p. 6). As is suggested by 
Bowen's emphasis on the objectives and values of society, CSR rests on two fundamental 
premises: First, business exists at the pleasure of society, and second, the social 
responsibility underlying business acts as a moral agent within society. These two ideas 
(social contract and moral agency) have provided the basic premises for CSR. 
However, Levitt (1958) argues that "welfare and society are not the corporations business. 
Its business is making money, not sweet music. In a free enterprise system, welfare is 
supported to be automatic; and where it is not, it becomes government's job" (p. 47). His 
objection centres on the fact that social responsibility would put business into fields not 
related to their 'proper aim', as Hayek (1969) stated. Friedman (1970) writes further, that the 
social responsibility of business is to increase its profit. 
Further criticism of CSR focuses on its ambiguity. For example, Davis and Blomstrom's 
classical definition states that "social responsibility is the managerial obligation to take action 
to protect and improve both the welfare of society as a whole and the interest of 
organisations" (1975, p. 6). The main concepts of 'obligation', 'welfare', and 'self interest of 
obligations' in this definition are very broad, and open to a range of interpretations. 
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Moving away from economics, McGuire (1963) and other authors such as Kohlberg (1969), 
Davis (1973), Stone (1975), and Frederick (1987), include not only economic and legal 
obligations, but also certain responsibilities to society which extend beyond these 
obligations. Davis' definition of CSR demonstrates these concerns: 
The firm's consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm [ ... ] to accomplish social benefits 
along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks. (1973, p. 313) 
Manne and Wallich (1972) take this definition further, by suggesting that the behaviour of the 
firm must be voluntary. Jones' (1980) definition develops the notion that corporations have 
an obligation to constituent groups in society other than shareholders, and beyond that, 
prescribed by law or union contract. Two facets of this definition are critical: First, the 
obligation must be voluntarily adopted, and second, the obligation is a broad one, extending 
beyond the traditional duty to shareholders and to other societal groups. 
Following this, Preston and Post (1975) and Buchholz (1977) introduce the notion of 'public 
responsibility', proposing that the social impact of the firm should be guided and appraised 
within the context of external public policy. These advocates of public responsibility focus 
more on the social contract side of business and less on the question of morality. 
Steiner (1975) conceptualises CSR as a continuum of responsibilities, ranging from 
'traditional economic production' to 'government dictated', to a 'voluntary area', and 
incorporating 'expectations beyond reality'. Similarly, Carroll (1979) has brought together four 
aspects of social responsibility; namely the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
categories of business performance. 
Ackerman and Bauer (1976) and Sethi (1979) further extend the concept of CSR. Rather 
than providing a focus on social responsibility, which assumes an obligation and emphasis 
on motivation rather than performance, their concept integrates the notion of 'social 
responsiveness'. The idea suggests that the way in which firms should respond to social 
pressures is of importance, but that their long-term role in a social system is equally so. 
Tuzzolino and Armandi (1981) sought to develop a mechanism for assessing CSR by 
proposing a framework based on Maslow's (1954) needs hierarchy. In 1982, Dalton and 
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Cosier presented a model depicting a two by two matrix, with 'illegal' and 'legal' on one axis 
and 'irresponsible' and 'responsible' on the other. This conceptualisation of CSR addresses 
the major criticism of social responsibility by integrating the narrow definition of public policy 
into a broader definition of social policy. 
Strand (1983) presents a paradigm of organisational adaptation to the social environment so 
as to illustrate the way in which such related concepts as social responsibility, social 
responsiveness, and social responses connect to an organisation-environment model. In 
Strand's model, public responsibility is implicit in his category of social demands and 
expectations placed on organisations. Strand equates these demands and expectations with 
legal, economic and social pressures. 
Other writers such as Hay et al. (1976), and Zenisek (1979) place greater emphasis on the 
ethical perspective in modelling social responsibility, viewing it as the degree of 'fit' between 
society's expectations of the business community and the ethics of business. In 1987, 
Epstein provides a definition of CSR in his quest to equate social responsibility, 
responsiveness, and business ethics. 
An example of the growing interest in putting CSR into practice and relating this to financial 
performance can be seen in the research of Cochran and Wood (1984). Aupperle et al. 
(1985) meanwhile, published another empirical study seeking to understand the relations 
between CSR and profitability. 
However, when considering the context of a specific industry in a specific country, it is 
difficult to apply the general definition and concepts of CSR. It seems that the most 
appropriate definition of social responsibility is one which encompasses legal obligations. 
Authors such as Thompson et al. (1991), Warhurst (1998a) and Schwartz and Gibb (1999) 
have taken the standpoint that CSR should go beyond mere legal obligations and needs to 
be empirically explored. 
As a general statement, it should be observed that there have been very few contributions to 
the definition of CSR in the 1990s. More than anything, the CSR concept served as a point- 
of departure for other related concepts and themes, many of which embraced CSR-thinking. 
Corporate social performance is a major theme that took centre stage in the 1990s. 
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2.1.2 Modelling Corporate Social Performance 
The corporate social performance (CSP) model is regarded as an advance on the framework 
of CSR. The distinctive features of this are the enhanced development of the ideas of social 
responsibility, coupled with the integration of responsibility and responsiveness through an 
approach involving principle, process and policy. CSP models were developed to bring a 
more pragmatic orientation to the relationship between business and society. 
CSP theory is, in part, a response to neo-classical economics' somewhat narrow emphasis 
on maximising shareholder value. Scholars envision societies as complex webs of 
interconnected stakeholders, multiple cause and effect, and they see business as a social 
institution with both power and responsibility. Although CSP is often thought of as having a 
normative content, this is not a prerequisite, but rather, establishes an intellectual framework 
for grasping the structure of relationships between business and society. It is a theory of how 
corporations are held accountable to the societies in which they operate. 
The three-dimensional model introduced by Carroll (1979) was the initial concept of CSP, 
intended to clarify, as well as to integrate various strands of definition that have appeared in 
literature. The model is an attempt to integrate three aspects: a definition of social 
responsibility, an identification of social issues or topical areas to which these responsibilities 
are tied, and a consideration of the philosophy, mode, or strategy behind business response 
to social responsibility and social issues. A criticism of Carroll's model is that it fails to 
capture the process of analysis, debate, and modification that characterises scholarly inquiry 
(Wartick & Cochran, 1985). However, two main contributions to the theoretical development 
of social responsibility are taken from Carroll's model. This was the first to consider those 
multi-faceted aspects of the definition of CSR and was concerned to identify social issues in 
which business is involved. 
Wartick and Cochran (1985) further extend Carroll's model by proposing three dimensions 
which may be thought of as depicting principles of CSR, processes of corporate social 
responsiveness, and policies regarding social issue management. These extensions are 
useful in that they help to appreciate more effectively those complementary aspects 
neglected in Carroll's model. 
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Wood (1991 a/b) has elaborated and reformulated Carroll's model and Wartick and 
Cochran's extensions. She considers social responsiveness as a set of, rather than a single 
process, and to think of Wartick and Cochran's policies as entailing observable outcomes of 
corporate and managerial actions. Wood has taken this definition further by proposing that 
each of the three components - principles, processes, and outcomes - are composed of 
specific elements. 
Swanson's model refers to "a remaining problem in the field of corporate social performance" 
(1995, p. 43); its economic and duty-aligned perspectives are not integrated. Her model 
provides a research framework that can be applied to explore this integration. To that end, 
Swanson's model reorients that of Wood's by recasting decision making in terms of ethical 
and value-based processes that are able to link the individual, the organisation, and society. 
Therefore, Swanson's model discards the assumption that the CSR principles are 
hierarchical. With this reorientation in mind, she suggests a theoretical picture that provides 
an interactive approach able to link principles, processes, and outcomes. 
Gnyawali (1996) considers CSP more from an international perspective. Her model suggests 
that in today's global environment CSP is shaped by a combination of firm specific, country 
specific and global factors. While some of these appear to be more common across 
countries, others are country specific. Also, each firm's unique characteristics shape the 
response of that firm to given social issues. Thus, to understand the CSP of a firm, one 
needs to examine factors that shape CSP in the country in which the firm operates, global 
factors that shape CSP in every country, and firm-specific factors that shape the CSP. 
The aim of the intellectual field of business and society is to find and develop a constructive 
business relationship with society. This search is inherently normative, because it seeks to 
explain what corporations should or should not do on behalf of the social good (Wood, 
1991b; Buchholz et al., 1994; Frederick, 1998a/b). Such an endeavour necessarily involves 
factual accounts of corporate activity. To date, normative and descriptive approaches have 
not been satisfactorily blended into one theoretical perspective (Swanson, 1999). Many 
prominent scholars hold that until integration is forged between normative and descriptive 
approaches, a coherent theory of business and society will be kept at bay (cf. Frederick, 
1994; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Quinn & Jones, 1995; Dean, 1998; Jones & Wicks, 1999). 
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Jones (1996) criticises the fact that although CSP models are rich in detail and thorough in 
coverage in its current version, they offer no formal, empirically tested theory. Previous 
research attempts to link corporate social and financial performance. As Ullmann (1985) and 
Pava and Krausz (1995) point out, attempts to measure this relationship are always 
hampered by measurement problems. The measurement of social responsibility is fraught 
with problems of definition. Even if a definition of social responsibility could be agreed upon, 
there still remains the complex task of putting such a definition into practice. Over the years, 
studies of the correlation between CSP and financial performance have produced varying 
results. Whereas some studies conclude that a relationship does exist, those that appear to 
be most methodologically sound fail to reach such a conclusion (cf. Cochran & Wood 1984; 
Aupperle, et al., 1985; McGuire, Sundgren & Schneeweis, 1988; Barton, Hill & Sundaram, 
1989; Preston & Sapienza, 1990; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Weaver, Trevino & Cochran 1999). 
Clarkson argues that the difficulties encountered in defining CSP can be attributed, in part, to 
the broad and inclusive meaning of the word social. "The connotation of social is society, a 
level of analysis that is both more inclusive, more ambiguous, and further up the ladder of 
abstraction than a corporation itself" (1995, p. 102). Current research focuses on linking CSP 
to theories of stakeholders, ethics, and organisations; systematising the assumptions and 
theoretical implications of the CSP model; empirically testing ideas on how people perceive, 
interpret, and enact CSP; examining the validity of the CSP model in cross-cultural and 
multinational settings; and critiques of existing CSP theory. 
In the late 1990s, corporate citizenship began to replace CSP (e. g., Carroll, 1998; Andriof, 
1998; Goyder, 1998; Miller, 1998). Companies, as independent legal entities, are members 
of countries and can be thought of as corporate citizens with legal rights and duties. All 
companies, therefore, are corporate citizens but their citizenship performance varies just as 
it does for any individual citizen. As Drucker (1993) argues, citizenship is a political, rather a 
political term. Positive corporate citizenship, therefore, can be defined as understanding and 
managing a company's wider influences on society for the benefit of the company and 
society as a whole (Marsden & Andriof, 1998). Corporate citizenship is closely associated 
with the idea of reputation management, sustainable development, and managing risk 
(Fombrun, 1996; McIntosh et al., 1998; Warhurst, 1998b; Robertson, 1999). 
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Andriof and Marsden (1999) argue that firms have a ripple effect on society, like a stone 
being thrown into a pond. Firms have an economic, environmental and social impact. 
Elkington (1997) earlier referred to this phenomenon as a 'triple bottom line'. 
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2.1.3 Building Social Capital 
Initially, the term social capital appeared in community studies, highlighting the central 
importance - for the survival and functioning of city neighbourhoods - of the networks of 
strong, cross-cutting personal relationships developed over time that provide the basis for 
trust, co-operation, and collective action in such communities (Jacobs, 1965; Loury, 1977). 
Recent research describes social capital as an asset embedded in relationships - of 
individuals, communities, networks, or societies (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1997; Walker et al., 
1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Unlike other kinds of capital, social capital cannot be 
traded on the open market; rather, it can change as relationships and rewards change over 
time, disappearing when the relations cease to exist. Generally, social capital also been 
treated as a moral resource (Hirschman, 1984), the supply of which increases rather than 
decreases with use. Nevertheless, some reservations about social capital remain. Locke 
(1999) criticises the authors for believing that knowledge is primarily a social product pointing 
out, for instance, a loss of objectivity and a weak established causality between social capital 
and other forms of capital. 
Researchers differ as to the level of analysis used in describing social capital; this concept 
has been described as an attribute of nations or geographic regions (Fukuyama, 1995), 
communities and societies (Putnam, 1993,1995), individual workers (Burt, 1992a), firms in 
their interactions with other firms (Baker, 1990), and individual actors (Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Belliveau et al., 1996). Social capital thus crosses several levels of 
analysis and has been described using both a macro and a micro lens. 
Researchers also vary with regard to the normative aspect of social capital implicit in their 
theories. Social network researchers, for example, assume Granovetter's (1973,1985) 
position that individuals best develop social capital by pursuing numerous strategically 
positioned 'weak ties' with others. Burt (1992b, 1997) describes social capital in terms of 
'brokerage opportunities' within a social system, whereby individuals who are able to bridge 
gaps between otherwise disconnected others (i. e. fill 'structural holes') enhance their stores 
of social capital. Conversely, writers like Fukuyama (1995) argue implicitly for the value of 
'strong ties' among individuals within cohesive and bounded social networks or communities. 
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Coleman (1990) also notes the importance of a closed system in maintaining social capital. 
Thus, different approaches to social capital alternatively stress density, redundancy, or 
efficiency in social interactions and, in this regard, vary in terms of their implicit normative 
recommendations for building social capital. 
The central premise in social capital theory is that networks of relationships constitute a 
valuable resource for the conduct of social affairs, providing their members with the 
"collectivity-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses 
of the world" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 249). Resources are made available through contacts or 
connections that networks bring. For example, through 'weak ties' (Granovetter, 1973) and 
'friends of friends' (Boissevain, 1974), network members can gain privileged access to 
information and to opportunities. Significant social capital, in the form of social status, can be 
derived from membership of specific networks (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992b; D'Aveni & 
Kesner, 1993). 
Although these authors agree on the significance of relationships as a resource for social 
action, they lack consensus with regard to a precise definition of social capital. This research 
applies Nahapiet and Ghoshal's view that defines "social capital as the sum of the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit" (1998, p. 243). In their article, 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) present a theoretical model of how social capital may facilitate 
value creation by firms. Building on Moran and Ghoshal's (1996) formulation of value 
creation as arising from the combination and exchange of resources, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
identify three dimensions of social capital - structural, relational, and cognitive - and seek to 
justify theoretically how attributes of each of these dimensions facilitate the combination and 
exchange of resources within firms. 
Although social capital takes many forms, each of these has two characteristics in common: 
They constitute some aspects of the social structure, whilst facilitating the actions of 
individuals or social units within the structure (Coleman, 1990). In addition, for firms' 
management of social risk, social capital might be an invaluable resource. Hence, it is 
important to build the right form of social capital - access information and opportunities or 
social status. 
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2.2 DEVELOPING A STAKEHOLDER THEORY OF THE FIRM 
2.2.1 Considering Stakeholder Thinking 
Stakeholder thinking is a way to see companies and their activities through constituency 
concepts and propositions. The idea is that 'holders' who have 'stakes' interact with the firm 
and thus make its operation possible (Blair, 1998). However, the basic ideas behind this 
thinking are not new, even though the explicit formulation of the theory is in its relative 
infancy. It is possible to trace the main impulses back to Barnard (1938), March and Simon 
(1958), Cyert and March (1963), Thompson (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). 
Freeman (1984) considers that the first definition of the stakeholder concept can be found in 
an internal memorandum of the Stanford Research Institute from 1963. 
Since this time, stakeholder thinking has become a consistent dimension in organisational 
life, and is therefore difficult to discount in any organisational model. It was not until Freeman 
(1984) integrated stakeholder concepts into a coherent construct, however, that stakeholder 
thinking moved to the forefront of academic attention. A number of scholars have developed 
and enhanced Freeman's work. Carroll (1989) was one of the firsts to use the stakeholder 
approach explicitly as a framework for organising business and society topics. Brenner and 
Cochran (1991) and Hill and Jones (1992) meanwhile, offered stakeholder models as 
alternative approaches to Wood's (1991 a) CSP framework. In Kay's (1996) formulation, 
strategy describes how companies respond to suppliers, customers, competitors, and the 
wider society within which they operate. According to Kay, strategy involves values and 
expectations of those who can influence the company and its performance - the stakeholder. 
Their efforts have led other researchers to realise that stakeholder thinking could potentially 
"explain and guide the structure and operations of the established corporation" (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995, p. 70). Several authors (Brenner & Cochran, 1991; Hill & Jones, 1992; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995) have treated stakeholder thinking as the 
foundation for a theory of the firm and as a framework for the business and society field. 
Thus, stakeholder thinking has matured from servant logic supporting the advancement of 
other theories to a theory of the firm in its own right. Whether a stakeholder theory currently 
exists is a matter of debate (Harrison & Freeman, 1999). Nevertheless, efforts to create 
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testable stakeholder theory (Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Berman et al., 1999), as well 
as Brenner and Cochran's (1991) and Sachs et al. (1999) work, are evidence of a movement 
towards theory explaining how organisations function. 
Stakeholder theory development has centred around two related streams: (1) defining the 
stakeholder concept and (2) classifying stakeholders into categories that provide an 
understanding of individual stakeholder relationships. One of the primary challenges in 
stakeholder analysis has been the construction of a universally accepted definition of the 
term 'stake' (Donaldson, 1995). Starik (1994) notes that although there has been an 
abundance of articles and books using stakeholder thinking, the meaning of the term 
stakeholder has not been consistently applied. Freeman's definition of stakeholder, "any 
group or individual who can affect or who is affected by the achievement of the firm's 
objectives" (1984, p. 25), continuous to provide the boundaries of what constitutes a stake. 
Although debate continues over whether to broaden or narrow the definition, most 
researchers have utilised a variation of Freeman's concept. For example Hill and Jones 
define stakeholders as "constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm" (1992, p. 133). 
Carroll (1993) also argues those groups or individuals can be stakeholders by virtue of their 
legitimacy, but he broadens the scope of the definition to include those who have power - 
the ability to impact the organisation. Clarkson (1995) suggests an alternative approach for 
identifying and evaluating stakeholder claims which casts stakeholders more narrowly as 
risk-bearers. He argues that a stakeholder has some form of capital, either financial or 
human, at risk and, therefore, has something to lose or gain depending on firm's behaviour. 
Regardless of how Freeman's (1984) definition is modified, there is a core idea which 
underlies stakeholder thinking. Whatever the definition within the stakeholder perspective, 
organisations are required to address a set of stakeholder expectations; thus, management 
choice is a function of stakeholder influences (Brenner & Cochran, 1991). Consequently, the 
main objectives in stakeholder research have been to identify who a firm's stakeholders are 
and to determine what types of influences they exert (McGee, 1998). 
A stakeholder theory of the firm, however, requires not only an understanding of the types of 
stakeholder influences but also how firms respond to those influences. Although focusing on 
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individual stakeholder relationships is appropriate for classifying types of stakeholders, this 
analysis cannot be extended to describe a firms' behaviours, because each firm faces a 
different set of stakeholders, which aggregate into unique patterns of influence. Ambler and 
Wilson (1995) demonstrate that firms do not simply respond to each stakeholder individually; 
they respond, rather, to the interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set. 
Thus, explanations of how organisations respond to their stakeholders require an analysis of 
the complex array of multiple, interdependent relationships existing within the stakeholder 
environment. 
Extant research has concentrated on producing classification schemes for categorising 
stakeholders according to the type of influences they exert on organisations. Several 
schemes exist, including Carroll's (1989) environmental sorting and primary and secondary 
classification; Freeman's (1984) internal and external change distinction; and the 
Scandinavian contribution, which focuses on types of transactions (Näsi, 1995). Yet, no 
matter how popular stakeholder analysis has become, and how richly descriptive it is, there 
is no agreement as to what Freeman (1994) calls The Principle of Who or What Really 
Counts. In 1997, Mitchell et al. developed a theory of stakeholder identification and salience 
- incorporating normative and descriptive theory elements - focussing on three core 
variables: power, legitimacy and urgency. Berman et al. (1999) partly tested the stakeholder 
identification and salience theory. The results provide support for a strategic stakeholder 
management model, but no support for an intrinsic stakeholder commitment model. 
Building stakeholder partnerships is an attempt to describe the behaviour of organisations 
within its environment. Referring to the theoretical rationales for stakeholder theory, there is 
a dichotomy within the explanation of organisations' behaviour in its environment. Whereas 
some consider the key to organisational survival to be within the incorporation of institutional 
pressure, others consider it within organisations' ability to acquire and maintain resources. 
The conceptual competition within stakeholder theory, between legitimacy and power that 
reflect in virtually every major theory of the firm - particularly in agency, behavioural, 
institutional, population ecology, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories 
(Argenti & Campbell, 1997). Resource dependence theory suggests that power accrues to 
those who control resources needed by the organisation, thereby creating power differentials 
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among parties (Pfeffer, 1981,1997), and it confirms that the possession of resource power 
makes a stakeholder important to a firm. Legitimacy is achieved if patterns of organisational 
practice are in congruence with the wider social system (Scott, 1987; Powell & DiMaggio, 
1991). Institutional theory describes this adaptation. Strategy processes deriving from 
resource dependence are primarily proactive, whereas institutionalised processes are 
reactive (Mintzberg et al., 1998; Mintzberg & Lampel, 1999). The following chart classifies 
research themes in terms of the two underlying rationales of stakeholder thinking. 
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Figure 3 Rationales for Stakeholder Theory 
Corporate social responsibility, and the maintenance of sound organisational ethics, may not 
invariably depend wholly on the strategic behaviour induced by the anticipation of 
organisational gain. Organisations may act ethically or responsibly not only because of any 
direct link to a positive organisational outcome (e. g., greater prestige or more resources) but 
merely because it would be unthinkable to do otherwise. In this way, organisational 
behaviour may be driven not by processes of interest mobilisation (DiMaggio, 1988), but by 
preconscious acceptance of institutionalised values or practices. 
Within the resource dependence perspective, theory assumes that organisations may be 
interest-driven and that organisations exercise some degree of control or influence over the 
resource environment or the organisation's exchange partners for the purposes of achieving 
stability. Theorists argue that organisational stability is achieved through the exercise of 
power, control, or the negotiation of interdependencies for purposes of achieving a 
predictable or stable inflow of vital resources and reducing environmental uncertainty. 
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2.2.2 Distinguishing Stakeholder Theory Dimensions 
Stakeholder theory, as currently seen, is of at least four types. These subdivisious theories 
are often intertwined in the literature and are rarely stated formally. Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) distinguish the theoretical dimensions implicit in stakeholder theory. Their three-part 
typology - descriptive/empirical, instrumental, and normative - makes explicit what was 
merely implicit in early formulations of stakeholder theory. These early formulations 
simultaneously suggested that: (1) firms and/or managers actually behave in certain ways 
(descriptive/empirical); (2) certain outcomes are more likely if firms/managers behave in 
certain ways (instrumental); and (3) firms/managers should behave in certain ways 
(normative). Donaldson and Preston also point out that none of the theoretical formulations 
of stakeholder theory is formally stated or fully developed. 
Freeman (1995) notes that the last fifteen years can be characterised as a search for a full- 
blown theory of stakeholders able to replace the dominant theory in business schools, 
namely the stockholder theory. However, he believes "that there is no one stakeholder 
theory of the firm" (1995, p. 35). Recognising and valuing Donaldson and Preston's 
perspectives on stakeholder theory, Freeman (1995) suggests a fourth use of stakeholder 
thinking - metaphorical. In this context stakeholder theory is a story rather than a theoretical 
construct. Freeman considers that the "task is to take metaphors like stakeholder thinking 
and embed it in a story about how human beings create and exchange value" (1995, p. 45). 
Donaldson and Preston conclude that the most promising area for the development of theory 
in stakeholder theory is in the normative realm. Indeed, they offer a normative justification for 
stakeholder theory based on property rights. Other normative justifications include social 
contract approaches, Katian capitalism, agent morality, and the normative arguments for 
CSR. Each of these normative positions is legitimate because each is falsifiable, presumably 
through logic, counter argument, and/or appeal to higher normative principle. 
Instrumental stakeholder theory is also possible. Firms run by their top managers and 
embedded in markets which provide some discipline for inefficiency have relationships - 
called contracts - with many stakeholders (Jones, 1994). Among the many mechanisms 
available for reducing contracting costs is the voluntary adoption of behavioural standards, 
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which reduce or eliminate opportunism - that is, certain ethical norms. While systematic 
benefits are easy to identify, individual benefits are less so. Frank (1988) has argued that 
honest, trustworthy, and co-operative people help solve the problem of opportunism and, 
hence, are desirable partners in contracting relationships. The key to competitive advantage 
for firms is, therefore, mutually trusting and co-operative contracts with their stakeholders. 
Empirical propositions can then be derived from this general statement of the theory. It could 
be shown, for example, that firms that contract with their stakeholders on the basis of these 
behavioural traits do not, in fact, realise competitive advantage (Atkinson et al., 1997). 
In the realm of descriptive/empirical stakeholder theory, several possibilities exist. One such 
statement could be phrased thus: 'Managers behave as if several stakeholder groups, not 
just shareholder, affect firm performance'. Again, this is an empirically falsifiable claim; that 
is, evidence could be accumulated to show that managers do not, in fact, behave as if 
stakeholders mattered in terms of the success of the firm. A semantically similar, but 
substantively distinct, descriptive statement could read: 'Managers behave as if stakeholder 
mattered because of the intrinsic justice of stakeholders' claims on the firm'. 
Empirically, Clarkson (1995) has accumulated evidence that does not contradict either of 
these claims. Berman et al. (1999) provide support for a strategic stakeholder management 
model, but place little emphasis on an intrinsic stakeholder commitment model. Brenner and 
Cochran (1991) make a theoretically more aggressive but empirically less traceable claim: 
The stakeholder theory of the firm posits that the nature of organization's 
stakeholders, their values, their relative influence on decisions and the nature of 
the situation are all relevant information for predicting organizational behavior. 
(p. 57) 
Although Brenner and Cochran argue that "values which are highly weighted should be 
favoured in actual choice situations" (1991, p. 44), they stop short of substantive prediction 
or description of the mechanism(s) through which the predicted behaviour might occur. 
Despite these efforts, no descriptive theory of the firm has emerged which might imitate, or 
perhaps replace, the theories of neo-classical and managerial economics. 
A descriptive 
theory of the firm may not be forthcoming unless some member of the community of 
business and society scholars is willing to make some heroic assumption(s) about human 
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behaviour (cf. Freeman & Liedtka, 1997; Hutton, 1997; Gioia, 1999). The success of 
economic theory is premised on the behavioural assumptions of rational self-interest, which 
Etzioni (1988) and others have thoroughly demolished. Unfortunately, even though these 
same scholars have also documented a wide variety of human behaviour - some self- 
interested, some altruistic, some rational, some irrational - their models still leave enormous 
amounts variation unexplained. 
Rationale Unit of Analysis Level of Analysis Underlying Theory Advocates 
8 
L Stakeholder is a'Story' Macro Organisational or 
in a Broader Narative Participants of Organisational Processes Market Perspective as a 
Strategic Management Mitroff, 1983; Freeman, 1995; 
C 
Corporate Live System Business Policy Litz, 1996 
0 
M 
n Q Modern Property Rights 
System-Centred 
Utilitariaism 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
y Corporate Social 
Principles Libertarianism Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999 
Responsibilit via 
Social Contract Theory 
Z 
E 
y 
Fiduciary Principle and Agent Morality 
Organisation-Centred 
Principal Agency Theory Wood & Jones, 1995; Yuthas & 
ö Principle of Corporate 
Principles Dillard, 1999 
z Legitimacy Social Contracts (welfare and justice) 
System-Centred 
Social Contract Theory Rawls, 1973; Rousseau, 1993; Principles Child & Marcoux, 1999 
Kantian Capitalism 
System-Centred Ethical Theory (categorical Freeman & Ewan, 1990; Wright 
Principles imperative) & Ferris, 1997 
Social Network Theory 
Effect of Stakeholder Efficient Frank, 1988; Preston et al., 
E Consideration on Relationships/Transactions/Relational Competitive Behaviour Positive Agency Theory 1991; Hill & Jones, 1992; Jones, 
2 Firm's Bottom Line Contracts 1994,1995 
CL U) Transaction Cost Theory 
Organisational and 
Extrinsic Performance Orientation and Managerial Behaviour 
Managerial Economics and 
Organisational 
Clarkson, 1995; Etzioni, 1988; 
- 
Managerial Behaviour Intrinsic Justice/Value Orientation Phs olo /Socilo 
Agle et al., 1999 
Q y for Stakeholder Nature of Stakeholders and their Values Organisation 
Brenner & Cochran, 1991; 
U, 
0 Consideration and their Influence on Decisions and Organisational Behaviour Theory/Decision Theory 
Logsdon & Yuthas, 1997; 
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Table 2 Stakeholder Theory Dimensions 
In 1999, Jones and Wicks developed a 'convergent stakeholder theory'. A convergent 
stakeholder theory incorporates elements of the social science approach and the normative 
ethics approach (Jones & Wicks, 1999). This theoretical view of organisations helps to 
explain why managers can develop morally sound approaches to business and then ensure 
that they work (Donaldson, 1999, Marens & Wicks, 1999). However, Trevino and Weaver 
(1999) question Jones and Wicks' (1999) assertion that their convergent approach can be 
used to integrate divergences in stakeholder theory. They argue that Jones and Wicks have 
failed to prove the existence of any plausible empirical stakeholder theory that can be 
integrated with normative theory. Furthermore, Jones and Wicks' attempt to create a 
convergent theory has done little to advance stakeholder research beyond its current 
limitations (Beaver, 1999). Freeman (1999) views the new approach to stakeholder theory as 
divergent, rather than convergent, claiming that ethics and instrumental theory cannot be 
linked. More empirical research is needed to establish a stakeholder theory of the firm. 
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2.2.3 Engaging with Stakeholders 
Stakeholder groups can be assessed against strategic aims according to three sets of 
criteria - influence, impact and alignment. Each of these is measurable, to a greater or 
lesser degree. Clearly, the higher the potential for business fortunes and the higher the 
business impact on stakeholder groups, the more important it is to maintain a constructive 
dialogue. The easier the dialogue becomes, the greater the alignment of values between the 
company and the stakeholder group (Scholes & Clutterbuck, 1998). However, managing 
stakeholder audiences as if they were discrete and unconnected is no longer a viable 
strategy. Companies need to develop systems and approaches that enable them to prioritise 
stakeholders, align closely to them, integrate the messages to and from them and build 
bridges between them rather than buffer impacts. 
Stakeholder research has concentrated primarily on classifying individual stakeholder 
relationships and influential strategies. The first such analysis was probably Vogel's (1978) 
work, focusing as it did on such strategies as proxy resolutions and boycotts. In recent years, 
stockholder resolutions (Davis & Thompson, 1994), boycotts (Paul & Lydenberg, 1992), and 
modified vendettas (Shipp, 1987; Corlett, 1989) have all been subject to theoretical 
treatment. Researchers have performed empirical studies on many of these same 
stakeholder influence strategies. In these empirical studies scholars have generally 
considered the effectiveness of the strategies, or the market's reaction to such strategies, 
and have included examinations of boycotts (Garrett, 1987; Pruitt et al., 1988), divestitures 
(Davidson et al., 1995), and letter-writing campaigns (Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997). 
Frooman (1999) goes beyond particular influence strategies. His stakeholder influence 
theory suggests the existence of four types of stakeholder influence, and four types of 
resource relationships. It argues, further, that the balance of power implicit in the relationship 
determines which of the types of strategy a stakeholder will use. However, this approach 
cannot explain how a firm reacts to its stakeholders. 
Each firm faces a different set of stakeholders which aggregate into unique patterns of 
influence. Thus, firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually, but rather, must 
answer the simultaneous demands of multiple stakeholders. 
Rowley (1997) contributes to 
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stakeholder research by providing a mechanism for describing this simultaneous influence 
on multiple stakeholders and for predicting firms' responses. He placed four responses of 
firms within a two by two matrix - density of the stakeholder network by centrality of the focal 
organisation. The bedrock of this work is Oliver's (1991) effort to converge institutional and 
resource dependence theory. 
However, recent developments have weakened conventional boundaries between internal 
and external stakeholders as they relate to management principles and systems. As a 
consequence, stakeholders require more, and different, management attention than they 
traditionally received. These ideas lay a foundation for understanding why more and more 
organisations are embracing a stakeholder management approach. 
The instrumental perspective is that stakeholder management activities can lead to other 
outcomes, which in turn can then lead to higher profitability or increased firm value. 
Examples of instrumental outcomes include improved predictability of changes in the 
external environment resulting from better communication with external stakeholders (which 
may also lead to greater control), higher percentages of successful innovations resulting 
from the involvement of stakeholders in product/service design teams, and fewer incidents of 
damaging moves by stakeholders (e. g., strikes, boycotts, bad press) due to improved 
relationships and greater trust (Svendsen, 1998; Moss Kanter, 1999). 
Stakeholders provide a lens for viewing and interpreting important trends in the operating 
environment. Therefore, "proactive stakeholder engagement is simply the right thing to do" 
(Harrison & St. John, 1996, p. 49). One of the key factors that determine the priority of a 
particular stakeholder is its influence on the uncertainty facing the firm. For example, political 
power influences environmental uncertainty. In addition, it is important to understand the role 
of strategic choice in determining the nature of the interdependency that exists between a 
stakeholder and a firm. Strategic decisions at all levels influence the importance of various 
stakeholders. 
f 
When environments are more complex and uncertain, webs of interdependencies are 
created among stakeholders. In these environments, bridging (also called boundary 
spanning) techniques are needed that build on interdependencies rather than buffering them 
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(Harrison & St. John, 1996). As Pfeffer and Salancik argue, "The typical solution to problems 
of interdependence and uncertainty involves increasing the mutual control over each other's 
activities" (1978, p. 43). Joint ventures with competitors, co-operative product development 
efforts involving suppliers and customers and industry-level lobbying efforts are examples of 
partnering techniques that bring the firm into closer alliance with its critical stakeholders. 
Research suggests that strategic alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties 
that arise from unpredictable demand and the pressures that come from high levels of 
interdependencies among organisations (Burgers et al., 1993). 
Contribution of the 
Stakeholder to the 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Facing the Firm 
Ability of the Stakeholder to 
Reduce Environmental 
Uncertainty for the Firm 
Firm Strategic Choice 
HIGH 
Increased Use of Strategic 
Partnering Tactics 
Strategic Importance 
of Stakeholder 
(PRIORITY) 
LOW 
Primary Dependency on 
Traditional Stakeholder 
Management Techniques 
Figure 4 Strategic Importance of Stakeholders (Harrison & St. John, 1996) 
Harrison and St. John (1996) postulate that firms should consider proactive partnering 
techniques, not only to increase control in the face of environmental uncertainty, but to 
create organisational flexibility. Partnering activities allow firms to build bridges with their 
stakeholders in the pursuit of common goals, whereas traditional stakeholder management 
techniques (buffering) simply facilitate the satisfaction of stakeholder needs and/or demands. 
The potential benefits of bridges between partners may be illustrated using relationships with 
customers as an example. Firms with a traditional buffering posture towards customers focus 
on arms-length information-gathering about new products needs and expected demand and 
compliance with current quality and service expectations, all in an effort to buffer the firm 
from uncertainty and customer complaints. With bridging techniques, a firm might choose to 
create stronger linkages with customers by involving them directly in the firm's product 
development programmes, continuous improvement programmes, and production planning 
and scheduling. Bridging builds on interdependency rather than buffering it. However, 
empirical research is needed to describe the process of building stakeholder partnerships. 
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2.3 REVIEWING STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS 
2.3.1 Appreciating Collective Strategies 
For much of its history, business policy has characterised the organisational environments 
as an exogenous entity, or a set of external constraints delimiting what is possible in terms of 
strategic action. Managers must navigate within and around these constraints as lone 
pioneers negotiate an intractable terrain. Thus, strategic management is seen as an 
entrepreneurial adventure in which firms must circumvent 'threats' and exploit 'opportunities' 
(Andrews, 1971). Organisations are basically viewed, as solitary units confronted by faceless 
environments. This may be characterised by business policy's pioneering ethos. 
More recently, organisational environments have been viewed as neither faceless nor 
intractable, but as constituted by specific interest groups or stakeholders with whom 
organisations may strike favourable bargains and thereby shape the basic nature of their 
operating domains (Ansoff, 1965; Freeman, 1984; Ocasio, 1997). Astute manipulations of 
stakeholder resource dependency can afford organisations a degree of autonomy to 
exercise strategic choice in the forging of a 'negotiated environment' (Cyert & March, 1963). 
Despite this mutual interdependence with others, however, organisations are still viewed as 
pitched against their environments in the sense that they act on their own behalf, pursuing 
localised interests rather than furthering the joint goal of the organisational collectives in 
which they are immersed. In business policy, analysis typically proceeds only from the point 
of view of the focal organisation. Strategic choice is predicted on the independent actions 
and self-interested motivations of the focal units concerned. This may be characterised as 
business policy's 'egocentric organisation' (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). 
Some of this narrowness of focus on single units has been overcome with the importation of 
ideas from the field of industrial organisation and its emphasis on aggregates of 
organisations in whole industries. Again, this development has simply reinforced the notion 
that fundamentally alien environments confront organisations. The managerial task is viewed 
as one of devising a 'competitive strategy' for bettering rivals (Porter, 1980). Business 
policy's debt to military science (Evered, 1983) becomes evident here: policy making 
approximates to a cut-throat game of 'warfare' (Porter, 1980) in which an astute choice of 
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'competitive weapons' (Uyterhoeven et al., 1973), 'strategic moves' (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978), and 'counterpunch plans' (MacMillan, 1982) sorts out the 'winners' from the 'losers' 
(Allen & Hammond, 1975). In other words, inter-organisational relationships are seen as 
ultimately competitive and antagonistic. This may be characterised as business policy's 
'battlefield analogy' (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). 
Each of these characterisations is grounded in a particular conception of the nature of 
organisation-environment relationships. The pioneering ethos implies that the critical variable 
in organisation-environment relations is 'constraint', in that organisations are forced to adapt 
to sets of exogenous and rather intractable contingencies (Astley, 1984). The egocentric 
orientation implies that the critical variable in organisation-environment relations is 'choice', 
in that strategic, self-serving action assumes a degree of autonomy on the part of 
organisations to select beneficial courses of action and to manoeuvre independently on their 
own behalf. The battlefield analogy implies that the critical variable in organisation- 
environment relations is 'competition'. Thus, organisations must constantly strive to do better 
than their rivals in order to survive. Constraint, choice, and competition have been seen, 
respectively, as the central foci in the history of the field of strategic management. 
Astley (1984) proposes, however, that the field has neglected one particular variable in 
organisation-environment relations. This is 'collaboration' or joint action by organisations on 
matters of strategic importance. Astley argues that collaboration should join constraint, 
choice, and competition as being of central interest to strategic management theorists. It is to 
this end that scholars call for an appreciation of the role of collaboration as an integral part of 
what is termed 'collective strategy' (Bresser, 1988). 
Business policy should have behind its pioneering ethos a sentiment. This view is grounded 
in the conception of the environment as an exogenous constraint. It must recognise that 
organisational environments are primarily socially constructed environments that emerge 
from the milieu of interactions taking place among the collectivities of organisations 
pervading modern society. In this view, threats and opportunities are not so much found as 
created. Resources are not simply fortuitously discovered and exploited, but produced. 
The 
source of this creativity and production lies in collective organisational actions. 
Strategic 
networks increasingly influence contemporary environments. 
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2.3.2 Towards Strategic Networking 
The broad, context-sensitive concept of strategic management emerging in modern strategy 
research are based on recognition that firms must be regarded as open systems, dependent 
on their environment for survival and goal achievement. In most businesses, the 
environment has changed from low competition and low complexity towards more turbulent, 
complex and demanding operating conditions (Drucker, 1980; Ansoff, 1984; Peters, 1987). 
Increased interdependency makes it necessary to focus on a firm's strategic relations to a 
larger set of actors - stakeholders - in the task environment, and to increase awareness of 
relevant contextual aspects behind the market scene. Accordingly, the stakeholder 
perspective on strategy research highlights a major challenge to strategic management 
stemming from changed market conditions. This challenge incorporates ecological concerns, 
global aspects, CSR, and long-term commitment and co-operations among various market 
participants. 
However, an area of complication within strategic network theory development is the lack of 
empirical grounding of new, more complex models. Several authors claim that strategy 
research is facing a serious identity crisis (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Zan, 1990). The field is 
seen to lack critical assessment of the theoretical issues of the discipline. Nevertheless, 
strategic network theory can contribute to new principles of management by (1) including 
whole systems of organisations, the macro environment as well as the micro level of the 
individual network actors, (2) regarding personal relations between managers as an 
important element in the contractual grounding of an exchange, (3) discussing the role of 
long-term commitment, reciprocity and trust to reduce uncertainty about the future 
consequences of relational investments, and (4) including not only economic and technical 
information related to price, product and market, but also information flows about social 
behaviour, values, symbols and culture-specific authority criteria (Powell, 1990). 
Networks are claimed to be complementary to competitive relations and short-term contracts 
in the market (Dussauge & Garrette, 1999). The benefits of networks are increased flexibility 
from the partners, a more open stream of confidential information between exchange 
partners, and reduced conflict as shown in the following table (Borch & Arthur, 1995). 
51 
Neo-classical Principles Strategic Network 
of Strategic Management Management Principles 
Flexibility Low, Limited to Formal 
Contract 
High, Based on Openness to 
the Consequences of Trust 
Conflict-reducing 
Mechanisms 
Range of Relation 
Connection to 
Personal and Social 
Life-worlds 
Power-oriented. Based on 
Formal Agreement and Law 
Limited in Time and Space 
Through Formal Contracts 
None. Instrumental and 
System-oriented 
Norm-oriented, Based on 
Communicative Action and 
Agreement 
Long Range Because of 
Transaction-specific 
Investments 
Several. Co-ordination 
Through involvement of 
Personal Affiliation and Social 
Norms 
Table 3 Neo-classical Principles of Strategic Management vs. Strategic Network Management Principles 
The activities of the firm in a strategic network are cumulative processes including both 
increased dependency through exchange and the development of social bonds. The 
partners in a network gradually build dependency on resources controlled by others in the 
network and position themselves to make future use of these resources (Johanson & 
Mattsson, 1987). 
The partners within a strategic network must rely on each other to share unforeseen benefits 
and costs of the exchange. Such mutual trust can be achieved through the extension of 
exchange relations to incorporate deeper personal commitments among the participants. 
Shared values, norms, inter-personal affiliation and respect, that have been found important 
to help the single firm cope with increased complexity and uncertainty, need now to be 
extended to stakeholder contractual relations. Because of complexity and turbulence, the 
formalised legal contract is not sufficient to co-ordinate and control such transactions 
(Granovetter, 1985). However, a relation-based co-ordination can reduce uncertainty, and 
thereby transaction costs (Williamson, 1991). 
In sum, a stakeholder perspective emphasising strategic network principles suggests a 
broad analytical frame as well as new tools for solving strategic challenges. Included are a 
knowledge of trust-building, and of creating an atmosphere to stimulate learning and 
adaptation processes (Johanson & Mattsson, 1987). Strategic networks may serve as a 
complementary solution to co-ordination through formal-legal contracts based on 
law, or 
through hierarchy and internal bureaucracy. 
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2.3.3 Deliberating a Relational View of the Firm 
Scholars in the strategy field are concerned fundamentally with explaining differential firm 
performance (Rumelt et al., 1991). As strategy scholars have searched for sources of 
competitive advantage, two prominent views have emerged regarding the sources of 
supernormal returns. The first - market-based view (MBV) - associated with Porter (1980), 
suggests that supernormal returns are primarily a function of a firm's membership in an 
industry with favourable structural characteristics. Consequently, many researchers have 
focused on the industry as the relevant unit of analysis. The second view - the resource- 
based view (RBV) of the firm - argues that differential firm performance is fundamentally due 
to heterogeneity, rather than industry structure (Rumelt, 1984,1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991). Firms that are able to accumulate resources and capabilities that are rare, 
valuable, non-substitutable, and difficult to imitate will achieve a competitive advantage over 
competing firms (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). Thus, extant RBV theory views the 
firm as the primary unit of analysis. As a further development of the RBV, the dynamic 
capabilities approach (Teece et al., 1997) also views the firm as the unit of analysis. 
Although these two perspectives have contributed greatly to the understanding of how firms 
achieve above-normal returns, they overlook the important fact that the (dis)advantages of 
an individual firm are often linked to the (dis)advantages of the network of relationships in 
which the firm is embedded (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Porter, 1998). Proponents of the RBV have 
emphasised that a competitive advantage results from those resources and capabilities that 
are owned and controlled by a single firm. Competing firms purchased standardised (non- 
unique) inputs that cannot be sources of advantage, because these inputs (factors) are 
either readily available to all competing firms or the cost of acquiring them is approximately 
equal to the economic value they create (Barney, 1986). However, a firm's critical resources 
may extend beyond firm boundaries. 
Recent studies suggest that productivity gains in the value chain are possible when trading 
partners are willing to make relation-specific investments and combine resources in unique 
ways (Dyer, 1996). This indicates that firms who combine resources in unique ways realise 
an advantage over competing firms who are unable or unwilling to do so. Thus, idiosyncratic 
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inter-organisational linkages may be a source of relational rents and competitive advantage 
(Moss Kanter, 1994). 
Dyer and Singh's (1998) relational view of the firm suggests that a firm's critical resources 
may span firm boundaries and be embedded in inter-organisational routines and processes. 
The central thesis of the relational view is that a pair or network of organisations can develop 
relationships that result in sustainable competitive advantage. Inter-organisational 
relationships are the unit of analysis. The relational view extends the existing literature on 
alliances and networks in a number of ways. First, it attempted to integrate what is known 
regarding the benefits of collaboration by examining the inter-organisational rent-generating 
process. Dyer and Singh (1998) have argued that collaborating organisations can generate 
relational rents through relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary 
resource endowments, and effective governance. Second, the relational view has identified 
the isolating mechanism that preserves the relational rents generated through effective inter- 
organisational collaboration. The relational view introduces mechanisms not discussed 
previously in the literature on sustainability of rents: inter-organisational asset 
connectedness, partner scarcity, co-evolution of capabilities, and institutional environment. 
2.4 A FRAMEWORK TO ANALYSE STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP BUILDING 
The three reviewed theory areas - business and society, stakeholder theory and strategic 
relations - comprise the conceptual foundations and key issues that are used to construct a 
framework with which stakeholder partnership building is analysed. From each theoretical 
area, a key message can be gained that reflects the theoretical development and its likely 
future direction. Unfolding business and society makes clear that organisations have moved 
from a reactive compliance orientated management of social issues to a more proactive 
engagement in CSR-related challenges. Research and the focus within stakeholder theory 
development moved away from considering stakeholders as environmental constraints 
towards engaging them as political partners that are seen as a valuable resource for firm's 
long-term survival. The review of strategic relationship literature clearly indicates a transition 
from a buffered dependency on stakeholders towards a bridging dynamic interdependency 
between a firm and its surroundings' as well as influential stakeholders. 
54 
For this research partnerships are defined as trust-based collaborations between individuals 
and/or social institutions with different objectives that only can be achieved together. The 
basis for successful partnerships is an agreement about rules for co-operation. A higher 
consensus means less regulated partnering because of a minimised conflict potential. 
There are two areas for which the three theory fields and the derived key messages provide 
key issues. Navigating social risk refers to a firm's process of social risk management and 
establishes the context in which a firm builds stakeholder partnerships. It is important to 
analyse the key characteristics of the context in order to explain similarities and differences 
within firm's stakeholder partnership building processes. Key issues of these processes 
establish the core for analysing stakeholder partnership building and finally the variables to 
describe and differentiate the processes of stakeholder partnership building. 
For the contexts of navigating firm's social risk are social capital, connecting processes with 
stakeholders, and the set course for social risk management, key issues. Key issues for the 
analysis of stakeholder partnership building are the purpose, power relationships, and 
agreement between the partners, and the evolution of the partnership. 
The following table summarises key messages and key issues that establish the framework 
to analyse stakeholder partnership building: 
Conceptual Key Messages Key Issues for Key Issues of 
Foundations Derived from Theory Navigating Firm's Stakeholder Development Social Risk Partnership Building 
Business & From Reactive 
Society Compliance to Proactive Engagement 
Stakeholder From Environmental 
Theory Constraints to Political Partners 
Social Capital 
Connecting 
Processes 
Purpose 0 
4- 
0 
Power w 
W- Relationships 
Y) CO 
Strategic From Dependence to ö 
Relationships Dynamic 
Set Course Agreement 
Interdependence 
Table 4A Framework to Analyse Stakeholder Partnership Building 
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Chapter 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Scientists and philosophers use a logic - they have a cognitive style which is more 
or less logical - and some of them also formulate it explicit. I call the former the 
logic-in-use, and the latter the reconstructed logic (... ] There are many logics-in- 
use and there are many reconstructed logics. 
Abraham Kaplan (1964) 
In any research procedure, a distinction must be drawn between two related concepts: 
methodology and method. Methodology is the analysis how research should, or does 
proceed. It includes discussions of how theories are generated and tested - what kind of 
logic is used, what criteria they have to satisfy, what theories look like and how particular 
theoretical perspectives can be related to particular research problems. Ontological 
assumptions, epistemology, human nature, and a methodological strategy are elaborated 
because they constitute the research's underlying methodology - in other words, 
methodology is a reflection on the research itself. 
Methods of research are the actual techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse 
data related to a given research question or hypothesis. To describe the method selected for 
this research, four issues require considerations: the theoretical direction adopted, the nature 
of this process, the reason for the application of a qualitative inquiry, and the study research 
strategy that establishes the elements for the specific research design. 
Research design may be defined as the logic that links the data to be collected and the 
conclusion to be drawn to the initial questions of a study. Together, the characteristics and 
the process of case selection, data collection, data analysis as well as validation issues trace 
the design of this research project, involving stakeholder partnership building. 
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3.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 Applying Critical Realism 
A paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs or metaphysical assumptions that deal 
with ultimates or first principles (Kuhn, 1970). A paradigm represents a worldview that 
defines, for its holder, the nature of the world, the individual's place within it, and the range of 
possible relationships to that world and its parts, as, in the case with, cosmologies and 
theologies. Part of this belief system is ontology, which refers to the assumptions made 
about the primitive elements or components of reality that constitute the basic phenomenon 
to be studied (Mitroff & Mason, 1982). Ontology refers to the claims or assumptions that a 
particular approach to social inquiry makes about the nature of social reality - claims about 
what exists, what reality looks like, what units make it up and how these interact with each 
other (Blaikie, 1995). 
Four paradigms currently compete for acceptance as the paradigm for informing and guiding 
qualitative inquiry: these are positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and related ideological 
positions, and constructivism (Mitroff, 1985; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Critical realism is the 
ontology of post-positivism and the perspective taken in this research. Its nature 
distinguishes ontology, and provides reasons for its application in terms of the debate about 
underlying assumptions like the disjunction of nomothetic and ideographic. 
Critical realism assumes that reality exists but can only be imperfectly apprehended because 
of basically flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature 
of phenomena. This ontology is labelled as critical realism (Cook & Campbell, 1979; 
Bhaskar, 1986; Collier, 1994) because of the posture of its proponents who claim that reality 
must be subjected to the widest possible critical examination, so as to facilitate 
apprehending reality as closely as possible, although never perfectly. Knowledge consists of 
non-falsified hypotheses that can be regarded as probable facts or laws (Tsang & Kwan, 
1999). 
Social reality is viewed as a socially constructed world in which either social episodes are the 
products of the cognitive resources social actors bring to them or social arrangements 
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remain the products of material, yet unobserved constructs of relations (Berger & Luckmann, 
1996; Searl, 1995). The aim of critical realism is to explain or describe observable 
phenomena with reference to underlying structures or mechanisms (Blaikie, 1995). 
Bhaskar (1986) suggests that experiences, events and mechanisms constitute three 
overlapping domains of reality: empirical, actual and real. The empirical domain consists of 
events which can be observed; the actual domain consists of events whether or not they are 
observed; meanwhile, the real domain consists of the structures and mechanisms which 
produce these events. This research analyses the underlying structures of stakeholder 
partnership building, rather than explaining its underlying mechanisms. However, social 
structures can neither be identified independently from their effects nor be seen as existing 
independently of them. 
3.1.2 Contextualism as Modified Dualism 
Associated with ontological issues, is a second set of assumptions about the grounds of 
knowledge (Burell & Morgan, 1979). An epistemology represents a view and a justification 
for what can be regarded as knowledge - what can be known, and what criteria must be 
satisfied in order to call it knowledge rather than belief (Blaikie, 1986). 
These assumptions entail ideas, for example, about what forms of knowledge can be 
obtained, and how one can distinguish between 'true' and 'false'. Indeed, this dichotomy itself 
presupposes a certain epistemological stance. It is predictated upon a view of the nature of 
knowledge itself: whether, for example, it is possible to identify and communicate the nature 
of it as being objective or whether it is subjective. The epistemological assumptions 
underlying these instances are extreme positions regarding whether knowledge is something 
that can be acquired (objectivist), or is something which has to be personally experienced 
(subjectivist) (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). 
For this research a modified dualist/objectivist perspective is applied (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Dualism of objectivity and subjectivity is largely abandoned, as it is untenable, but while 
objectivity remains a 'regulatory ideal'; special emphasis is placed on external 'guardians' of 
objectivity such as critical traditions (Do the findings fit with pre-existing knowledge? ) and the 
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critical community (editors, referees, and professional peers). Replicated findings are 
probably true but always subject to falsification (Lee, 1991). 
Despite the requirements for objectivity, however, research can also be characterised by the 
language of muddling through, incrementalism, and political processes rather than as a 
rational, goal-directed activity. For this reason Pettigrew (1985) develops a contextualist 
approach that puts into practice a modified dualist perspective. 
Contextualism is concerned with the event in its setting; the truth theory has to be 
qualitative confirmation, since the context will change and knowledge will also need 
to change, and the root metaphor is the historical event. (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 230) 
From a contextualist perspective, human behaviour needs to be understood with reference 
to the duality of structure and the socially constructed meaning over time. Structuration 
theory helps to understand human nature, and is therefore a metatheory for stakeholder 
partnership building. 
3.1.3 Structuration Theory as Metatheory 
Associated with ontological and epistemological issues is another set of assumptions 
concerning human nature and, in particular, the relationship between human beings and 
their environment (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This type of assumption is important since 
human life is essentially the subject and object of inquiry. Thus, one can identify 
perspectives in social science which entail a view of human beings as responding in a 
deterministic fashion to the situation encountered in their external world. The view tends to 
be one in which human beings and their experiences are regarded as products of the 
environment. This extreme perspective can be contrasted with one that ascribes to human 
beings a much more creative role: with a perspective where social actors are regarded as 
the creators of the environment. Given these two extreme views of the relationship between 
human beings and their environment, there has been a long-standing philosophical and 
sociological debate between advocates of determinism and voluntarism (Layder, 1997). 
Whilst there are social theories which adhere to each of these extremes, the assumptions of 
many social scientists are situated somewhere in between. Sztompka's (1991) theory of 
social becoming and Giddens' (1984) structuration theory are cases in point. 
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Structuration theory is a concept used to identify a contemporary approach to social theory 
and methodology. However, "structuration theory is not intended to be a theory 'of' anything, 
in the sense of advancing generalization about social reality" (Giddens, 1991, p. 204). It is, 
rather, an attempt to reconstruct some of the basic premises of social analysis, particularly a 
methodological framework for the study of human social activities, and may therefore be 
seen as a metatheory. The theory establishes a bridge between the concerns of some 
traditions of social theory, or between the experiences of social actors and the existence of 
forms of social totalities, between 'agency' and 'structure'. Building this bridge requires a 
theory of the human agent, an account of the conditions and consequences of social action, 
and an interpretation of 'structure' as dealing with both conditions and consequences 
(Giddens, 1979). The bridging theory dispenses with the notion of 'function' and is based on 
the view that dualities such as 'subject' and 'object', or 'action' and 'structure', need to be re- 
conceptualised under the concept of 'duality of structure', the core concept of Giddens' 
structuration theory. 
"By the duality of structure I mean that social structures are both constituted by human 
agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution" (Giddens, 1976, 
p. 121). Social structures are both the conditions and the consequences of social interaction. 
They are the rules and resources drawn upon by social actors as they engage with each 
other in interaction, and cannot be seen as patterns of social relationships. Structures are 
not external to the social actor. They exist in memory traces and are embodied in social 
practice. This view is very different from that adopted by the structuralist traditions of social 
science. 
Many critics have argued that the central concepts in Giddens' scheme - structure, 
structuration and duality of structure - are ambivalent and inadequately developed. They are 
seen as abstract, and lacking in empirical examples (cf. Layder, 1997). In a sympathetic 
review of the relevance of structuration theory to policy research, Bryant (1991) has 
suggested that Giddens contribution lies not so much in empirical research as in his 
conceptualising of a dialogical model of social science, flowing from elements of structuration 
theory. 
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3.1.4 Retroduction as Methodological Strategy 
Ontology, epistemology and assumptions about human nature have a direct bearing on the 
nature of methodological strategy (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Different ontologies, 
epistemologies and models of human nature are likely to lead social scientist to adopt 
different methodological strategies. It is possible to differentiate between those strategies 
employed in social science research that treat the social world as a natural world as being 
hard, real and external to the individual, and others which view it as being of a much softer, 
personal and more subjective quality. The former perspective expresses itself most forcefully 
in a search for universal laws -a nomothetic approach. The latter perspective - an 
ideographic approach - questions whether there is any external reality as such worthy of 
study. 
The underlying question of methodological strategy is how an inquirer can go about finding 
out whatever he or she believes can be known (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). An inductive 
argument begins with a singular or particular statement, and concludes with a general or 
universal statement. The deductive strategy is sometimes referred to as the 'hypothetico- 
deductive' or the 'falsificationist' approach, or the method of conjecture and refutation 
(Blaikie, 1995). Induction and deduction are both criticised for their linear logic (Gutting, 
1980). Pettigrew (1997) suggests joining induction and deduction into an iterative strategy. 
Blake (1995) refers to two further strategies - abduction and retroduction. 
Retroduction and abduction are based on cyclical or spiral processes. Abduction involves 
constructing a theory which is derived from social actors' language, meanings and theories, 
or is grounded in everyday activities. The present research applies a retroductive strategy. It 
involves the construction of hypothetical models as a way of uncovering real structures and 
mechanisms assumed to produce empirical phenomena. The strategy adopted here 
encapsulates first the domain of the actual observed phenomena of social risk management 
through stakeholder partnerships. This is followed by the postulation of the existence of 'real' 
structures and mechanisms, which, if they existed, would explain stakeholder partnership 
building. Finally, a cross-case analysis attempts to demonstrate the existence and operation 
of partnership structures and mechanisms. 
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3.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.2.1 Theory Building vs. Theory Testing 
Strategic Management theory draws on a variety of disciplines, including industrial 
organisation economics, marketing, finance and administrative behaviour (Biggadike, 1981; 
Jemison, 19981; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986; Porter, 1981). Each of these disciplines has its 
specific paradigm, unit of analysis, assumptions, and research biases. Given this disciplinary 
diversity, it is not surprising that theory development relies on a broad array of research 
methods. Perhaps because the early strategy literature was dominated by case studies (e. g., 
Chandler, 1962; Learned et al., 1965), and because of the field's traditionally applied nature, 
field methods have dominated the development of empirical literature in strategic 
management theory (Shrivastava & Lim, 1989). Snow and Thomas (1994) classified theory- 
development according to their research objective (description, explanation, or prescription), 
and whether they built or tested theory. 
Before a theory can be tested, it must be constructed. The process of theory generation 
typically includes steps such as the identification of relevant constructs, the development of 
propositions about relationships, and the proffering of explanations for these relationships 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Denzin & Lincoln, 1997). Each of these steps addresses a different 
research goal. Description contributes to understanding primarily by identifying the concepts 
or constructs of a theory. With explanation as a research objective, the investigator must 
address the issue of causality among variables. A predictive study builds on the efforts of 
prior research through its ability to incorporate previously identified variables and hypotheses 
into a theoretical framework whose boundaries can be determined (Whetten, 1989). 
After a theory has been assembled, it can be tested. Rather like theory building, theory 
testing moves through several distinct phases, each characterised by increasing 
specification and rigour. Because of statistical requirements, theory testing usually requires 
studies of larger size than theory building. Ultimately, theories that purport to explain the 
same phenomenon can be tested against each other. Description, in theory testing, focuses 
on construct measurement, while explanation concerns the documentation of relationships 
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among variables. It has been claimed that prediction is the ultimate research goal 
(Venkatraman, 1990). 
This research builds rather then tests theory. The objective is to identify and describe 
characteristics of stakeholder partnership building. Causalities between the analysed 
variables are not addressed, nor are the boundaries of a theoretical framework determined. 
However, a further decision needs to be made about the nature of the theory to be built. 
3.2.2 Process vs. Variance Theory 
Zucker (1977) observes that "institutionalisation is both a process and a property variable" 
(p. 728). Mohr (1982) differentiates between variance and process theories. Variance theory 
seeks to explain phenomena by applying dependent and independent variables, with the 
objective of producing externally valid propositions, and to establish causal relations (Scott, 
1995). This theoretical approach addresses the question: Why did the observed effect 
happen? However, variance theories often seem to provide trivial truths, which "are of little 
value for improving practical wisdom" (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 204). 
Conversely, process theory seeks to provide understanding by investigating the sequence of 
events leading to an outcome, with temporal embeddedness of varieties in terms of 
precision, duration and relevance, and multiple levels of analysis (cf. Abbott, 1990; 
Pettigrew, 1997). Despite its primary focus on events, process data tends to be eclectic, 
drawing on phenomena such as changing relationships, thoughts, feelings and 
interpretations. Hence, the test of validation is based on data that results from the tracing of 
organisational events over time. Thus, the identification of processual elements is the key to 
developing process theories. There are two approaches to process theory development. The 
theory can be developed by a construct based, hypothesis-testing approach grounded on 
comparative logic (Eisenhardt, 1991) or by a story-based, interpretative approach, where 
insights can be obtained from rich accounts (Pettigrew, 1985; Ropo et al., 1997). 
In conducting processual analysis based on constructs, researchers develop theories 
through a hypothetical process theories and test propositions using time-series process data 
(Langley, 1999). The focus of processual analysis is on defining clear constructs and thereby 
developing mechanisms to verify or falsify a set of propositions. This approach makes it 
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necessary to record events, describe features and identify patterns from processes by using 
different methods of processual analysis (e. g., content-context-process model suggested by 
Pettigrew, 1987) or techniques of process data modelling (e. g., the seven sense making 
strategies for theorising process data proposed by Langley, 1999). Nonetheless, such an 
approach invariably fails to capture the ongoing dynamics and temporal evolution of 
stakeholder partnership building. The resulting theory may not take sufficient account of the 
conflicting mental models, reciprocal causalities and pluralistic context, thereby generating 
theories that are scientifically valid but practically less useful (Argyris, 1988; Van de Ven, 
1988). 
If researchers apply the paradigm of hypothesis testing to process theory building without the 
goal of telling good stories, "they are likely to miss both the calibre and the quantity of theory 
we have seen result from classical story-telling through case studies in the past" (Dyer & 
Wilkins, 1991, p. 618). Thus, a story-based approach is applied to this research. It can 
overcome some of the criticism levelled against a construct-based approach but it also has 
its weaknesses. Sometimes, processual research becomes a story-telling practice, without 
contributing sufficiently to the theory building, as Knudsen (1993) and Pentland (1999) 
propose. Starkey (1987) observes that the outcome of such an approach can easily become 
the writing of a novel. The process theory which arises from this research entails diachronic 
stories, from which most defining characteristics of stakeholder partnership building are 
analysed. To construct these stories, the question of whether a qualitative or quantitative 
inquiry is appropriate needs to be answered. Furthermore a specific data inquiry method has 
to be selected. 
3.2.3 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Inquiry 
The word 'qualitative' implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not 
rigorously examined or measured in terms of quantity, intensity, or frequency (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1997). Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational 
constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasise the value-laden nature of 
inquiry, and they seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and 
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given meaning. In contrast, quantitative studies emphasise the measurement and analysis of 
causal relationships between variables, not processes. Such an inquiry is purported to be 
within a value-free framework. 
Positive science (e. g., physics, chemistry, economics) is often seen as the crowning 
achievement of Western civilisation, and through this, it is assumed that "truth can transcend 
opinion and personal bias" (Carey, 1989, p. 99). Qualitative research is seen as an assault 
on this tradition. Its adherents often retreat into a "value-free objectivist science" (Carey, 
1989, p. 104) model to defend their position. They seldom attempt to make explicit, or to 
critique, the "moral and political commitments in their own work" (Carey, 1989, p. 104). The 
opposition to positive science by post-positivists and post-structuralists is seen as an attack 
on reason and truth. At the same time, the positive science attack on qualitative research is 
regarded as an attempt to legislate one version of truth over another. Nevertheless, a 
qualitative inquiry is applied for this research project so as to provide a rich and in-depth 
description of the process of stakeholder partnership building. 
Qualitative researchers use ethnographic prose, historical narratives, first-person accounts, 
still photographs, life histories, fictionalised facts, and biographical and autobiographical 
materials, among others. Quantitative researchers use mathematical models, statistical 
tables, and graphs, and often write about their research in impersonal, third-person prose. 
Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in five significant ways: 
USES OF POSITIVISM. Although many qualitative researchers in the post-positivist tradition use 
statistical measures, methods, and documents as a way of locating a group of subjects 
within a larger population, they seldom report findings in terms of the kinds of complex 
statistical measures or methods on which quantitative researchers (Becker, 1993). 
ACCEPTANCE OF POST-MODERN SENSIBILITIES. The use of quantitative, positivist methods and 
assumptions has been rejected by a new generation of qualitative researchers who are 
attracted to post- structural, post-modern sensibilities (Patton, 1980). 
CAPTURING THE INDIVIDUAL'S POINT OF VIEW. Both qualitative and quantitative researchers are 
concerned about the individual's point of view. However, qualitative investigators think they 
can get closer to the actor's perspective through interviewing and observing (Stake, 1995). 
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EXAMINING THE CONSTRAINTS OF EVERYDAY LIFE. Qualitative researchers are more likely than 
quantitative researchers to confront the constraints of the everyday social world (Pettigrew, 
1997). They view research as a process of abstraction (Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997). 
Securing rich description. Qualitative researchers believe that rich descriptions of the social 
world are valuable, whereas quantitative researchers, with their nomothetic commitments, 
are less concerned with such details (Denzin, 1989). 
Qualitative research involves the collection and the studied use of a variety of empirical 
materials that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals' lives. 
The research approach is inherently multi-method in focus (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). 
However, the use of multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in- 
depth understanding of the phenomenon in question (Lewis & Grimes, 1999). Objective 
reality can never be captured. Triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation, but an 
alternative to validation (Denzin, 1989). The combination of multiple methods, empirical 
material, perspectives and observers in a single study is best understood, then, as a strategy 
that adds rigor, breath, and depth to any investigation (cf. Flick, 1992, p. 194). With the 
differences between these two research approaches understood and the criticism about 
qualitative data elaborated, a specific research strategy needs to be selected. 
3.2.4 Case Study as Research Strategy 
The craft of research is enhanced by respect for error and surprise, storytelling, emotion, 
common sense, firsthand learning, and research colleagues (Daft, 1983). Within this context 
Creswell (1998) distinguishes five traditions of research strategy in terms of methodology 
and research objective. Biographical strategy relating to a single individual is selected when 
material is available and accessible and the individual is willing to share information; a 
phenomenological strategy is selected to examine a phenomenon and the meaning it holds 
for individuals; a grounded theory study is used to generate a normative theory; an 
ethnography strategy is utilised to study the behaviour of a culture-sharing group or 
individual; a case study strategy is selected to examine a case, bounded in time or place, 
and to look for contextual material about the setting of the case. 
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According to Yin (1996) a case study copes with the technically distinctive situation in which 
there will be many more variables of interest than data points. A case study is an exploration 
of a bounded system or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data 
collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context. This system is bounded by 
time and place, and it is the case being studied -a programme, an event, an activity, or 
individuals. Multiple sources of information include observation, interviews, audio-visual 
material, documents and reports. Collected data can be both of a qualitative and quantitative 
nature. The context surrounding the case involves situating it within its setting, whether a 
physical, social, historical, and/or economic. The focus may be on a case that, because of its 
uniqueness, requires studies (intrinsic case study), or it may be on an issue or issues, with 
the case used instrumentally to illustrate the issue (an instrumental case study) (Stake, 
1995). When more than one case is studied, this is referred to as a comparative case study 
(Yin, 1993). 
Although Eisenhardt's (1989) conceptual work of theory building from case study research 
was criticised by Dyer and Wilkins (1991) as being too construct-based, the proposed 
process elements can be adapted for story-based approaches as well. Eisenhardt's case 
study strategy features are: getting started, selecting cases, crafting instruments and 
protocols, entering the field, analysing data, shaping propositions, enfolding literature 
reaching closure. This research analyses characteristics of stakeholder partnership building 
rather than propositions about the process. 
Two issues are important in reaching closure: when to stop adding cases, and when to stop 
iterating between theory and data. The answer to both points is that one should stop if the 
incremental improvement is minimal. Theoretical saturation is the point at which incremental 
learning is minimal because the researcher is observing phenomena seen before (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). 
Theory development from case study research is likely to have important strengths such as 
novelty, testability, and empirical validity, which arise from intimate linkage with empirical 
evidence. Given the strengths of the theory-building approach and its independence from 
prior literature or past empirical observation, it is particularly well suited to new research 
areas like stakeholder partnership building. 
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1 Selecting Case Studies 
In conducting case study research, it is recommended that investigators first consider what 
type of case study is most promising and useful. The case can be single or collective, multi- 
sited or within-site, focused on a case or on an issue (Yin, 1989; Stake, 1995). For this 
research, stakeholder partnership building processes were studied. In addition, to describe 
their evolution and reasons for emergence, it was crucial to understand the firm's social 
integration or reintegration process. 
In choosing what case to study, an array of possibilities for purposeful sampling was 
available (Creswell, 1998). McWilliams and Siegel (1997) suggest that critical incidents are 
effective case selection criteria to enhance the force of case illustration and variance. 
Creswell (1998) proposes that case studies should be selected if they provide different 
perspectives on the problem, process, or event that needs to be portrayed. The sampling 
criteria were differences and similarities between the cases. In 1997, a pilot study was 
conducted of BMW in Germany. The objective was to tune the theoretical framework and the 
criteria for case selection on the basis of empirical data of selected business practices. 
BP and Hoechst have been chosen as the base for case studies in this study because 
critical incidents and stakeholder partnership building challenged them. However, whereas 
BP faced accusations of human rights abuses in Colombia -a less-developed country, 
Hoechst underwent chemical accidents in Germany -a developed country. Social risk 
management was an issue for both companies. Further enhancement of variance derived 
from the different industrial sectors in which the companies operated. There were also 
differences because Hoechst was a German company and BP British. 
Stakeholder partnerships with different objectives have been selected. However, similarity is 
also important, otherwise no comparison would be possible. Therefore, similar partnerships 
are selected in terms of the involved stakeholders and underlying generic process elements. 
The process of building stakeholder partnerships is the unit of analysis. The three levels of 
analysis are social, institutional and individual, with a primary focus on the second. 
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3.3.2 Conducting Case Studies 
The data collection was intensive, drawing on multiple sources of information such as 
observation, interviews, documents, audio-visual materials, and archival data. However, 
because the primary sources of evidence were interviews, access to the case study 
companies had to be negotiated. Since data sensitivity was a critical issue, the negotiation 
with each company and the involved stakeholders was problematic and took more than six 
months. During this time, and during the interview process itself, a high level of trust was 
sought with the objective of gaining detailed access to data. 
A hundred and fifty six interviews were conducted and data from seven participant 
observations collected. The interviews lasted between one and two hours. Eight videos and 
more than four hundred documents were analysed. Data from companies' archives was 
collected to trace the history of specific issues. English, German and Spanish are the 
languages of the collected data. Interviews were held with stakeholders and managers from 
headquarters and subsidiaries. This included long field visits to Great Britain, Colombia and 
Germany. Board level managers and operational managers were interviewed. As far as they 
were involved in the partnerships that are at the focus of this study, stakeholders were 
interviewed. In addition, critical observers of the stakeholder partnerships were asked about 
their opinion and observations. 
For this research, a general, open-ended interview guide approach was applied. Topics and 
issues to be covered were specified in advance, in outline form; the interviewer decided on 
the sequence and wording of questions in the course of the interview. The interview was 
always adapted to the specific individual profile of the interviewee. While collecting data from 
multiple sources of evidence, a case study database was created and a chain of evidence 
was built. Where necessary, interviewees were re-interviewed. There was a continuous 
feedback loop between key decision-makers of the stakeholder partnerships and the 
interviewer in order to refine and to assure findings. Data was continuously compared and 
scrutinised against consistency. For this research a chronological case study report structure 
was chosen because the case studies cover events over time. 
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3.3.3 Analysing and Interpreting Case Studies 
The role of theory in this research is characterised as analytic generalisation, and set in 
contrast to other ways of generalising results, known as statistical generalisation. Within this 
context previously developed theory is used as a quasi-template with which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study. The type of analysis of case study data can be a holistic 
analysis of the entire case or an embedded analysis, of a specific aspect of the case (Yin, 
1989). This study applies an embedded analysis because the case studies are two 
companies and their management of social risk; whereas the unit of analysis is embedded 
within it - four processes of building stakeholder partnerships. 
The underlying analytical paradigm of this case study research is processual analysis, which 
is well established and a growing approach to strategy research (cf. Van de Ven, 1988; 
Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Huber, 1995; Pettigrew, 1997). Issues of time, agency, structure, 
context, emergence and development are crucial in human conduct and have been widely 
implemented in processual analysis (Hinings, 1997). Studying processes over time and in its 
context have become integral component in this analytical concept (Tuttle, 1997; Zaheer et 
al., 1999). Pettigrew's (1997) triangulation of context, content and process will be applied to 
this multi-level case analysis. The major contribution of process research is "catching reality 
in flight" (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 345). A missed opportunity is to see the wider terrain in which 
the set of comparative cases under study is located. 
Through data collection, a detailed description of the cases emerges, as do an analysis of 
themes and an interpretation, and finally, assertions about the case (Stake, 1995). The 
analysis is rich in the context of the case and setting in which the case presents itself 
(Merriam, 1988). The investigator narrates the study through techniques such as a 
chronology of major events followed by a close-up and detailed perspective relating to a few 
incidents. When multiple cases are chosen, as for this study, a typical format is given, which 
provides an initial detailed description of each case and theme within the case, known as 
within-case analysis, followed by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a cross-case 
analysis, as well as assertions and an interpretation of the meaning of the case. Eisenhardt 
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(1989) proposes a cross-case analysis method composed of categorisation, search for 
similarities and differences, and stratification on the basis of data sources. 
There are further analytical tools such as pattern matching, explanation building, time series 
analysis, and programme logic models (Patton, 1980; Miles & Huberman, 1994). However, 
these techniques are more suitable for explanatory and predictive rather than descriptive 
analysis. Stake (1995) advocates pattern generation, direct interpretation, naturalistic 
generalisation and categorical aggregation as the four forms of data analysis and 
interpretation for case studies. This research applies categorical aggregation. The 
researcher seeks a collection of instances from the data, hoping that issue-relevant meaning 
will emerge. 
It is important to have the right case study balance in terms of the amount of description 
versus the amount of analysis and interpretation or assertions. In comparing description 
versus analysis, Merriam (1988) suggests that a proper balance might be sixty to forty per 
cent or seventy to thirty per cent in favour of description. In the final interpretative phase of a 
case study analysis, the researcher reports, as Lincoln and Guba (1985) mention, the 
'lessons learned' from the case. As McGloskey (1998) emphasises, it is crucial to find the 
right rhetoric 'to persuade with sweet talk'. 
3.3.4 Case Study Validation Issues 
Qualitative researchers strive to gain a deep structure of knowledge that comes from visiting 
personally with informants, spending extensive time in the field, and probing to obtain 
detailed meanings. During or after, qualitative researchers ask, "Did we get it right? " (Stake, 
1995, p. 107) or "Did we publish a 'wrong' or inaccurate account? " (Thomas, 1993, p. 39). To 
answer these questions, the researcher asks participants in the study or, better yet, reflects 
on the question personally. Further, the researcher looks to the multi-vocal discourse 
communities such as constructivists and interpretivists to raise the question and pose the 
answers (Denzin & Lincoln, 1997). 
On the basis that a research design is supposed to represent a logical set of statements, one 
can judge the quality of any given design according to certain logical tests. Because the four 
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tests are common to all social science methods, the tests have been summarised in 
numerous textbooks (cf. Kidder & Judd, 1986; Yin, 1993). 
CONSTRUCT VALIDITY means establishing operational measures for the concepts being 
studied. 
INTERNAL VALIDITY varies according to whether the research is explanatory, descriptive or 
prescriptive. For the former causal relationship is established, whereby certain conditions are 
shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. The latter 
refers to the analysis of similarities and differences within and between cases or frameworks 
of cases that establish internal validity. 
EXTERNAL VALIDITY establishes the domain to which a study's findings can be generalised. 
RELIABILITY to demonstrate whether the operations of a study, such as the data collection, 
can be repeated, with the same results. 
Tests Case Study Tactic Phase of Research 
Construct Multiple Sources of Evidence Data Collection 
Validity 
Establish Chain of Evidence Data Collection 
  Key Informants Review Draft Case Study Report Composition 
Internal Within-Case Analysis Data Analysis 
Validity 
  Cross-Case Analysis Data Analysis 
External Replication Logic Within the Four Units of Analysis   Research Design 
Validity and the Different Context 
Reliability Case Study Protocol Data Collection 
  Develop Case Study Database Data Collection 
Table 5 Stakeholder Partnership Case Study Validation Issues 
Patton (1980) suggests that an important way to strengthen a study is triangulation, or the 
combination of methods in the study of the same phenomena. For this research data 
triangulation is applied, the use of a variety of data sources in a study. Another applied 
verification tool is investigator triangulation, namely the use of several different evaluators. 
Theory triangulation is used, the consideration of multiple perspectives to interpret a single 
set of data; and finally, methodological triangulation, the application of multiple methods to 
study the two companies and the four different processes of building stakeholder 
partnerships. 
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Part II Practice of Social Risk Management 
Sustainable growth is the modern utopia, one that does not promise too much. 
Frits Wils (1998) 
The practice of social risk management is described through a focus on the process of 
stakeholder partnership building. Two different transnational companies are selected. 
Whereas one represents a business case in a less developed society, the other does so in a 
developed society: British Petroleum (BP), one of the world's leading energy companies, 
established a new oil exploration business in Colombia facing the problem of social 
integration in a conflicting environment. Hoechst, one of the world's leading life-science 
companies, experienced pressure for social reintegration in Germany, in a relative stable 
environment, but with uncertainty arising from the long-term social impact of business 
practice. Partnerships with NGOs and communities are at the core of BP's and Hoechst's 
social risk management. 
The management processes of the two cases can be seen to focus on three spheres: 
  The internal process of social integration and reintegration; 
  The external process of building partnerships with NGOs; 
  The external process of community partnership building. 
Each sphere provides information about the initial problem and situation. The management 
process is described chronologically, and can be seen to be structured by major themes and 
characteristic features. This description of BP's and Hoechst's practice of social risk 
management forms the basis for the subsequent analysis of characteristics for stakeholder 
partnership building. 
Part II: Practice of Social 
Risk Management 
4. BP in Colombia: 
Managing Social Risk in a 
Less Developed Society 
5. Hoechst in Germany: 
Managing Social Risk in a 
Developed Society 
4.1 Integrating 
Business into Society 
4.2 Engaging NGOs in 
Policy Dialogue 
4.3 Committing to 
Community Development 
5.1 Reintegrating 
Business into Society 
5.2 Developing a Strategy- 
Tool with an NGO 
5.3 Building a Community 
Discussion Group 
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Chapter 4 BPX IN COLOMBIA: 
MANAGING SOCIAL RISK IN A LESS DEVELOPED SOCIETY 
Oil has shaped the politics of the twentieth century and has changed profoundly 
the way we lead our daily lives. 
Daniel Yergin (1991) 
British Petroleum (BP) is a transnational company, having operations in over 70 countries. 
The company is a holding with independent exploration, chemicals, refining and marketing 
businesses. In the 1990s, the company faced the challenge of managing social risk, a 
challenge induced by its business integration in less developed societies. BP not only faced 
criticism of its business practice, but also accusations of human rights abuses and 
environmental damage. This chapter focuses on the presence of BPX (BP Exploration) in 
Colombia. The journey towards a society-driven company is described and analysed by 
focusing on three relevant areas of social risk management: 
  BPX's social integration in Colombia; 
  The engagement with NGOs in policy dialogue; 
  The commitment to community development. 
BP, with its headquarters in London, is one of Britain's biggest companies, and one of the 
world's largest oil and petrochemical groups. In 1997 its profit was USD 4.6 billion, which 
represented a 17 per cent ROCE (BP Annual Report, 1997). The company directly employed 
56,000 people. In BPX's first six decades, its prime area of involvement was in the Middle 
East. From the late 1960s the centre of gravity shifted westwards, towards the USA and 
Britain itself. A third shift started in the late 1980s, with an increased focus on countries in 
Africa, the former Soviet Union and South America - all areas of social conflict. BPX in 
Colombia is an example of a transnational company operating in a less developed society, 
striving for a licence to operate through social integration and stakeholder partnership 
building. 
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4.1 INTEGRATING BUSINESS INTO SOCIETY 
4.1.1 Social Risk as an Effect of Business Integration 
Founded in 1909, BP owes its origin to William Knox D'Arcy, who invested time, money and 
labour in the belief that a worthwhile deposit of oil could be found in Persia. Since this early 
years, when setting-up a new exploration site, besides technological challenges, the 
company always faced political and social issues. However, in the 1990s, when BP began to 
invest in social conflict-led countries, these soft issues became even more important. 
Today, one country in which BPX operates is Colombia, which has South America's oldest 
democracy. Although it is in many ways much advantaged, it is nonetheless afflicted with 
violence, a much criticised human rights record and a huge, underground international 
narcotics industry. The cocaine industry is estimated to be worth USD 3 billion per annum, 
which is more than three times Colombia's earnings from oil exports (Economist, 19 July 
1999). Guerrilla movements have been active since the 1960s. In 1990, a peace agreement 
was negotiated between the government and the three main guerrilla groups. One group 
became actively involved in the new 1991, constitution but the other two rejected 
assimilation, and have continued to attack government and military installations, as well as 
industrial and civilian targets, and are increasingly financed by the drug cartels. There are an 
estimated 10 to 15,000 full-time guerrillas operating in Colombia. 
Guerrilla groups have targeted the oil industry, kidnapping and killing people associated with 
it and regularly blowing up pipelines. According to BP's Senior Policy Advisor, "six times the 
amount of oil spilled in the Exxon Valdez has been spilled due to guerrilla activities". 
Meanwhile, paramilitary organisations with a variety of different affiliations, illegal but 
allegedly often supported by an exasperated Colombian army, are countering the guerrillas' 
presence in particularly brutal ways, including the murder of those suspected of collaboration 
with the guerrillas. Any oil company that invests in Colombia will be affected by guerrilla and 
paramilitary activities, which put business of an extreme level at risk. 
Before the oil development, Casanare, the regional district of Colombia where BPX operates, 
had been a sparsely populated agricultural area, effectively cut off from government interest 
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and the rapidly developing urban areas of the country. When BPX began its business 
involvement in Casanare, the inhabitants of the region were relatively poor. Cattle breeding 
and rice-growing were the main sources of income. The local workforce was underskilled, 
and was prone to high levels of unemployment. Feeding on local discontent were guerrilla 
groups that came to Casanare because of BPX's oil operations, keen to denounce the 
activities of the oil company and ever ready to exploit popular fears for their own ends, which 
included organised crime, drug-trafficking, extortion, kidnapping and political manipulation. 
Since BPX's presence, society has changed. Casanare's GDP is due to reach USD 2 billion 
in 2000 from a figure of USD 0.75 billion in 1995 (Economist, 8 August 1998). The population 
of the area is now 200,000 and is growing fast. Previously small villages such as Yopal and 
Tauramena have become boomtowns, with all the associated problems of rapid 
development, such as inadequate government, poor infrastructure and prostitution. The 
arrival of BPX in the province raised people's hopes for better employment prospects, more 
investment in the economy and social infrastructure, and other direct benefits arising from 
royalties and tax revenues. However, because of the existing social uncertainty, there was 
no obvious right way to fulfil society's expectations. 
Based on the uncertainty associated with unintended social development, BPX had to 
manage a variety of social risk potentials that could affect the company, but which were also 
induced by its presence. In addition, many critical ecological issues impinged on company's 
operations. BPX had entered a rural, nearly untouched part of Casanare, where it changed 
not only the way of life, and its quality, but also the countryside. Besides wealth creation, 
there was an impact on the ecological environment that would not have existed without BPX. 
The company had no experiences in managing social and environmental issues in a cultural 
context such as that of Colombia. BPX recognised its social responsibility, but also faced 
accusations of human rights abuses and environmental damages. Social risk induction was 
predetermined. Therefore social risk needed to be managed, not only because of the impact 
on firms' overall performance. A BP investor relations manager said: 
[... ] investment community does not care directly about BP's licence to operate; 
they care indirectly. They want to know if [BP] does anything that could 
compromise [its] ability to generate rent. 
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4.1.2 From a Technology to a Society Driven Company 
From the 1970s to the early 1990s BP, as many other Western oil companies, focused 
primarily on two exploration areas: North America and Europe. These were technology 
intensive and drove the company into a 2-pipeline dependency. At the end of the 1980s, 
BPX began to explore new areas for oil and gas production. The company invested in less 
developed countries to be prepared for the future. 
In 1986, BPX started a major oil and gas exploration programme in Colombia that came on 
stream in the early 1990s. This was an investment in a social conflict area. Consequently, 
during the construction and production period, BPX was confronted with the management of 
society's expectations that had direct influence on its business activities. Although, the 
company thought that it contributed positively to the society, in 1996 it was accused of 
human rights abuses and environmental damages. Since then, BP strategized corporate 
reputations to restore and maintain its licence to operate (LTO). The company managed the 
aftermath of the accusations, re-gained credibility and developed prevention activities for 
similar incidents in the future. As a direct outcome of this learning process and the ambition 
to design a responsible way forward, BP reviewed its corporate policy. To control and 
communicate its social and environmental impact, in 1997, the company systematically 
began to measure and report its social and environmental accountability. 
The following seven sections describe BP's society driven change process within the context 
of social risk management. 
Today 
Accountability 
New Policy 
Strategizing Reputation 
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Figure 5 BP's Thematic Timeline 
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4.1.2.1 EXPANDING THE 2-PIPELINE COMPANY 
In the 1960s and 1970s, oil operations in the Middle East consisted of explorations and 
productions in remote areas at low cost. Whereas BP's business practice was cost efficient, 
unpredictable developments at a political level were the driving force for change. In the 
1970s, when the world-wide oil industry suffered from the Middle East oil crisis, BPX was 
already in the process of establishing two major new oil production areas: one in America 
and one in Europe. These operations, which were technology driven, and primarily based 
onshore, were cost intensive, and there was thus a higher likelihood of a negative impact on 
the ecological environment. However, natural scientists and engineers were able to solve 
these technological challenges and since the 1980s, environmental issues have become part 
of the management agenda. The development of BPX's oil production since the 1960s can 
be subdivided into three stages, based on the defining characteristics of these periods: 
  Stage 1: Cost efficient; 
  Stage 2: Technology intensive; 
  Stage 3: Social conflict affected. 
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In 1965, BPX made its first major oil discovery in the North Sea. A major offshore production 
in the UK sector began in 1982. Operating conditions, such as the need to drill many meters 
below sea level and to build oilrigs, necessitated intense technology. In Alaska, BPX was 
rewarded for ten years' exploration effort when, in 1969, it announced a major oil discovery. 
Towards the end of 1987, the world's first continuous commercial production from an 
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offshore area in the Arctic was achieved. In addition to offering offshore operating conditions 
that were similar in nature to those in the North Sea, Alaska had extreme regional weather 
conditions that posed further technological challenges. The availability of new technology 
often influenced the success and failure of oil explorations. 
BPX's operations in the North Sea and Alaska amounted to about 90 per cent of its total 
production on average. Hence, BPX was called 2-pipeline company'. Since then, the 
company entered new countries for oil- and gas-explorations. Although the Middle East owns 
the major proven oil reserves (676.9 thousand million barrels of oil in 1997) South and 
Central America emerged as a prospective area. For BPX, Colombia became an important 
oil exploration country. However, instead of technology, it was the nature of society itself that 
became a critical issue. 
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BP's senior policy advisor summarised the company's development in terms of 
its strategic 
performance orientation: 
[.. ] BP had major shifts in strategic performance orientation, especially over the 
last 20 years. Starting with purely cost cutting and net-present-value-orientation, 
moving to quality orientation and nowadays getting more and more green and 
social orientated. 
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4.1.2.2 INVESTING IN A CONFLICT-RIDDEN SOCIETY 
Colombia is situated in the north-eastern corner of South America. BPX had been interested 
in the country's oil prospects since January 1918 (Bamberg, 1994). Exploration was difficult 
because of the lack of roads, the nature of terrain and the shortage of labour. Nevertheless, 
according to a company survey, the country offered distinct possibilities with respect to oil 
development, albeit at considerable cost, financial and organisational. 
Negotiations with the Government commenced in 1926. Hearn, the company director in 
charge of concessions, stated approvingly that Colombia was excellently situated as a 
complementary area to Iran, owing to its proximity to western markets in which Iranian oil 
suffered the competitive advantage of high transport costs compared with nearer sources of 
supply. However, Hearn's enthusiasm on that score was tempered by other considerations 
of a more political nature. 
It was not until 1936 that the Colombian government passed a further petroleum legislation, 
Law 160, which effectively lifted legal restrictions that had stood in BPX's way. The matter 
was taken further when the company's geologist, Cox, visited Colombia in December 1937 
and an exploration programme was planned. Just when the prospects of exploration in 
Colombia appeared to be brightening, the company was warned that any further foreign 
explorations liable to prejudice production in Iran were completely unacceptable. Geological 
work in Colombia was thus brought to a halt until the 1980s. 
In 1986, BPX began a major oil and gas exploration programme in Colombia in the Andean 
foothills, some 125 kilometres to the north-east of the capital Bogota. The programme was 
rewarded by the discovery of the Cusiana oil field in 1991, the Cupiagua field in 1992, and 
the Volcanera gas field in 1994 (BP Annual Report, 1998). Between them, these represent 
the largest oil discoveries in the Western Hemisphere in the last 20 years. Oil production 
began from Cusiana field in 1994, and production rose to 150,000 barrels a day by 1995. 
The Colombian government granted BPX the licence to be the operator in the development 
of the oil fields in a joint venture partnership with the state oil company, Ecopetrol (59 per 
cent), Total and Triton. BPX's share was 19 per cent. 85 per cent of all revenues went to the 
Colombian government in royalties. The total production from all oil fields in 1999 was about 
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500,000 barrels a day (Economist, 24 October 1998). The company was also involved in 
constructing the Ocensa pipeline that transports the Cusiana and Cupiagua oil from 
Casanare to the port of Covenas. 
Guerrilla organisations in Colombia have several revenue streams, among them: narcotics, 
kidnapping and extortion. Companies refusing to pay for protection money suffered the 
consequences - as a result of the failure to pay, oil pipelines are routinely destroyed and 
people kidnapped or killed (Guardian, 15 August 1998). BP's policy on corruption is strict: 
the company refuses to engage in corrupt practices (BP Policy, 1993,1998). BPX's 
operational and domestic areas for non-local workers are surrounded by barbed wire. The 
company has employed the services of the Colombian army and police and are advised by 
an organisation called Defence System Colombia (DSC), a subsidiary of the international 
Defence System Limited, which is used elsewhere in the World by many different 
companies, development agencies and NGOs. DSC has contributed to the training of military 
police in protecting BPX's operations. However, BPX's investment needed not only to be 
protected, but was ideally also seen as means of raising society's expectations as to the 
company's contribution to a higher quality of life. 
4.1.2.3 CONFRONTED WITH RAISED SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS 
Expectations as to BPX's ability to provide social support services and to act in a quasi- 
governmental role in Casanare were high. BPX and its partners designed a voluntary social 
investment plan, based on a continuous dialogue with the community and the regional 
authorities. Between 1992 and 1997, the company spent USD 27 million on social 
programmes, such as small business development, health education and local infrastructure, 
as well as devoting a lot of working time to strengthening local citizen groups in managing oil 
revenues effectively (Social Investment, 1998). Evaluations of BPX's effect on society were 
not part of the early social investment activities. Systematic 
Social Impact Assessments 
(SIA) were only made at a later stage. 
BPX's operations generated royalties for Casanare. In 1995 and 
1996, Cusiana yielded 
USD 180 million fiscal revenue for Casanare (Social Investment, 1998). 
In 1997, BPX 
directly employed 1,000 local people from Casanare and 
indirectly, nearly 4,000 as contract 
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workers. Revenues from BPX's oil fields are expected to add more than 1 per cent per 
annum to Colombian GDP between 1997 and 2000. 
Health, safety and environment performance are crucial to BPX's business in Colombia and 
elsewhere. It is one of BP's key assets in its international reputation as a company. 
Company's natural scientists and engineers prepared Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA) to evaluate the needed investment to achieve international environmental and safety 
standards. Until 1997, BPX invested USD 30 million in environmental protection, in addition 
to its public commitment to compliance not only with the Colombian government's 
environmental legislation but, also the company's own, high global standards (Doust, 1997). 
For all new projects, public hearings can to be organised, whereby the public could question 
BPX. BPX was part of a state-led committee that developed environmental standards and 
regulations for oil and gas-exploration operations (Ministero del Medio Ambiente, 1997). 
In 1997, BP's CEO John Browne met Colombia's president Samper. Despite the fact that 
BPX was Colombia's guest, at the presidential meeting he raised the question of guerrilla 
and paramilitary activities that had negative effects on BPX's business and human rights in 
Colombia. The ELN, for instance, wanted all natural resources nationalised and to revise 
existing oil contracts. Their basic principle was the - usually foreign - companies pay all 
exploration costs, the oil, if any, to go 20 per cent to the state, 40 per cent to its oil company, 
Ecopetrol, 40 per cent to the foreigners. Fair enough? Not for the ELN. Oil prices? Sovereign 
management, in world markets. Foreign investment? Yes, if it brings technology and is linked 
to Colombian priorities. Foreign debt? Renegotiate it, said ELN and FARC alike, the two 
biggest Colombian guerrilla organisations (Guardian, 14 October 1998). 
All oil companies face such risks. One way out might be to pay protection money to the 
guerrillas. However, BPX is determined to refuse this, and in consequence, relies on 
Colombia's armed forces and its own efforts. BPX's problems centre on security 
arrangements. Oil companies, by law, have to pay an official 'war tax', of USD 1.25 a barrel 
for protection. On top of this, in November 1995 BPX signed an agreement pledging a further 
USD 5.4 million to the army over three years. The deal brought accusations that BPX was 
forming a private army (Economist, 16 January 1999). BP's senior policy advisor said "the 
military is accused of human rights violations and BP condemns all abuses of 
human rights 
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from whatever quarter. However, we suffer from guilt by association. " The presence of a 
large security force breeds mistrust among the local community. 
Social expectations were paramount. The society judged BPX on its contribution to the 
development of Casanare, the exploration and production of oil and gas fields in an effective 
and environmentally responsible manner. Additionally, these operations needed to generate 
royalties and taxes for producing regions. However, BPX was only laying the seeds for what 
the government and the community needed to lead. The company thought that it was acting 
like a good citizen should - paying tax and complying with the law. 
4.1.2.4 FACING ACCUSATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
In July 1995, a report was published by the Inter-institutional Commission on the human 
rights situation in Casanare, which had referred to BPX in only two out of its 25 
recommendations. The first concerned an unfulfilled commitment to a community group and 
the second to damage to a forestry reserve. BPX welcomed the report, and being committed 
to addressing the two criticisms, thought no more of it (Inter-Institutional Commission Report, 
1995). BP's former head of community affairs in London remembered the time after: 
You can not solve a problem until there is one. The problem came really when 
some people decided to turn human rights issues against BP. The company denied 
everything [... ] The problem risen when BP realised that denial would not do it. 
BP was truly shocked and angered, therefore, when following a visit to Colombia by Richard 
Howitt MEP in 1996, (which included a long meeting with BPX in Bogota but not a visit to 
Casanare itself) a report was presented to the European Parliament accusing BPX of human 
rights and environmental misdemeanours (Howitt, 1996). This was followed by a series of 
newspaper reports; some taking the accusations at face value (e. g., Observer, 20 October 
1996) others a more balanced view (e. g., FT, 8 November 1996). Meanwhile, BPX denied 
every accusation. However, there was a demonstration outside BP's head office in London 
organised by 'The Coalition Against BP in Colombia', and disruption of other company 
activities. On 8 February 1997 came the Assignment Programme on BBC2, which implicitly 
accused BPX of collaborating with the army and paramilitary groups to kill people, damaging 
the environment and destroying a century old way of life in Casanare. Browne wrote in an 
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internal email to BPX's employees that the "programme contained many inaccuracies, 
distortions, and was unbalanced. I have full confidence in the ethical conduct of our staff. " 
Published in April 1998, BP's Social Report 1997 describes the difficulties the company had 
operating in the Casanare region, where since 1991 it has exploited an oil find worth more 
than GBP 25 billion. The report, which promises that good and bad performance should be 
noted, fails to mention a new, critical investigation by Jose Castro Caycedo, the Colombian 
government's highly respected independent ombudsman, which BPX had asked for. His 
office is the one government department trusted by many local people to defend them 
against powerful interests. His inquiry was concluded in January 1998. 
The report accepts that BPX addressed complaints after they were raised by the community, 
but concludes that the oil companies should "not wait for the intervention of the local 
community before it acts, but instead must demonstrate the desire not to cause 
environmental damage" (Public Prosecutor, 1998, p. 15). The ombudsman's official report 
details fines on BPX in view of serious environmental damage caused by 12 wells and two 
oil processing facilities during the period 1991-1997. BPX received the biggest fine in 
Colombian history (USD 125,000) for environmental damage at five oilrigs in 1994 
(Guardian, 17 October 1998). Between 1997 and 1998 drilling by four BPX rigs was 
temporarily suspended for similar reasons. Meanwhile, BPX claims it has invested USD 360 
million in environmental protection measures in Colombia since 1992 and that its aim is "to 
surpass statutory requirements" (BP HSE Fact, 1997). 
The General Prosecutor's Human Rights Unit found no evidence to corroborate any of the 
accusations of human rights abuses including that of passing photographs to the army. 
Moreover, one of the individuals assumed to have been murdered was, in fact, found to be 
alive. BPX has welcomed the report, saying it has continued to have a constructive dialogue 
with the ombudsman. 
Equally disturbing for BPX was criticism of its human rights records in Casanare in general. 
The US-based Human Rights Watch organisation wrote to BP's CEO saying the company 
"has not taken adequate steps to prevent abuses and to address those that have occurred" 
(HRW Report, 1998). Since 1994, at least seven people have been assassinated and others 
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falsely imprisoned or harassed by the army for speaking out against the environmental 
excesses of the BPX-led oil boom in the area. 
The media played a very important role in stimulating attention to BPX's accusation. The 
alleged misdemeanour from BPX in Colombia that the media concentrated on involved 
collusion with the Colombian military and suspected company activities that brought violence 
to Casanare. BPX could not simply publish the General Prosecutor's report. A way forward 
was to strategize corporate reputation. 
4.1.2.5 STRATEGIZING CORPORATE REPUTATION 
Since the early 1990s, BPX increasingly assessed the impact of social factors and conflict in 
order to understand the implications of their business in Casanare, and how they could work 
with others, including governments, communities, NGOs and the UN, to achieve a positive 
contribution and enhance corporate reputation. 
In 1995 the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum and the World Bank were invited by 
BP to visit its operations in Colombia. The World Bank realised that there was a potential to 
work with the company to promote sustainable development in less developed countries. In 
the aftermath of human rights accusations, these kinds of relationships helped BP to restore 
its credibility. In 1997 the World Bank formed a group called Business Partners for 
Development. The aim of this was to establish a win-win relationship between business, civil 
society, and the state. BP was part of this group, and was involved in two projects in 
Casanare. 
BPX's lobbyist towards sustainability was the Colombian Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (CECODES). BPX began to consult communities for social investment 
decisions and to work with local authorities that had influence over the spending of royalties. 
At a national and international level, BP started to talk to NGOs. In 
London, in 1997, the 
Inter-Agency Group, made up of various international NGOs, came together to start a 
dialogue with BP. In the same year, BP organised its first Social Forum; an 
international 
stakeholder conference held in London. The event was repeated 
in 1998 and is now part of 
BP's strategy to build and maintain its corporate reputation. 
The Social Forum focuses 
primarily on BP's policy, social impact and verified accounts 
(Social Forum, 1997). 
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Colombia's government provided BPX with the legal licence to operate. It is also the 
regulator of the country that provides the legal context for BPX's operations. To solve BPX's 
security issues in Casanare, the company negotiated a collaborative national armed forces 
agreement with the Colombian Ministry of Defence and Ecopetrol. The agreement was 
signed in January 1998 (National Armed Forces Agreement, 1998). 
In 1997 BPX introduced its Strategic Plan for Reputation Management in Casanare. The 
mission of the reputation group was "to create favourable conditions in the external 
environment, enabling the company to meet its business goal, generate new business, and 
enhance the agreed corporate image in the national and international environment" 
(Strategic Plan for Reputation, 1997). Elements of the strategy document are a general 
policy for strategizing reputation, core strategies and the structure of the reputation group. 
The following five strategies permitted BPX to build up its reputation: 
  Direct work with communities; 
  Municipal level work; 
  Departmental level work; 
" Security and; 
  Communication. 
To achieve such objectives, and to deploy these strategies within the general policy 
framework for Casanare, a field reputation group was established with a team in Casanare 
and a team in Bogota. This group had one departmental manager, reporting to the Casanare 
manager, one staff member as communication adviser, and one group of professionals 
comprising three seniors and three juniors divided according to the three operating areas of 
BPX in Casanare. Line management was involved as much as possible. The Casanare field 
and the Bogota reputation team had an identical overall strategic objective: "BP as a partner 
of choice" (Strategic Plan for Reputation, 1997). 
BP's headquarters had no explicit communication structure. Regional directors were directly 
subordinated to the MD who had responsibility for all regions and corporate policies. 
Communication functions were similar to those in Colombia, namely were external and 
community affairs, media and publications, investor relations, as well as HSE. Only recently 
was the community affairs manager renamed as social investment manager. This job title 
also implies his link to the investment department. Planning, legal, organisational structure 
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and technology were first linked to chief of personell and then to the MD for regions and 
policies. However, the London office initiated the review of BP's policy that provides the 
corridor in which BPX in Colombia can operate. 
4.1.2.6 REVIEWING CORPORATE POLICY 
BP's policy on business conduct must be complied with at all times by all those employed by 
or acting for the company. BP's dealings and relationships should always be such that BP's 
international reputation would not be damaged if the details were to become public 
knowledge. In 1993, BP set out detailed guidance on the application of the Policy on 
Business Conduct in the BP Code of Business Conduct which was available in all locations 
through the audit function, from which guidance could also be sought. This policy focused 
primarily on the behaviour of BP's employees and contractors. The main guidance was on 
ethical behaviour and compliance of laws and regulations (BP Policy, 1993). 
Policies for getting HSE right have existed in BP's practice since the late 1980s. However, it 
is only since 1995 that BP began to adopt the principle of sustainable development. In 1994, 
BP published its first Community Involvement Report, which included a community relations 
policy (BP in the Community, 1994). BP states that it aims for "reputation as a good 
neighbour and corporate citizen wherever [BP] operates". The emphasis of such a policy 
was on education, the environment and community development. At this time, BP's 
community affairs concentrated on specific local issues rather than on BP's wider social 
responsibility and on links of local issues. 
In 1997, the company developed a new policy, published in 1998 and entitled "What we 
stand for ... " 
(BP Policy, 1998). BP's mission was to establish a new BP brand -a strong 
dynamic brand captured in the theme Positive Energy. Linked with this are new technologies 
and new markets but also BP's values - consideration of human rights, ethical behaviour, 
environmental stewardship, economic growth and social responsibility. Especially within 
unstable economies and weak democracies like Colombia it became very important for BP to 
integrate the idea of sustainable development - the balance of economic progress, 
environmental concerns and social development. 
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BP learned "that a company must be an integral part of the society in which it operates; that 
it must fulfil a number of different expectations - financial, social and environmental". The 
policy focused on four areas: 
" Ethical conduct; 
  Employees and relationships; 
" Health, safety and environment and; 
" Finance and control. 
In 1997, BP also reviewed its Social Policy. The company saw active support for the people 
and communities where they operated as a fundamental part of their contribution, an 
expression of belonging, but also as a wider responsibility (BP Amoco Social Report, 1998). 
In August 1998, the oil industry witnessed the birth of a new super-major - BP Amoco plc - 
to form an energy business for the next millennium. The joining of BP and the American oil 
company Amoco created Britain's biggest company, worth USD 110 billion, propelling it into 
the top three global oil majors, and forming one of the strongest, most competitive energy 
and petrochemical groups in the world. After only 100 days, the two companies joined their 
global operations together, with a 60 per cent equity share to BP and 40 per cent to Amoco 
(BP today, 1998). However, Amoco has a record of environmental damages and accusations 
of human rights abuses (Guardian, 17 October 1998). 
The social challenge is to move the merger towards a socially responsible multinational 
company. "Policies are easy to state, but their ultimate expression lies in the way we 
behave", says Browne (1997) at a presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations. To 
evaluate success and failure of responsible behaviour - integrated policy - BP began to 
develop an approach for social and environmental accountability. 
4.1.2.7 ACCOUNTING FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
The world's largest 500 industrial corporations, which employ just 0.05 per cent of the 
world's population, control 25 per cent of the world's economic output (Browne, 1997). 
"Social responsibility is an integral part of economic power, because it is central to the 
fundamental business drive of performance, " said Brown at the annual conference of 
Business for Social Responsibility (1998). MORI asked the question: "Thinking about large 
companies, which statement comes closest to your own opinion about companies and their 
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responsibilities? " As the answers show, society wants to see business' contribution to 
community as a priority. Based on this and on its own experiences, in 1996, BP saw the 
need to integrate social and environmental accountability. 
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Figure 8 Thinking about Large Companies (Source: MORI, 1996) 
One of the first steps towards measuring social impact was undertaken in 1994. This was 
essentially a value-assessing matrix, which helped to visualise BP's contribution to society 
(Smithers & Marsden, 1994). In 1995, BPX in Colombia commissioned a national institution 
to develop an economic and social account system for Casanare. Although it was very 
detailed, its complexity prevented it from applying the system internally and for 
communication purpose (CRECE, 1996). At this time, BPX measured its contribution to 
society in terms of social investment, subdivided by community development, education, 
environment and arts. 
In terms of HSE performance, BPX reported on safety, hydrocarbon emissions to air, 
discharges to water, oil spills, environmental costs, and fines and penalties. For HSE 
management, BPX established an Operations Integrity Assurance System (OIAS). Here, 
assurance may be undertook as the process whereby Business Unit and Support Unit 
Managers confirm that processes are in place and working effectively in order to manage the 
key success factors for, and major risks to, sustainable business performance. An Ethics and 
Environment Assurance Committee reviews policies and processes, which bear upon the 
group's reputation and its community, customer, employee, HSE and other relationships. 
Assurance is a continuous review process, involving regular dialogues, which are 
documented in a formal annual report. 
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Since 1997, BPX has developed a systematic approach in order to measure social impact 
effectively, the procedure consists of the identification of norms for organisational behaviour, 
social impact measures, and areas for social contributions. Under social impact 
measurement, BPX summarises social impact assessment, peer review of social impact 
issues, social performance reporting, and social accounting and auditing. HSE, social, and 
financial performance make up the 'triple bottom line' - the underlying idea of sustainable 
development. In 1998, BPX first published social and HSE performance in a joint annual 
report. 
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4.1.3 Business's Social Integration Features 
BP itself and its stakeholders asked the question: How should a company behave when 
integrating business in a less developed society? After BPX in Colombia was accused of 
human rights abuses and environmental damages, the question of whether BPX's way of 
minimising social risk and maximising social contribution is the right one became critical. 
However, BP decided to act as a good citizen. Based on its policy, BPX's operation was 
compliance directed. As a guest in Colombia, the observance of law and order was of 
paramount importance. Additionally, BPX's set course was responsibility orientated. The 
company recognised that because it had initiated tremendous social change in a less 
developed area, the resulting social risk generated by its business led to a corresponding 
duty to contribute as positively as possible to a sustainable development of the society in 
which the company operated. 
Changes within society instigated by BPX in Casanare required social investment. Based on 
its set course, BP recognised that social problems both affected and were affected by its 
business. To cope with the challenge to mitigate induced social risk, BPX developed social 
investment projects able to guide its actions towards a positive contribution to Casanare's 
social development. Social investment projects were organised like other investment 
projects, but did not always aim to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. In this context, 
stakeholder consultation became crucial for selecting, planning, integrating and assessing 
social investments, and therefore co-ordinating company's contribution to Casanare's social 
development. BPX's expertise was technology led rather than social issue based; therefore 
stakeholder competence was needed. Social development together with stakeholder 
consultation became the driving connecting processes for BPX's integration into Casanare. 
The licence to operate (LTO) can be given to a company and can be taken away. The 
attainment and maintenance of a LTO depends on the extent to which BPX contributes 
positively and negatively to social development. BPX's connecting processes for managing 
induced social risk provided the company with a LTO. This licence is a crucial resource for 
long-term survival. BPX's LTO in Casanare can be revoked if BPX were to wilfully abuse 
human rights. Also, if BPX were to have negative social and environmental records, 
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investors could withdraw their LTO by divesting in BP. Only in an extreme case could a lost 
LTO drive a company out of business, but it will always have a negative impact on firm's 
performance. 
BP was accountable to its stakeholders for the contribution to the society in which it 
established its business. After facing accusations of human rights abuses and environmental 
damages, BP had to recognise that it did not, as it thought, meet societies' expectations. 
Given its strategic endeavour to restore its reputation, the company discovered that 
stakeholders assessed BP in terms of its social investment. BP saw that its social 
development endeavours could enhance its reputation. Therefore, strategizing reputation 
was for BP also the management of its LTO. BPX's licence to operate and its reputation are 
interlinked components of its social capital and resources generated by BPX's social 
integration process. 
The following table summarises business social integration features under three headings: 
Set Course Connecting Processes Social Capital 
  Compliance Directed 
  Responsibility Orientated 
  Social Development 
  Stakeholder Consultation 
  Licence to Operate 
  Reputation 
Table 6 Business's Social Integration Features 
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4.2 ENGAGING NGOS IN POLICY DIALOGUE 
4.2.1 BP and Human Rights Agents 
"I think the first way to think of it is to throw a stone in a pond and see how that creates a set 
of ripples. A lot depends also on the size of the pond and the stone and whether or not the 
pond is indefinite or has got boundaries", said BP's group director regional Latin America. 
When BPX began to integrate its business into Casanare, the company immediately created 
all sorts of ripples - political, social, economical and environmental. The pond in Casanare 
was very small and BPX's stone very big - this raises the question of who thought about 
human rights? 
In 1996, when BPX was accused of human rights abuses, the company thought that it could 
manage all its induced ripples. However, at this time, human rights was not regarded 
specifically as a business issue, because it has not been an issue that BP was pressured to 
think of. The trouble for BPX emerged from doing business in a potential 'war zone'. NGOs - 
human rights agents - have, indeed, pointed out that an oil company may be unable to 
behave ethically in Colombia today for the following reasons (Independent, 1997): 
  All oil companies in Colombia are obliged to pay war tax to the Colombian 
government, which is then channelled to the military; 
" Colombian military personnel are responsible for systematic human rights abuse, 
including arbitrary killings of civilians and torture. This has been documented by 
Amnesty International and UN Special Rapporteurs; 
  Colombia has one of the worst human rights records in the Western hemisphere. 
NGOs recognised that BPX took its social responsibility seriously. However, they also spoke 
out against the way in which the company was 'pouring money into the coffers of an army 
with blood on its hands'. Human rights agents suggested that the only way BPX could 
remove this contradiction and stay in business in Colombia was to put pressure on the 
Colombian government to improve its appalling human rights records. BPX also had to 
change its own way of doing business in Casanare. The company needed to accept that it 
could not continue to do business in Colombia without making human rights a business 
issue. BPX realised that not considering human rights as a business issue could mean the 
loss of its LTO. 
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Managers lacked knowledge of human rights, whether in a business context or in terms of 
management. BP's lack of competence in the field of human rights and the social context of 
Casanare as well as the network and the public attention human rights agents had left the 
company with no alternative to the decision to engage with NGOs. However, NGOs were as 
suspicious about companies as these were of NGOs. Until then, the two were often throwing 
stones at each other. There was a fear on both sides of being misused. Local NGOs in 
Casanare could not work with BPX directly because guerrillas and paramilitaries put too 
much pressure on them. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were the first 
international NGOs to talk to BP about human rights in Colombia, but mainly functioned as 
'watch dogs'. 
Who would have thought that BP could sit at a table with human rights agents to discuss its 
policy and practice? BP had to be able to mange the situation in Colombia and integrate 
human rights with business matters. NGOs wanted to enhance human rights, especially in 
less developed countries like Colombia that were influenced by transnational companies. In 
1997, the Inter-Agency Group (IAG), a group of development NGOs came together to 
discuss BP's business policy and human rights in Colombia. Whereas the company wanted 
to engage the NGOs in actions, the development agencies wanted to focus on a human 
rights standards for oil companies in less developed countries. However there was a 
common ground. "It became important to invest in people, instead of in things, because 
people are more dynamic and people can activate help to build the future", said a BP 
international policy advisor. A constructive policy dialogue developed between BP and the 
IAG -a partnership to improve and integrate human rights into business policy and practice. 
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4.2.2 From Accusations to Conversations 
Because of various conflicting antecedents, BP and NGOs hardly talked to each other unless 
they saw each other in the courtrooms. In the 1980s, BP began to engage with 
environmentalists. Prior to 1996, BP had few contacts with NGOs aimed at conversations 
about human rights. After the company faced accusations of human rights abuses and 
environmental damage caused by its operations in Casanare, it was forced to do more. A 
new engagement process started when BP began to talk to Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. In 1996 and 1997, BP and NGOs with human rights competence 
approached each other on various levels. In 1997 the IAG was set-up. This established a 
basis for engaging in constructive, continuous dialogue with a variety of human rights 
agents. 1997 and 1998 was the beginning of the dialogue that enabled both partners to learn 
more about the possibilities of dialogue. After integration, it was crucial for both sides to 
ensure that policy dialogue would have a positive influence on the way in which BPX does 
business in Colombia, as well as on how NGOs perceive this endeavour and communicate it 
to their constituencies. 
The partnership between BP and the IAG is a business-NGO policy dialogue. Although there 
was a common agenda item - human rights improvement, ideas about ways of achieving it 
differed. The following five sections describe the partnership building process in detail. 
4.2.2.1 LOBBING BRICKS AT EACH OTHER 
Although BP's senior policy advisor claims that engagement "with environmental NGOs 
started some time ago in the 1980s", it was only in 1997 that BP and Greenpeace came to 
blows over oil operations in the North Sea and environmental safety. However, at the same 
time BPX Scotland set up round tables to discuss primarily BPX's environmental impact. 
Greenpeace was invited, but did not participate. BP's regional director Latin America 
distinguishes between two NGO polarities: "On one end are NGOs that only throw stones 
whereas on the other end are NGOs that say: We are prepared to work with you. " BP 
focused on the second group of NGOs to find solutions to environmental, and later, social 
challenges. The head of CEP Europe believed, "working with NGOs is buying legitimacy. " 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, when BPX began its operations in Colombia, it was not held in 
the highest esteem, and was not thought to deal in a socially responsible way. Indeed, BPX 
was viewed with suspicion. Nevertheless, it was also the engine of wealth creation. 
Investments in Colombia are at very high risk because of social instability. This was 
enhanced by the conflict between BP and NGOs that occurred after BP realised that merely 
denying the accusations of human rights abuses would not solve the problem. Relationship 
building became of crucial importance to BPX's operations. BP's former head of community 
affairs said: 
We had to make sure that we have the relationships so that we know who to talk to 
immediately after a likely crisis to give them your side of the story and hopefully to 
get them arguing on our behalf in other places. 
BP benefited by being open with NGOs about the nature of its operations in Colombia, the 
commercial structure, relationships with authorities, and where the company might play a 
role in promoting peace and security and stability. BP found themselves in a role close to 
that of honest broker between a government and the international community. It was 
essential to have a full understanding of the weight of feeling held by all sides in these issues 
(Barrett, 1998). 
"Few types of partnership are as challenging for business as those some companies are 
beginning to develop with their erstwhile enemies, the NGOs", says John Elkington, 
chairman of SustAinability in BP's employees' magazine Shield (1998). "These strange 
alliances will demand extraordinary vision and new political and management skills from 
people who in the past have found it much easier to simply lob bricks at each other. " In 
1996, BP and NGOs began to approach each other to talk about human rights in Colombia. 
4.2.2.2 APPROACHING AT VARIOUS LEVELS 
Human Rights Watch, an American based NGO, approached BPX in Colombia in the early 
1990s. They regularly reported on Colombia's human rights records, and expected a positive 
contribution from BPX. However, their field contacts reported the opposite. BPX and Human 
Rights Watch had spasmodic conversations where these critical points were discussed and 
continuously controlled to report any changes. Human Rights Watch's emphasis was not on 
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BPX's operation in particular, but rather on the country in general. After BPX faced 
accusations of human rights abuses, the NGO sent a letter to BP's CEO and criticised BPX's 
business practice on the basis of their data. Human Rights Watch was never anything other 
than an informative 'watch dog'. The contacts between BP and the NGO were mainly based 
on personal relationships. 
In 1991 Amnesty International established its Business Group, a part of the NGO that aimed 
to work with business on human rights. In the early 1990s, the group sent a letter to BP 
asking for conversation about BPX's operations in less developed societies and the 
relevance of human rights consideration. The following talks were sporadic, and not directly 
linked to any specific business from BPX. However, Sir Geoffrey Chandler, head of the 
Amnesty International Business Group, predicted that it "is vital to company's achieving 
objectives. Its reputation is today an important part of future profitability. " Amnesty 
International developed human rights guidelines for multinational companies. The 
conversations continued primarily with BP's headquarters and managers that knew the 
members involved in Amnesty International or were members of the NGO. 
Since the early 1990s, BP's MD for policy and politics was involved with NGOs such as 
Greenpeace, Oxfam and WWF, at director level. The strategic conversations were thought to 
provide a corridor for actions at the next management level and below. BP's MD explained 
the strategic necessity of partnerships with NGOs: 
The other party has skills you don't and you don't wish to have or you would be 
very inefficient to duplicate these skills. They also have attitudes and sensitivities 
that you don't and you learn enormous things if you are really listening to this. They 
also have connections and relationships that you don't. If they are prepared to 
share this with you or if they contribute it for your benefit then that is an advantage. 
At a very early stage in the integration of its business in Casanare, BPX made an effort to 
involve local NGOs because of their specific insights into Casanare's social context. 
However, local NGOs were less resourceful, and more critical, under the threat of guerrillas 
and paramilitaries. This made it nearly impossible for them to engage with the company. To 
raise their voice and not to dissimulate problems, international NGOs, on behalf of local 
NGOs, campaigned for a responsible and sustainable business practice of BPX in Casanare. 
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It was not until BPX faced accusations of human rights abuses that the company searched 
for NGO contacts at international level to tackle the problems in Colombia. In the beginning, 
BP saw the accusations as a problem that was made up, and not as one that was instigated 
by its business practice. Later, BP searched for the source of criticism. There were 
newspaper articles and other publications. BP's senior policy advisor said, "we phoned the 
authors and asked for a meeting. That was the beginning of our conversations with 
international development NGOs about human rights in Colombia and our business 
practice. " 
4.2.2.3 COMING TOGETHER FOR DISCUSSIONS 
In March 1996, a British foundation approached a development NGO to do some work on 
BPX in Colombia. At this time, BP approached Save the Children Fund and offered some 
money for a project in Nigeria. The company already worked with the NGO in Vietnam in the 
early 1990s in a development project. This time, Save the Children Fund thought that it 
needed some backup from other agencies. Oxfam's field office in Casanare was also 
interested in doing some more work about BPX in Colombia. Consequently, Oxfam gave 
priority to undertaking particular case study, so as to do much more work on corporate 
responsibility in extractive companies. A member of a development NGO remembered BP's 
strategy: 
They did not sit down and think who would be the right NGO for Colombia. There 
were already some NGOs that looked into this. They only contacted me when I had 
a newspaper article published. As soon as this one came out they rung and said 
we want to meet. They wanted to meet me alone but / said that I want to meet 
them only with the other NGOs that deal with Colombia. 
In 1997 the NGOs, CAFOD, Christian Aid, CIIR, Oxfam and Save the Children, came 
together to form the Inter-Agency Group (IAG), that then engaged in discussions with BP on 
the impact of the company's operations is Colombia, and aimed to develop human rights 
guidelines. Amnesty International did not join the IAG because they considered their work as 
parallel to the work of the development NGOs. Nor did they want to institutionalise their 
engagement with BP and become overtly focused on Colombia. 
98 
The dialogue between BP and the IAG aimed at getting the company to accept responsibility 
for the full impact of its operations on people's lives and the environment, as a necessary 
prerequisite to ensure that BPX's actions are beneficial at a local and at a national level. By 
bringing experience to the discussion with BP, IAG believed it to be possible to bring about 
improvements to the less developed society of Casanare. Discussions with BP were based 
on information received by IAG from their staff in Colombia, partner organisations and 
members of the affected communities in Colombia's Casanare region. BP had a slightly 
different strategy. Its senior policy advisor expressed company's intention thus: 
Where 1 want to move the relationship to is from negative questioning to positive 
contribution. I want to get them involved because then they are part of it. They 
would get accused of things we were accused of. 
The IAG sent out conditions that BP was to meet and established then basis for 
conversation. This included a stated code of practice on business ethics and clearly 
identified responsibilities for both senior and middle management for the monitoring and 
implementation of any commitment. None of the NGOs within the IAG accepted BP money. 
An advisor to BP's board of directors elaborated that both BP's and the IAG condition for 
partnership met in a "context of suspicion, scrutiny is a completely new phenomenon - 
important to both NGOs and international business. " An external environmental advisor to 
BP said that one "can not just get partners when it suits you. " 
The dialogue between BP and the IAG constituted a very small part of the NGOs' work in 
Colombia. Through their programmes in Colombia, containing advocacy, human rights, 
development and humanitarian aid components, members of the IAG sought to address 
property and suffering, as well as challenge their causes. The NGOs have been working in 
Colombia for decades with people from all walks of life. Because of this knowledge and 
competence, BP considered the IAG as a valuable partner to discuss policy and practice 
issues for its business in Colombia, and for wider implications. 
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4.2.2.4 TALKING ABOUT POLICY ISSUES 
Once BP started engaging, it became challenged by the NGOs who that said. 'Now 
you realised that you are part of the problem, even if you do not want to be, now 
you are saying to us you want to be part of the solution. Part of the solution means 
to tell the government to change. ' But you cannot do this because you need their 
licence. BP had a three-stage model: from denial, to engagement, to activism. 
This is how BP's former head of community affairs saw the development of conversations 
with NGOs in BP in general. According to a company's senior policy advisor, the dialogue 
between BP and the IAG "moved from direct allegations against BP into whether a company 
should be there at all. " BP tried to involve the IAG in problem solving, so that they would 
experience the situation from company perspective. However, when BP's senior policy 
advisor "asked Oxfam if they would like to manage BPX's community affairs in Colombia", 
they refused. The IAG was concerned at being associated with an oil company. BP believed 
that because of their ideology, NGOs had a general problem with the idea of partnership. 
Although this did not cause problems, it made dialogue more difficult. A BPX external affairs 
manager said that the partnership "was really only at a level of discussing. We talked about 
big issues together. Mainly it was about principles. It was not about doing things. " 
The IAG saw the dialogue moving much more towards a discussion about the development 
of Casanare and why generated risk was predictable. They decided to come up with some 
sort of outline of good practice, in the promotion of economic, cultural and social rights. The 
NGOs continued talking to other companies. They tried to hold their own agenda, which was 
not to help BP or any other company. In this context it became more decisive whether the 
IAG would disseminate their knowledge to BP or not. An explicit decision was never made 
on this question but knowledge sharing became a practice of the policy dialogue. 
The discussions at the meetings were open, but did not lack tensions. Oxfam, for instance, 
was persistent in its request for a memorandum of understanding that set the rules for the 
partnership. However, this existed only verbally, not in a written form. BP and the IAG met at 
least every second months but also at other meetings, such as conferences or workshops. 
There was no formal timetable for policy dialogue. The partners emailed each other, phoned 
or wrote letters. From the IAG, the same people were involved in the dialogue. BP had a 
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core team at its London office co-ordinating BP's partnering activities and bringing managers 
in and out of the dialogue as needed for specific issues. 
The policy dialogue meetings were structured and had an agenda set by the IAG, to which 
all dialogue partners had to agree prior to the meeting. The IAG always kept records of 
meetings that were conducted by one of its members. The only specific rule for the meetings 
and any outcomes was confidentiality. The IAG was concerned with this because there was 
a potential threat from guerrillas and paramilitaries to people that talked to, or were seen as 
associated with, BP. 
To protect staff and partners in Colombia the circulation list of the minutes of meetings was 
limited to the participants, staff in Colombia and key partners of the IAG. A member of a 
participating NGO said: "Much of the discussions have been undertaken at the level of policy 
advisors. " IAG staff and partners in Bogota met with company staff in Colombia. Senior NGO 
staff who met with the BPX president in Bogota and BP director and senior policy staff in 
London monitored the process. BP's policy advisor for Latin America summarised the 
partnership agreement: 
We don't have any formalised agenda or rules for meetings. We have not written 
anything down. We have always agreed that the point of the meeting is to share 
information with each other and then not to show it more widely. We also have an 
agreement not to use the relationship for publicity reasons. 
Although there were a few slips, BP and the IAG developed a constructive way of talking 
about their concerns. Both partners were on the way to achieving their objectives. 
4.2.2.5 REVIEWING DISCUSSION INFLUENCE 
"It was not a PR exercise but it has something to do with reputation management", said a 
BPX external affairs manager. "I think the more you interact with the NGO world the more 
you start to understand them. You learn what they do and what they are capable of doing. " 
BP saw some of them as useful to be confronted with. These were the campaigners. Others 
were seen as partners for managing BPX's social investment. However, BP's policy advisor 
for Latin America reviewed that - "external advisors - one can not really speak that out. 
NGOs could feel exploited. " A BPX external affairs manager considered relationships with 
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NGOs more like a personal network. The strategy of BP was to work in partnership in any 
area, with the best people in that field, whether it be technology or development. As far as 
policy dialogue with the IAG was concerned, BP's senior policy advisor felt that "BP comes 
out of meetings and asks what are the actions, what do you do and what do we do? That is 
all that we need to know. " He further concluded "if they do not want to work with us, we will 
do it on our own. " 
The initial aim of the IAG was to seek concrete evidence of actions within the company that 
demonstrated that human rights and development concerns were, indeed, part of BP's 
stated agenda. A group member noted that they " were pleased that over the period of 
dialogue there was some evidence that BP acted on these issues. " The next aim of the IAG 
was to empower community organisations in Casanare in their dealings with BPX, and to 
encourage the company to get detailed advice from human rights organisations. 
The third, key aim for the NGOs of the IAG was to see BPX undertake concrete steps in 
defence of human rights in Casanare. This was primarily achieved by raising individual 
cases to the company and by promoting dialogue with international human rights 
organisations. A NGO policy advisor said, "there is still a great deal to be done in this area 
by the company. " The group comment on the achievement and continuation of the policy 
dialogue with BPX was that "while the IAG consider that the dialogue is contributing to 
bringing about tangible improvements in the lives of poor people, the IAG will continue to talk 
to the company" (IAG, 1998). Referring to the way in which the group had dialogue with BP, 
one member of its members said that they "are not working with BP but you will get a 
different answer depending on who you talk to in the IAG. I am not convinced that capitalism 
is a model that we should operate in. We worked on BP. " 
The IAG also thought, "the internal structure of BP is a weakness", as one of 
its members 
criticised. Policy and practice were seen as not connected enough. "We are good at 
the top 
but we need to transfer it to the base line", said BP's regional director 
for Latin America. This 
was also recognised at BPX in Colombia as its former president pointed out: 
Sometimes they sit in the corporate centre and develop a policy and the 
subsidiaries have to integrate it. A head office can not properly assess 
the issues 
from the ground. 
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However, BP's MD for policy and politics concluded that BP "learned that you can not solve 
complex problems a priori". Colombia challenged BP with a social conflict-ridden society that 
had different values and a different way of life, as a BPX legal advisor, a native Colombian 
summarised: 
We do not have the values from Europe. Time does not matter. You cannot have a 
good partnership if you forget to ask people about their family and refuse to have a 
cup of coffee with them. 
4.2.3 Business-NGO Policy Dialogue Features 
The business-NGO policy dialogue between BP and the IAG was driven by the accusations 
of human rights abuses that BPX faced in Colombia in 1996. BP did not previously consider 
human rights as a business issue, and was now forced to implement it into its policy and 
practice. However, BP was not the only organisation interested in human rights in Colombia. 
National and international NGOs were already observing Colombia's human rights records 
and campaigning for ways to improve them. Through media and direct contacts, BP found 
out which NGO was concerned with human rights in Colombia. Since NGOs expected 
multinational companies to contribute to the amelioration of human rights in this socially 
unstable country, BP and NGOs had a joint interest in improving the human rights records of 
Colombia and in particular in BPX's operating environment. Because BP did not understand 
the situation and the associated risks that it created for human rights, it needed the IAG to 
gain this understanding. In return, the IAG required knowledge from BP to accomplish its aim 
of developing human rights guidelines for the excavation industry in Colombia. Therefore, 
the purpose of the partnership was a joint interest in human rights and the acquisition of 
each other's knowledge to achieve distinguishing objectives. 
The reason why development NGOs congregated into the IAG was to support each other in 
the conversation process with BP. The IAG criticised BP and at least parts of it were not 
convinced that capitalism was the right way forward. Moreover, NGOs are aware of the 
power that companies have and often apply. BP was no exception to this. Based on these 
circumstances together with assumed neglected human rights, the IAG was very suspicious 
about BP and its offer for conversations about the conflicting issues. NGOs considered the 
IAG as an assurance of their involvement with BP. BP on the other hand, had experiences 
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where NGOs accused the company of not acting responsibly. According to BP's 
understanding there were sometimes no grounded reasons, other than ideological. BP 
engaged with various NGOs and on various levels to get assurance for the case of 
accusations. Therefore, both partners established assurance as a base of the covenant. A 
memorandum of understanding complemented this. The content of it was the way and the 
context in which conversations would happen. The informal agreement developed out of the 
partnering practice as well as experiences but was never written down. 
Human rights accusations, of course, had a negative influence on BP's reputation. Although 
oil is not a commodity good, the company has a very strong brand identity. Not only were 
BP's employees deeply hurt by the fact that they might work for a company that harmed 
human rights but other stakeholders also put pressure on the company. The accusations that 
BP faced were initiated as well as driven and enforced by the media. NGOs were recognised 
as opinion leaders and fighters for human rights and responsible development. BP had to 
accept its negative and NGOs' positive reputation as the power base of the partnership. The 
IAG saw that it was unable to achieve its initial objective. However, they by the same token, 
were unwilling to accept BP's offer to become more specific about BPX's practice. The 
company could not convince the NGOs to become involved in a specific project in Casanare. 
If this situation remains unchanged, and the reputation becomes balanced again, there are 
indications that BP will not continue this partnership in the way they did. Consequently, that 
leads to the conclusion that there is an incident driven power balance between the company 
and the IAG with reputation as a power base. 
When BP approached development NGOs to talk with them about human rights, the 
direction of these conversations was unpredictable. The partners, on both sides, had 
different expectations and objectives for this dialogue. They did not know what one could 
expect as an outcome of this engagement, although there were set objectives on both sides. 
At the beginning, it was not clear that the dialogue would become institutionalised. The 
partners did not have a plan for the development of the conversations. The only thing that 
they were sure about was that they wanted a joint positive contribution to human rights in 
Colombia. No serious conflicts between BP and the IAG interrupted the partnership. The 
evolution of the business-NGO policy dialogue was premised on the notion of an emerging 
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development. A permanent adaptation process drove actions and therefore the evolution of 
the partnership. Both partners were open and saw it as a purpose of the dialogue to acquire 
each other's knowledge. If unpredictable, the development of the partnership was chaotic. 
Permanent adaptation to the changes in partnership was a precondition for a sustainable 
evolution since it was a reactive development. 
The following table summarises the business-NGO policy dialogue features: 
Purpose 
  Human Rights 
Improvement 
  Acquisition of 
Knowledge 
Covenant 
  Assurance 
Based 
" Memo of 
Understanding 
Power 
" Reputation as 
Power Base 
  Incident Driven 
Power Balance 
Evolution 
  Incremental 
Development 
  Permanent 
Adaptation 
Table 7 Business-NGO Policy Dialogue Features 
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4.3 COMMITTING TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
4.3.1 BPX and its Community Responsibilities 
In 1987, BPX began exploring for oil in a remote part of Colombia, which was to become the 
Department of Casanare in 1991. The company consequently invested in Colombia's 
poorest region. Governmental capacity for planning, managing finances and maintaining law 
and order was very weak. Both educational attainment and lifestyle fell was below the 
national average. Yet within ten years, Casanare's oil-related royalty income exceeded that 
of any other department. 
Three communities were directly affected by BPX's operations. Two of them were near to its 
oil fields and the third one next to the oil pipeline. The specific social issues were varied but 
the nature of them was the same. Almost immediately, the expectation of economic 
opportunities resulted in large-scale immigration and this in turn led to in social impact, which 
generated growing disaffection on the part of local communities. The injection of cash into 
the local economy and the presence of contractors fuelled both corruption and extortion, and 
led to an escalation of civil conflict. In particular, the violent activities of both guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups affected all elements of society in Casanare, casting a shadow of 
intimidation among its communities and impeding social and economic progress. In the midst 
of this complex web of expectations, impacts and opportunities, BPX consciously attempted 
to define and redefine their community responsibilities. The evolution of the company's social 
policies and programmes, and the way in which BPX in Colombia achieved its objectives 
despite the various obstacles, lay at the heart of this evolution process - BPX's commitment 
to community development. 
Underlying BPX's community strategy in the broader business sense was the need to uphold 
the company's reputation as a good employer and contributor to national wealth creation. 
The foundation of the strategy was a three-way partnership between BPX, the local 
community and government agencies. This enabled BPX to identify essential needs, 
complement governmental responsibilities, encourage community self-help and avoid any 
accusations of paternalism. 
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For the most part, BPX's community affairs activities were progressive, far reaching, and 
produced benefits for both the company and the community. The company's most 
remarkable achievement was to obtain a licence to operate from communities, and to 
implement major industrial development, despite difficult local circumstances. However, 
BPX's involvement with the communities was not always of mutual benefit, or at least, was 
not always seen to be so. In other cases, BPX was criticised for investments or interventions 
that were viewed by some as being inadequate. More significantly, BPX were at risk of being 
associated with a lost development opportunity, because of the inability of local government 
to manage revenues that accrue locally for lasting social and economic benefit. 
Liaison with governments and authorities happened at two levels - national and local. For 
community development, only the local level was relevant, whereas at a national level, policy 
was the dominant issue, at local level, relationships where infrastructure developments were 
social problem orientated rather than regulation orientated. BPX had to integrate its social 
investment into the community development plan and it needed to co-ordinate its activities 
with others. However, authorities at local level were not prepared for the new tasks. This 
circumstance had a negative influence on BPX's social contribution to Casanare and 
ensured the necessity for community development partnerships. 
Communities should not only benefit directly from the wealth and jobs that were created, but 
also from developed skills within the local population, resources invested, products and 
services provided, and BPX's active participation to meet society's needs. Hence, the 
company committed to four areas of community responsibility (BP Social Report, 1997): 
  Institutional strengthening; 
  Human development; 
  Income improvement; 
  Improvement of the standard of living. 
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4.3.2 From Impact Management to Regional Development 
When BPX began its community development programme in the early 1990s they had 
neither a policy nor a strategy. Only after the integration of a community affairs team in May 
1992 did the company move towards a more structured partnering with its communities. In 
1993, based on a community affairs policy, BPX engaged with communities proactively so as 
to analyse and manage their expectations. It was after 1997 that the company developed a 
vision for sustainable community development, focussing on the region of Casanare rather 
than on specific local issues. Because of the high commitment from BPX's senior 
management, and a corresponding reluctance on the part of stakeholders to become 
involved, the strategy was revised in 1997. Since 1998, the company has striven for an 
internalisation of a regional development of Casanare. Indeed, an ongoing review process of 
BPX's community commitments and activities provides the company with a base to assess 
and develop a strategy for its partnerships for community development. 
Groups such as village and worker associations, church organisations, and NGOs represent 
the society of Casanare. Recognising its community responsibility as being primarily driven 
by the social risk that had been introduced to Casanare, BPX changed its community activity 
commitments from reactive impact management to strategic regional community 
development. The following five sections describe the partnership building process in detail. 
4.3.2.1 COMPENSATING COMPANY'S SOCIAL IMPACT 
As early as 1992, BPX facilitated communities so as to diagnose their development needs 
and priorities. In doing so, the company helped to ensure that community development 
programmes were of direct relevance to the intended beneficiaries; create a forum for 
discussion with communities; foster their independence, capacity to negotiate and plan; and 
to improve the prospects for success of the follow-up development projects. BPX's insistence 
on co-financing with municipalities, and on community contributions was also very 
progressive for its time, in attempting to improve community development initiatives. 
However, the former BPX head of community affairs remembers that they "had no 
foundations, no strategy, no view of the future". 
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The objectives underpinning BPX's social and community programmes in Colombia have 
evolved over time. Originally, their main aim was to manage the direct socio-economic 
impact of exploration, with a view to developing support for the company's activities and 
establishing better communication channels. Until 1992, BPX's community responsibility 
resided with exploration managers, although the need for specialist advice on social issues 
was recognised, and in consequence three professionals were employed. Following the 
setting up of a community affairs team in May 1992, the aim of BPX switched to managing 
expectations of local communities and to collaboratively developing a diagnosis of the needs 
of the individual communities affected. 
Prior to 1993, there was no explicit corporate policy on community affairs, since these were 
embedded within a general commitment to environmental policy, and the aspiration not to do 
harm to people or the environment. The community affairs team in Casanare developed a 
robust policy and a series of related programmes in 1992/1993, these being directly relevant 
to Casanare, and they communicated the resulting benefits to the corporate centre in 
London as they emerged. A number of staff from the community affairs teams participated in 
peer-assisted reviews of other BPX operations, both internationally and in internal 
conferences on community affairs, and this further helped to disseminate the benefits of the 
approaches being adopted in Casanare. However, BP's senior management at the 
headquarters in Bogota and London had only little understanding about the relevance of 
community affairs activities. 
Prior to 1992, most community investment initiatives were not demand-driven, but rather, 
they aimed at mitigating the local impact of operations, while enabling BPX to continue with 
exploration. Although many individual investments were locally appropriate, they took place 
without any overall development strategy or interaction with the community. In many 
instances, there was a degree of local resentment from those who had not benefited from 
what was perceived as 'buying favours'. "Compensations for BPX's social impact in 
Casanare did not meet communities' expectations and were primarily reactive", concluded a 
BPX legal advisor. 
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4.3.2.2 MANAGING COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS 
The establishing of a community affairs team in May 1992 marked a significant change in the 
way social programmes and projects were managed. First, a framework within which 
individual investment could be made was developed. Community affairs personnel then 
facilitated communities within BPX's area of influence to develop a diagnosis of their 
development needs and expectations, involving a series of interactions between 
communities and community affairs personnel. The form of these partnering activities varied 
from open public meetings to focused workshops. 
Once development priorities had been established, communities were obligated to prepare a 
plan for individual projects, specifying objectives, material requirements, costs, etc., with 
input from either BP specialists or their appointed consultants. The majority of community 
development projects were submitted to the appropriate municipal authority for initial 
approval, BPX's involvement generally being contingent on the availability of counterpart 
funding. Except in emergency situations, the company would not finance projects without 
counterpart funding from municipalities and input from communities. For each project, all 
involved partners had to sign an agreement, which detailed the responsibilities for planning, 
implementing, and financing the project. A BPX government and public affairs manager 
commented that the "lack of consistency in communities' planning schedules had negative 
influence on BPX's community development efficiency". 
The 1993, community policy and programmes formed the base for managing expectations at 
a community level, and for creating trust and dialogue. The programmes were broadly 
divided into urban, rural, and support activities. BPX's community affairs team focused on 
the following areas (BP in Colombia, 1997): 
  Developing partnerships; 
  Developing relations of mutual benefit with stakeholder; 
  Complementing the activities of the state in relation to infrastructure provision; 
  Evaluating the basic needs of communities as the basis for investments; 
  Promoting community participation in developing investment proposals; and 
  Developing relationships between communities, state and private enterprises. 
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Although, BPX in Colombia tried to manage communities' expectations in a proactive way, 
the company was criticised for its failure to adopt a strategic development perspective. The 
Cusiana environmental pre-diagnosis highlighted the difficulties, which the territorial 
authorities in the neighbouring department of Aurauca experienced in benefiting from 
royalties, and the related escalation in conflict. It also identified a weak institutional capacity 
for planning and management of royalties. BPX appeared unable to assist the local 
authorities to manage royalties in an equitable and transparent way. In mitigation, BPX was 
rightly sensitive about being seen to be meddling in the affairs of state. The company 
supported preparation for development plans and provided training for municipal and 
departmental personnel, but frequent changes in administration have diluted the long-term 
benefits of such efforts. 
The main criticism of the 1993 community development approach lay in the narrow definition 
of the project's areas of influence to which programmes where tied. This was divisive, as 
communities beyond the limited boundaries of influence were unable to benefit from BPX's 
supported development initiatives. Reviewing these community development projects, a BP 
legal advisor commented: 
Until today one can say that the Casanare community does not feel these projects 
as projects of their community. This has created a lot of problems with 
stakeholders and especially with investors. 
BPX recognised the problem and further developed its approach. The revised objective was 
to provide support for regional as well as local programmes, and mechanisms through which 
benefits could be more broadly shared on departmental level for regional development. 
4.3.2.3 VISIONING SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to 1996, the overall responsibility for implementing the community affairs policy was 
vested in the president of BPX in Colombia. In 1996, a BPX associate president was 
appointed based in Yopal, with overall responsibility for community affairs. This significantly 
raised the profile from community affairs. The community affairs team comprised 16 people. 
It revised its community development approach. Social aspects were included in training for 
project managers and other staff. 
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In 1997, a new post of Casanare manager was created, replacing that of the associate 
president, and this manager was accorded responsibility for both operational and community 
affairs functions. Moreover, BPX consulted with its business partners, the community, and 
government representatives to define a joint vision for the region - Casanare 2000. It was a 
pilot model, which sought to lay the foundations for sustainable development, based on the 
sound investment of oil revenues. To achieve this vision, BPX jointly identified seven 
strategic principles and implemented projects that address community needs. For example in 
training, small business support and the environment were important areas to be considered. 
At the same time, BPX supported projects to improve the physical, social, institutional and 
economic infrastructure, which they believed would help lay the foundations for sustainable 
improvement in the quality of life of the people in Casanare. With its partners, BPX's social 
investment in 1996 was nearly USD 9.7 million. 
BPX's community record in Colombia and beyond has enabled the company to facilitate a 
closer relationship between the World Bank and the Colombian government to support 
regional development. The Bank is now working with the Colombian government to give 
financial support to an integral family care centre in Casanare, in which BPX is a partner. 
The centre provides health advice to pregnant mothers, day care for children and recreation 
and employment advice for youths. The project was the first example in Colombia of a three- 
way partnership between the World Bank, a national government and a private sector 
company, and established a model for future development programmes. 
BPX also supported a number of initiatives to encourage non-violent behaviour and promote 
human rights. These included a peace programme in Aguazul; one of Casanare's most 
violent areas, as well as citizens' rights campaigns and conflict management programmes in 
Casanare and along the route of the pipeline connecting the oilfields with the coast. 
Although BPX directly managed and funded a number of community programmes, it 
decided, along with its joint venture partners Ecopetrol, Lasmo Oil, Total and Triton, to pool 
resources and establish a basis for delivering programmes on the partner's behalf. The 
benefits were substantial: administration costs are reduced; the partners can speak with a 
single voice to the government; and they have extra bargaining power with suppliers of 
goods and services. 
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Excursus Casanare 2000 -A vision of the future based on seven principles 
1. Leadership in occupational health, safety and the environments. 
2. Maximising job opportunities for local people both directly and through BP contractors and increasingly 
opportunities for local companies to supply goods and services. 
3. Guaranteeing the security of BPX's workers in Casanare, within a framework of close co-operation with the 
Colombian government and its institutions. Security actions undertaken must promote a peaceful work 
environment based on good community relations and respect for human rights and must contribute to 
improving security conditions in Casanare. 
4. Maintaining a permanent dialogue with the community and the authorities by fulfilment of BPX's commitments 
and the timely provision of information on BPX's projects and plans. 
5. Contributing to the presence and development of strong institutions in Casanare. 
6. Obtaining additional resources for social investment with the support of communities and authorities and 
seeking joint funding from national and international sources. 
7. Maintaining social investment in the following areas: 
- human development 
- institutional strengthening 
- regional economic development 
- environmental conservation 
- investment in infrastructure projects. 
Figure 10 Excursion Casanare 2000 (Source: BP Social Report, 1997) 
This benefit also meant that the foundation, rather than the companies, operated 
programmes, decided what to support and where and when to invest funds. Since some of 
the contributions to the foundation were capitalised, the foundation could survive the 
eventual departure of the oil companies from Casanare. 
The establishing of Casanare 2000 involved considerable effort and vision at a corporate 
level, but had little involvement from the local authorities and communities. Irrespective of 
how well conceived Casanare 2000 was, two year after its conception the lack of input from 
stakeholders delayed the adoption and implementation of the strategy. Consequently, BPX's 
social investments appeared to be a little more than disparate development initiatives rather 
than a strategic vision. Nevertheless, the shift in emphasis from managing local impacts and 
expectations to one of sustainable regional development supported by oil revenues marked 
a significant shift in policy. The opinion of a BPX community affairs manager was: 
BPX rationalises things very fast. It understands the problem and makes a very 
good analysis of the problem and finally develops a good policy and strategy. [... J 
the problem was that it had commitment from the top but did not involve enough 
line managers and affected stakeholders. 
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4.3.2.4 INTERNALISING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Many of the principles, aspirations and approaches outlined in Casanare 2000 required 
review when BPX overhauled its strategy in Casanare in 1998. The expectation was that the 
review would emphasise the developing responsibility for community affairs to field based 
operations managers, supported by fewer specialised community affairs personnel. To 
ensure that community affairs did not become of peripheral concern to front-line managers, 
mechanisms for improved accountability were put into practice. In effect, community affairs 
became one of a number of key areas that together formed the basis for evaluating the 
performance of managers. 
Since 1998, BPX has had its community offices outside the fences. This made them 
accessible for the community. A BPX community affairs manager summarised these new 
partnering activities: 
We have contacts with the church. We have contacts with the community. We have 
a council where we discuss opportunities. The meetings are basically organised by 
the community and we will go there. We have what we call juntas'. We have 
representatives that cover the region and we cover various problems. 
BPX and the community organised workshops to discuss community development issues 
and to set priorities for projects and programmes. The community decided on priorities and 
how they could support the project or programme so that it became a community owned 
project financed by BPX. "Finally an agreement was signed" said a BPX community project 
manager. "This was a process of negotiation that started every time we started a new 
project. We controlled the project progress. The majority was not successfully finished. " 
While most beneficiaries of BPX's community projects acknowledged the benefits of BPX's 
involvement, they typically view the company's contribution as obligatory and an inadequate 
response to disruption brought by oil production. Given that BPX's community development 
budget in Colombia of USD 6 million in 1996, and nearly USD 100 million in 1997, 
represented a fraction of royalties' related earnings in the department, the real opportunity 
for sustainable development in Casanare lay in harnessing these revenues more effectively. 
BP's head of community affairs named the new strategic direction for community 
development as "long-term economic development in partnerships with communities". 
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4.3.2.5 REVIEWING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
In 1994, BPX initiated a database to control the effectiveness and efficiency of its community 
development activities. Monthly and quarterly reports were produced that provided a 
summary of the people involved, the money spent and other, quantifyable social impact 
measurements. Budgets and strategies were based on past performances. Later, in 1996, a 
social impact assessment tool extended the database. However, BPX's head of community 
affairs admitted that "there were no indicators or benchmarks that could be used to argue for 
further investment and most of the budgeting at BPX is based on a mechanism like this". 
To ensure that community perspectives on BPX's social investments were as representative 
as feasible, a Colombian NGO was set up to facilitate evaluations of representative projects 
that BPX had co-financed. In terms of community participation, this evaluation concluded 
that participation during the planning stage of specific projects was often minimal, but 
improved substantially during project implementation. Although most projects resulted from 
the way in which the needs of communities were diagnosed through participation, individuals 
with leadership skills often directed, through follow-up projects, which particular needs 
received attention. In terms of the processing of projects, a recurring criticism was that 
information was not always readily available, or intended beneficiaries were unaware of how 
to access information or participate more actively. In most cases, public partnering beyond 
implementation was neither relevant nor perceived as important communities. In general 
terms, the level of participation in co-financed community development initiatives by BPX 
improved over time. However, a BPX public affairs manager concluded, "the development of 
Casanare requires an amount of resources that BPX did not have. We need to carefully 
decide in which community development activities it is worthwhile to invest. " 
Evolving Community Policy 
First Community Affairs Team in '92 - First Community Policy in '93 Casanare 2000 in '96 - Policy Revision in '98 
Social Investment Objectives and Approaches 
Impact Management Managing Expectations Regional Development 
Reactive Proactive 4 Strategic 
Numbers of Community Affairs Staff 
368 12 16 30* 34* 4 
16 core team and the rest for Ocensa 
1990 1995 2000 
Figure 11 BPX's Evolving Framework for Community Development in Colombia 
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Overall, most involved community development partners considered that projects delivered 
tangible worthwhile benefits, although it was not possible to evaluate the long-term benefits 
of the educational aspects of certain projects. However, a commonly held view of BPX's 
effort, was that they represent a partial, if inadequate, retribution for disruption related to oil 
production. This may be inevitable, given that communities had little faith in the capacity of 
the government to deliver tangible benefits, despite their improved access to finance as a 
result of royalties from BPX's operations. Because of this, BPX became the focus of 
expectations that often overlap with the roles and responsibilities of government. In this 
context, it was BPX, rather than government, that became the target of frustration and 
disappointment at the failure of the government to deliver improvements in their social well 
being. The company was committed to supporting the Colombian society by efficient, 
effective use oil revenues. BP's MD for policy and politics concluded, "the absence of a civil 
society was a great threat to capital". 
4.3.3 Community Development Features 
BPX's presence and its operations in Colombia had considerable positive and negative 
impacts on Casanare. The poorest department of Colombia got the chance to develop its 
communities with wealth created by the oil industry. However, community development was 
only possible through a triad partnership between the company, communities and local 
authorities. BPX recognised its community responsibilities, and accordingly, committed itself 
to community development. This was based on the company's endeavour to manage its 
social impact. Communities' expectations were centred around BPX's contribution, and by 
implication, its impact on society. Both, the company and the community were convinced that 
social impact management was the key to sustainable community development. However, 
because of the wide impact area that was affected by BPX's presence in Casanare, various 
communities needed to be involved, and complex development issues needed to be 
considered. BPX could not mitigate all social conflicts and risk potentials. Communities' 
needs had to be analysed and to be understood in order to meet social expectations. BPX, 
together with communities and local authorities, were in a position to co-finance social 
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investments. The underlying purpose for the community development partnership was joint 
social investments and social impact management. 
When BPX began its operations in Colombia they had only a limited understanding of the 
social environment and the company's effects on it. Accusations and criticism with regard to 
BPX's social impact and contribution to community development made the company aware 
that it was not meeting society's expectations. The primary reason was that BPX built 
community affairs often detached from the society, without enough stakeholder engagement. 
BPX recognised that to achieve sustainable community development with a positive return to 
its business, the company had to forge partnerships linked to social expectations. These 
became more visible when they focused on negotiations about concrete projects and joint 
actions. Workshops and open forums were established so as to analyse and understand 
social expectations in general. After prioritising community development issues specific 
project planning began. For each project a formal agreement between the involved partners 
was signed. Therefore the covenant for community development was informal and social 
expectation based, but in addition, formalised, for every specific community development 
project into a signed formal project agreement. 
BPX committed itself to community development, which implied a community policy, a 
community affairs team and a social investment budget. However, the company experienced 
difficulties in achieving sustainable community development without communities' 
commitments as well. BPX aimed to transfer the ownership to the affected community 
members and local authorities. The company's early, paternalistic approach meant that 
many projects were inefficient, or indeed, failed. However, BPX's primary commitment was 
one of social investment, which financial contribution combined with expertise knowledge. 
The communities' commitment was based on active engagement and participation in project 
fulfilment. Lack, or indeed misuse of commitment on at least one side of the partnership 
often resulted in criticism about and failure of the partnership projects. Hence, commitments 
were the power base for the community development partnership that was sometimes 
consciously and sometimes unconsciously applied. Because the success of community 
development in general and certain projects in particular, depended on the full commitment 
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of both partners to achieve the appropriate ownership structure, there was a mutual- 
dependent power balance between BPX and its communities. 
While BPX integrated and developed its business within Casanare, social and environmental 
issues changed. The company developed a policy and programmes that influenced its 
engagement with community development. BPX's approach was reactive at the beginning of 
the partnership, and only became strategic after 1996. Community development also needed 
to be aligned with the development plans of local authorities. Because of various 
inconsistencies in the government mechanism these often changed, and BPX had to adapt 
its development activities. Communities' needs and expectations based on social 
development also changed over time and required changes in BPX's community 
development engagement. While the company had a continuous consultation process with 
its community partners, every concrete development project required a separate, quite 
specific negotiation process. Nevertheless, based on achieved project objectives and mutual 
learning resulted from this, the involved community development partners enhanced the 
process of the re-negotiation for new projects. The experiences from projects, the analysis of 
social impacts, together with the criticism that BPX faced from NGOs about its community 
development activities, influenced the company to change its social investment approach to 
meet societies' expectations. Therefore, the evolution of the community development 
partnership was embedded in a gradual re-negotiation process of development projects and 
community affairs professionalism developed towards strategizing for regional development. 
This implied the application of a long-term perspective towards a community development 
partnership that would ensure positive social impact even for the time when BPX will be long 
gone. 
The following table summarises the community development features: 
Purpose Covenant Power Evolution 
  Social Impact   Social Expectation   Commitments as   Re-Negotiation for New 
Management Based Power Base Project 
  Co-financed Social   Formal Project Mutual-Dependent   Strategizing for Regional 
Investments Agreements Power Balance Sustainability 
Table 8 Community Development Features 
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Chapter 5 HOECHST IN GERMANY: 
MANAGING SOCIAL RISK IN A DEVELOPED SOCIETY 
We have learned that a company needs to establish and promote a dialogue with 
all its stakeholders. In brief: you can only realise what you can communicate. 
Jürgen Dormann (1998) 
The Hoechst Group is an international network of companies that recently changed its 
business focus from industrial chemicals to life sciences, specifically pharmaceuticals, 
agriculture and animal health. Because of induced social risk, Hoechst's business practice 
was often under criticism. This chapter focuses on Hoechst in Frankfurt/Germany. The 
transition from chemicals to life sciences is described and analysed by focussing on three 
selected relevant areas of social risk management: 
  Hoechst's social reintegration in Germany; 
  The development of a sustainability strategy tool together with an NGO; 
  The building of a Community Discussion Group. 
In 1997, the companies consolidated in the Hoechst Group achieved sales of around DEM 
52 billion and had nearly 120,000 employees (InfraServ Fact Sheet, 1997). Since this year, 
Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft has been a strategic management holding, steering a group of 
legally independent companies operating autonomously with their own logos and corporate 
design in their specific sectors and markets. As a German global acting group, Hoechst has 
its corporate centre in Frankfurt am Main. It is the most important production site of the 
Hoechst Group. InfraServ Höchst, a new service company owned by Hoechst's autonomous 
subsidiaries, is the operating company of this Industriepark. Hoechst illustrates how a 
transnational company in a developed society is striving for a new identity through social 
reintegration and the building of stakeholder partnership. 
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5.1 REINTEGRATING BUSINESS INTO SOCIETY 
5.1.1 Social Risk as Driver for Business Reintegration 
Around fifty years ago, on 7 December 1951, Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft was founded as 
Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft vormals Meister Lucius & Brüning in Frankfurt am 
Main. The original company was also founded here in 1863 and Hoechst developed an 
integrated relationship with the surrounding society. The company got off to a difficult start 
six years after the catastrophe of the Second World War, when Hoechst was involved with 
the employment of forced labour convict as part of IG Farben, and just two years after the 
foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany. A damaged reputation and a starting capital 
of only DEM 100,000 are indications of this (Bäumler, 1988). Nevertheless, although it had 
just been founded, the company had the potential to build on a long tradition in research and 
development as well as outstanding products. It was crucial to establish international 
competitiveness and favourable relations with society. However, the company was not 
always an integral part of society. 
Hoechst's reputation was constantly affected by the widespread view of the chemical 
industry as a polluter. For many years, the company received criticism of its negative 
environmental impact, resulting from both production facilities and products. The Farbwerke 
portion of the name referred to the most important field of activity of the predecessor 
companies, which had profoundly changed the colourful world of dyes since the mid 19th 
century. Soon after, work in industrial chemistry and life sciences, in the form of 
pharmaceuticals, and fertilisers began. However, Hoechst's community not only benefited 
from the company's prosperity, but to face the consequences of Hoechst's induced 
environmental pollution. Ultimately, critical chemical accidents called for radical changes and 
participation of affected stakeholders on the way towards solutions. 
The Hoechst site in Frankfurt is part of a city particularly prone to ecological risks. When the 
company was founded, the site was close to a village called Höchst. Today, this area is a 
district of Frankfurt, surrounded by various communities with high populations. Hoechst built 
relationships with this neighbourhood, and supported the development of the region. Until 
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the 1970s, the company considered it as their responsibility. During the 1980s, Hoechst 
began to minimise its engagement in community development. The company partly justified 
this by the fact that quality had been achieved, and partly because they considered social 
responsibility as "state's responsibility rather than company's", as a Public and 
Governmental Affairs manager from Hoechst expressed. As a consequence of the 
breakdown in relations, the community understood Hoechst's behaviour no more than 
Hoechst could understand society's behaviour. 
As a result of Hoechst's restructuring, and other associated changes, the company is 
responsible to some degree for increasing the social exclusion of surrounding communities. 
International competitiveness forced Hoechst into a cost-cutting programme, which resulted 
in redundancies and cuts in community programmes. Hoechst's communities asked for 
social security and information about environmental impacts, including possible effects on 
human beings and nature. In addition, globalisation raises the awareness of effects on 
international communities. Hoechst became unable to manage these aspects, and in 
consequence was driven into a defensive position. Most crucially, the company had a series 
of chemical accidents that not only negatively affected communities of Hoechst, but also the 
performance of the company in general. 
The transition towards a company devoted to life sciences causes new social risk 
challenges. Gene-technology is one of Hoechst's future areas of involvement, so it is hard to 
predict long-term effects on society. However, the considerations about gene-manipulated 
products are often at the top of the agenda of social risk disputes. Along with information 
technology, gene-technology is likely to change societies, and therefore people demand to 
be informed, and to play an active role in change. A way of resolving resulting conflicts is 
through social reintegration and partnership building that can support Hoechst's endeavour 
to establish a new identity and build a good corporate reputation. 
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5.1.2 From a Chemical to a Life Sciences Company 
Under considerable external pressure, Hoechst, as many other companies, started to 
integrate environmental management aspects in the 1980s. Between 1993 and 1996, while 
managing the aftermath of major chemical accidents, the company realised how far it was 
detached from the surrounding communities. Established systems and structures could not 
sufficiently support the management of social risks. 
Hoechst's reputation was at a point where it had a negative impact on a company's business 
performance. Consequently, Hoechst adopted the concept of issue management. Corporate 
communication became a leading management system after Dormann took over the helm of 
the CEO of the Hoechst Group. It was he who initiated and led Hoechst's radical 
transformation from an industrial chemical to a life sciences company. On the basis of this 
restructuring and change of business focus, Hoechst established a new global corporate 
identity and new corporate values. At first, this resulted in a loss of identity among many of 
Hoechst's employees in Frankfurt. In 1997, Hoechst announced sustainable development as 
its guiding principle, and began to integrate it into business practice. After the major 
transition process, Hoechst announced its merger with Rhone-Poulenc in Aventis - the world 
leading life sciences company. 
The following seven sections describe Hoechst's transition process from a chemical to a life- 
science company within the context of social risk management. 
Today 
Aventis 
Sustainability 
Changing Image 
Corporate Communications 
Public Positioning and Issue Mgmt. 
Chemical Accidents 
Environmental Management 
1980 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Figure 12 Hoechst's Thematic Timeline 
122 
5.1.2.1 ADOPTING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Hoechst received massive criticism from environmentalists in terms 
of its products and production facilities. At the same time, issues like global warming and use 
of natural resources came to the forefront of the political agenda. Environmental standards 
and regulations were formulated and imposed. The whole of society developed an 
environmental consciousness. For business, the ecological environment turned into an 
important external cost factor. 
Environmental management entered the management deck in the early 1980s. Since then, it 
has been developed according to a sophisticated management process that is linked to 
Hoechst's operations and economic mechanisms (Schreiner, 1996). Many businesses in the 
Hoechst Group involve the use, emission, discharge, and disposal and clean up of various 
substances that are regulated under environmental law. Hoechst has sought to take the 
initiative in this area by developing new products and by investing in sophisticated 
technologies to reduce emissions and discharges under the pressure of environmentalists 
and environmental regulations. The change in Hoechst's product mix towards those that 
involve a lower risk of environmental hazard should decrease environmental expenditures in 
the future and enhance the quality of life. To achieve this, a specific process has been 
integrated into the existing strategic management process (SMP), which identifies and 
evaluates risks and issues of strategic relevance. 
Environmental management in developed countries is a highly regulated, quantified system. 
In 1996, the Hoechst Group invested DEM 227 million in environmental protection, health, 
and safety facilities (DEM 265 million in 1995). The operating costs of environmental 
protection in 1996 totalled DEM 1.2 billion (DEM 1.5 billion in 1995) (Hoechst Direkt, 1997; 
Hoechst Annual Report, 1996): Air-pollution control: 19 per cent noise prevention: 2 per cent 
prevention of water pollution: 44 per cent waste disposal: 35 per cent. In order to assess 
products and manufacturing processes from an environmental protection and occupational 
health standpoint, Hoechst developed the Product Risk Evaluation Process (PREP). The 
operating units of the Hoechst Group apply this tool to incorporate environmental protection 
and safety aspects into the SMP. The evaluation thus automatically became part of the 
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strategic planning and shaping of the entire Hoechst Group. Businesses that pose 
environmental and health risks can thus be replaced by eco-friendlier projects. The objective 
of the company is to achieve the ISO 14000 standard at all European locations by the year 
2000. Hoechst also developed and applied environmental guiding principles: 
Protection of People and Environment 
" Continuous protection improvement of people and environment with integration of employees as well as 
application of optimal eco-efficiency technology 
  Development of new as well as improvement of existing products and processes with the objective of 
efficient use of resources and environmental protection 
" Hazard protection of employees, neighbours and environment that are likely to occur in case of an 
emergency 
Contractors 
  Selection of contractors under consideration of health, safety and environment standards 
" Information and support of customers, consumers and contractors forthe safe and environmental 
responsible use, utilisation and disposal of products 
Public 
  Open co-operation with public administration and comprehensive information of the public about site 
activities and their likely effects for people and environment 
" Active communication and dialogue with all relevant interested stakeholders 
Prevention and Emergency Management 
" Prevention of breakdowns and therefore possible negative impacts for health, safety and environment 
  Operation of alarm and hazard management that enable to limit the likely negative effects of breakdowns 
on people and environment 
Figure 13 Hoechst's Environmental Guiding Principles (Source: Umwelterklärung InfraServ, 1997) 
In terms of its corporate policy Hoechst adapted the Responsible Care® programme. This 
initiative was developed by the chemical industry for the chemical industry. Employees at all 
company levels are trained in order to enable them to contribute to the implementation of 
these measures. Product stewardship and continuous communication with stakeholders are 
particularly important elements in Responsible Care®. While facing the constraints of 
environmental law, Hoechst also tried to influence new environmental regulations through 
targeted lobbyism. 
5.1.2.2 FAINTING AFTER CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS 
Three serious chemical accidents happened in spring 1993. On February 22, an uncontrolled 
chemical pre-product mix escaped from Hoechst's production site and contaminated an area 
of Frankfurt, about 42 hectares, with about 2,500 inhabitants. An employee died after an 
explosion at the Frankfurt site on 15 March 1993. After another chemical accident on the 
124 
second of April, Hoechst placed an area of Frankfurt under gas alert. During and after these 
incidents Hoechst had a limited, closed communication policy (Schönfeld, 1996). 
Two further chemical accidents in 1996 put Hoechst in a critical and controversial situation. 
At Hoechst's site in Frankfurt questions were asked about the implications and effects of 
these accidents on Frankfurt's population and the environment; but these were accompanied 
by questions about Hoechst safety prevention and its information policy. On Monday 29 
January 1996, the first stock exchange day after the chemical accidents, the Hoechst share 
prices fell. Despite a friendly stock exchange climate, the notation in Frankfurt dropped by 
3.30 to DEM 429.50. In contrast, the shares of Hoechst's competitors Bayer and BASF rose 
value by 6.30 to DEM 439.80 and by 2.80 to DEM 349.50 (FAZ, 10 January 1996). Frankfurt 
was not a new Bhopal or Seveso. However, Hoechst was fortunate to escape a company 
closure enforced by environmental law. The total damage caused by this chemical accident 
amounted to around DEM 10 million in terms of direct internal and external costs excluding 
any liabilities to recourses (FAZ, 10 January 1996). 
Regardless of any agreement with the city of Frankfurt, at the scene of chemical accidents 
the internal fire brigade was informed very late; there was no sirens alarm and only little 
information was given to the public. Together with TÜV, an independent specialist auditor, 
the company searched for the causes of the accidents. The Hessische Landtag, the 
parliament of the federal state where the accidents happened, discussed these, and the 
minister for environment ordered further investigations. Under pressure, Hoechst developed 
a new safety programme that also included safety managers for each site (FAZ, 10 October 
1996). Hoechst employed 40 experts after the chemical accidents in the Rhine-Main area 2 
that were responsible for the development of a proactive safety programme. Dormann said 
"emergency managers have to respond to critical incidents within three to five minutes". 
Today, co-operation with stakeholders provides Hoechst with knowledge and understanding 
of how to react in cases of critical incidents and how to be more proactive. One of Hoechst's 
emergency managers said: "We did not know under which conditions we have to push the 
2 The Rhine-Main area is a concentration area of major industrial and service companies around Frankfurt, where 
the river Main flows into the river Rhine. 
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button. " Between 1993 and 1996 Hoechst trained around 2,800 employees from the point of 
view of safety procedures. 
After the accidents, the climate among Hoechst's workforce was characterised by stress. 
The objective of Hoechst was to enhance the quality of work and the understanding of 
employees for their responsibilities. Nevertheless, Hoechst's unjustified propaganda about 
the quality and the high environmental standards of its production facilities distracted this 
endeavour. Employees overstated the miracle power of the efficiency of the biological 
purification plan. Consequently, Hoechst was forced to introduce additional system checks 
and risk assessments. 
According to statistics provided by the German Federal Environment Agency between 1992 
and 1995, BASF had 24 chemical accidents that were subject to registration but Hoechst 
had, during the same period, only nine incidents to report. However, chemical accidents 
within Hoechst experienced a very different aftermath to those of its competitors, BASF and 
Bayer. Accidents in the Rhine-Main-area elicited more attention because of the location of 
the sites within the city, criticism from politicians, NGOs and citizens, and the tradition of the 
company as a notorious Main-polluter. Critics had the impression that the company is not 
interested in the fear of the community, but is very concerned with investment conditions in 
Germany. At the time of the chemical accident in 1993, Hilger, CEO of Hoechst at this time, 
was on vacation and it took him a couple of days to respond to the incident. 
Hilger's successor, Dormann began his job in April 1994 with the promise that he would 
transform Hoechst into a transparent company. Indeed, at the time of the accidents in 1996, 
Dormann was on a business trip in the US, but provided a public apology for the incident. On 
the first working day after the accident a Community Discussion Group (CDG) initiated by 
Hilger came together, and a MD from Hoechst gave information about the incidents and 
answered questions from community representatives. The Board of Directors decided to 
invest more than DEM 150 million in extended safety management (FAZ, 1 February 1996). 
When asked about Hoechst's strategy, Schadow, MD with responsibility for technique and 
environment said that "Hoechst had learned its lessons and will try its best to develop an 
urban sociable chemistry. " He added: "For this reason, the Hoechst Group will closely co- 
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operate with its various stakeholders. " In 1996, Hoechst introduced its first environment 
magazine 'Change', a colour journal with 108 pages and a circulation of 250,000, available at 
no costs to all stakeholders. Fischer (1996), at this time federal environmental minister of the 
Green party in Hesse, wrote one of the first articles. The title is "Remain present and become 
better. " 
5.1.2.3 POSITIONING BY MEANS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 
Because of technological changes, societal development and environmental awareness, the 
German chemical industry has experienced continuous change over the past 50 years. 
However, this has become more and more relevant socially rather than from a technological 
or financial aspect point of view (Bathelt, 1997; Hessische Landesregierung, 1998). 
Remaining present and competitive for Hoechst, especially after the chemical accidents, was 
possible only by striving to review public confidence -a positioning problem in society's mind 
that effects its behaviour in various ways. 
Wagenburg'3 was the metaphor given to Hoechst in 1993. Stakeholders considered the 
company as isolated from its surroundings and arrogant towards its neighbours, politicians, 
and lay people. Critics complained about selective information instead of communication and 
no attempt to change. In general, Hoechst was recognised as a sclerotic and hierarchical 
company, and detached from society. In contrast, Hoechst's management, at this time, 
considered mass media and politicians as enhancing the hysteria in favour of their own 
objectives. A prevailing opinion was that citizens would like pharmaceuticals but not their 
production, and critics do not have a real interest in facts. Managers felt that Hoechst did lots 
of good things for the region and its people. 
The Institute for Opinion Research in Allensbach/Germany conducted a study of Hoechst to 
investigate the reputation of the chemical industry in Germany. 40 per cent of the 
interviewees expressed a negative opinion about Hoechst. Asked what one most remembers 
about Hoechst, 88 per cent responded 'chemical accidents', 83 per cent 'environmental 
pollution' and only in third position with values between 75 and 79 per cent, 'Hoechst's 
This term was given to Hoechst during its bad information politics in the 1990s. A translation could be 'wagon 
castle'which describes institutions that built an imaginary wall around them. This detaches them from the society. 
127 
products'. In contrast, Hoechst's competitors received much better marks 18 per cent (BASF) 
and 19 per cent (Bayer) in terms of negative opinions (FAZ, 2 February 1996). The research 
shows that 51 per cent of the interviewees want chemical companies to remain close to, or 
within, cities. Among citizens of areas, where companies operate within cities, the response 
rate was even more positive (59 per cent). Based on an opinion poll, commissioned by 
Hoechst to find out what society's expectations are in terms of company's contributions to it, 
the following graph lists some major priorities: 
Sponsoring of Art and Culture 
Support for Clubs 
Local Sport Sponsoring 
Support of Handicaps 
Youth Houses and Sport Areas 
House Building 
Kindergartens 
Openness for Citizens 
Environmental Protection 
Early Warning System 
Providing Jobs 
Information about Accidents 
Figure 14 What should big industries do for its neighbours? (Source: Piel, 1996) 
Hoechst wanted to position itself at the highest end of stakeholders' expectations. However, 
before Hoechst started its stakeholder engagement, it developed a five-stage model for 
strategic issue management (Issue Management, 1996): (1) issue scanning, (2) issue impact 
assessment, (3) prioritising issues, (4) development and choice of action alternatives, and 
(5) realisation and success control. Issue managers were located within corporate 
communications and operated as links between various departments and managers within 
the group. 
Corporate reputation became an important component of Hoechst's policy and strategy 
making. The company recognised that reputation building needs to be emphasised on its 
stakeholders if the company wanted to position itself within society. 
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Hoechst considered stakeholder positioning as crucial because (Henschel, 1998): 
  Public acceptance is a high and sustainable return on investment; 
  Attractiveness of a company is important in winning new employees; 
  Motivation of employees depends on pride in the firm; 
  Decisions of market participants is orientated towards image; 
  People do have an interest in what companies do; 
  Public opinion and media are linked and can have a positive or negative impact on a 
firms' image. 
After placing the issues of corporate reputation and stakeholder positioning firmly on the 
company's strategic agenda, Hoechst formulated conclusions with regard to strategic 
principles of stakeholder importance and the active management of stakeholder relations. 
The company began to strive for greater transparency through global networking with 
stakeholders. 
With Dormann, an economist became head of the company rather than a chemist, as had 
traditionally been the case. This changed the technocratic culture to a more open, 
communicative one. An environment manager from Hoechst viewed this change as follows: 
It depends where the CEO is most engaged. This area will succeed in the internal 
power conflict. We are moving away from a technology driven to a communication 
driven culture. 
5.1.2.4 PRIORITISING CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS 
It was not only for stakeholder positioning and issue management that Dormann, as CEO of 
Hoechst Group, prioritised corporate communication. The strategic communication 
development from Hoechst since 1994 happened in three phases (Heine & Mautz, 1995): 
1995 was the year of de-frosting, the beginning of the transparency and information 
offensive. In 1996, Hoechst began to set-up a new internal and external network with 
stakeholders, with the objective of establishing de-centralised communication channels. The 
discussion around the guiding principle of sustainable development started in 1997. Hoechst 
became a veritable trend-setter in the German chemical industry, and implemented good 
corporate communication into its mission. 
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In 1995, Dormann began to group managers from various areas of corporate 
communications. This corporate function became the direct responsibility of Hoechst's CEO. 
The objective of corporate communication was the formation of communication processes 
that were relevant for the Hoechst Group. The estimated target audience in 1997 
encapsulated around 5 million people (Corporate Communication, 1998). The main 
responsibilities of corporate communications are: 
  Business and financial communications; 
  The international positioning of Hoechst; 
  Communicating the strategic development of the group: 
  Crisis communications in situations of group relevance; 
" Continuous cultivation of relations with opinion leaders and interest groups. 
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By communicating openly with its employees, shareholders, as well as the media, the 
political community and the general public, the corporate communications department aimed 
at creating and cultivating a climate of understanding, trust and acceptance able to enhance 
corporate reputation and to contribute positively to long-term value creation. Corporate 
communications shaped and steered those communication processes that were of 
importance and relevance to either Hoechst as a holding company or the Hoechst Group in 
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Figure 15 Hoechst's Corporate Communication Structure 1998 (Source: Hoechst AG) 
its entirety. By contrast, the communication activities of the group companies focus on 
market- and product-related issues. 
Corporate communication covers economic, social and environmental issues. Group 
companies have autonomy in their communication organisation, but have to align their group 
activities to a corporate centre. There is a direct structural link with the operational 
management of the group. Communications are linked with the operational management and 
the top management. 
The main philanthropic activities, linked to a certain extent with the business activities of 
Hoechst, are externalised in the Hoechst Foundation. This foundation promotes projects that 
are on the interface of culture, science, business, and society. "The criteria for selecting 
projects are international, inter-disciplinary and future orientated", said the head of the 
Hoechst Foundation. The objective of the foundation is to identify thinkers and managers 
from tomorrow, and to provide them with the opportunity to contribute to sustainable 
development - in the form of art, scientific or political contributions, as well as societal 
engagement (Hoechst Facts, 1998). Therefore, the foundation is part of the communication 
concept. 
5.1.2.5 CHANGING IDENTITY THROUGH RE-STRUCTURING 
Because of the early products from Hoechst, people that worked for Hoechst in Frankfurt 
were called 'Rotfabriker' (Bäumler, 1988). Since 1997, Hoechst no longer runs any operating 
business, having transferred the responsibility to the companies that make up the Hoechst 
Group. Dormann has been nominated as the most radical manager of the year 1998 
(Spiegel, 1998). He changed the company so much that stakeholder asked the question: 
Who is Hoechst today? The German weekly magazine Spiegel (1997) asked: "Is Hoechst 
still German? " 
In the life sciences business, Hoechst has expanded its global market position. The 
company is strengthening its activities in biotechnology by forming strategic alliances and 
investing in biotech companies. Pharmaceuticals mean for Hoechst, developing drugs and 
launching them on a global basis. On its way to becoming a life sciences company, Hoechst 
in 1996 bought Plant Genetic Systems (PGS) in Amsterdam for more than DEM 1 billion 
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(Handelsblatt, 11 September 1998). Between 1994 and 1998 Hoechst acquired 
pharmaceutical companies with a value of DEM 20 billion (FAZ, 6 May 1998). The strategy 
of Dormann is under constant criticism because he bought and sold companies (WiWo, 
1998, no. 12). In 1998, there were speculations about a take-over of Hoechst. The 1998 
stock exchange value was DEM 43.9 billion (WiWo, 1998, no. 34). 
The headquarters used to manage its subsidiaries centrally from Frankfurt. Today, the 
corporate centre manages a portfolio of autonomous, affiliated companies. It is not directly 
involved in the management of its subsidiaries. The corporate centre can only give 
recommendations. However, it has to manage the portfolio, and therefore the affiliated 
companies are controlled through the corporate centre. Regardless of the different names 
and logos of the subsidiaries, Hoechst is the main brand name and therefore the most 
important capital from the standpoint of reputation. The remaining product of Hoechst as a 
management holding is the share. 
Traditionally, it was one company operating in Frankfurt. Today, Hoechst has various 
operations at Frankfurt Industriepark: The represented business units are chemicals, special 
chemicals, pharmaceutical, synthetic materials and technical substances. Various Hoechst 
owned companies are present: AgrEvo (Biotech), Trevira (fibre activities), Solvay (flour 
chemicals) and DyStar (textile paint substances). Frankfurt Industriepark is also the home for 
many central departments like finance and accounting, legal affairs, patents and insurance, 
information technology and communication, personal as well as central research and 
development (Werk Höchst, 1998). 
Hoechst has now changed from a company that was embedded in its local communities and 
identified by its chemical products to a global acting company with a new business focus that 
often can, not be directly identified by its products, but by the development and application of 
technologies that affect societies. The changed identity of Hoechst also requires a new 
approach to corporate development - that of sustainable development. 
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5.1.2.6 ENVISIONING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
As an international group of companies operating in life sciences and industrial chemistry, 
Hoechst actively promoted sustainable development. The basic aim was to meet people's 
needs in a long-term and responsible way. Health and nutrition are the new business areas. 
By focusing on these core life-science fields, Hoechst's objective was to help to further social 
and economic progress. In production, Hoechst's group companies strove to continuously 
improve occupational health, safety and environment protection standards. In the quest for 
innovative products, the companies pursued an integrated approach that covered the entire 
life cycle of a product from raw material to recycling. Every company had to find its own way 
of integrating sustainable development into practice. 
A sustainable development study conducted by the Öko-Institut in Darmstadt/Germany 
together with Hoechst assessed two different products in order to find ways of incorporating 
criteria such as sustainability in the product and strategic planning process. Before 
consulting its stakeholders, Hoechst did not really understand the issue of sustainable 
development and its implications for business practice. A corporate communications 
manager said: 
We are good in science and technology, research and development, production 
and marketing. Our business plans have a span of five to ten years. However, we 
don't know what this means to the environment or the society. We need to develop 
or acquire new competence that allow us to consider this as well and maybe to 
draw scenarios that will happen within the next fifty years to foresee our likely 
social and environmental impact. 
In 1997, Hoechst became a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), a coalition of 123 international companies that aimed to transform 
the guiding principle of sustainable development into business practice. Hoechst aimed to 
operate profitably, meet customer needs efficiently while conserving resources, lowering the 
environmental impact of production operations and products, and improving the qualification 
of employees the world over. 
Stakeholder pressure for accountability of business performance, a viable portfolio, and 
innovative strength led the company to sustainable development. Hoechst considered its 
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contribution to sustainable development as creating innovative solutions for combating the 
health and nutrition problems of a growing, and increasingly ageing population. The 
company saw biotechnology as the key to meeting these needs. 
An important prerequisite for environmentally friendly socio-economic development is a 
realignment of the communication process. The company engaged in establishing a 
dialogue, able to transcend cultural and generation boundaries, and which brought those 
affected by the business activities into dialogue. Hoechst's co-operation with the Öko-Institut, 
a German environmental research centre and leading green NGO is just as much a part of 
this policy as Hoechst's membership of the WBCSD and the creation of the Hoechst 
Foundation. Other existing co-operations are Hoechst's membership of the German 
Chemical Industry Association and Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industry Associations; 
Hoechst's Community Discussion Group and various co-operations and relations with local 
authorities and governments. Behaving responsibly towards society and the environment 
plays an essential role in the company's policy. In its 1997 annual report Hoechst states: 
Responsibility: To us, responsibility means harmonising economic, social and 
ecological requirements. 
Value Enhancement: Our long-term strategy is aimed at achieving sustainable 
increase in value. 
However, a corporate communications manager underlined what the purpose of Hoechst is 
and what it is not: 
Hoechst is innovative, and one of world's leading chemical companies. Its ultimate 
objective is to bundle all its resources and capabilities to become one of the driving 
life science companies. With our products, we will enhance the quality of life. We 
strive not to harm the environment in any way. However, social responsibility is not 
a subject for Hoechst. We are not a welfare company or a political body, but we 
have always played an active role in our neighbourhoods. Our responsibility is 
sustainable development. 
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5.1 
"2.7 
AVENTIS - HOECHST DISAPPEARS 
Hoechst will have ceased to be part of the industrial chemicals sector by the year 2000. By 
taking companies public or selling the business to strong partners, Hoechst opened new 
growth opportunities and unlocked values. Life-science is an industry sector with huge 
market potential, but also with far-reaching wide social implications. This implies enhanced 
corporate social responsibility. 
The new companies are Celanese, with Hoechst's chemical business, and Aventis, the 
merger with Rhöne-Poulenc, incorporating Hoechst's life sciences activities. The merger was 
announced on 1 December 1998 and approved by the by Hoechst's Supervisory Board on 4 
May 1999 (Spiegel, 1998). At the special general meeting on 15 July 1999,90 per cent of 
shareholders gave their approval for the merger (Hoechst New, 1999). 
In February 1999, Hoechst's position within the DAX system began to change from industrial 
chemicals to healthcare and pharmaceuticals. When this is, finally, accomplished, the name 
Hoechst will no longer exist. Aventis will be the market leader in life sciences. The new 
company will have an R&D budget of around USD 2.4 billion (Mumm, 1999). However, 
potential social risk is still present - in some business areas less, than before, and in others, 
more. Society is very concerned with gene-technology, one of Hoechst growing applied 
technologies. Hoechst operates in developed and developing risk societies. Societies are 
demanding a positive impact on the quality of life. 
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5.1.3 Business's Social Reintegration Features 
Hoechst faced a constantly bad reputation as a polluter. It was hard to understand 
company's business because of the limited information that was available. Hoechst reduced 
its social engagement. Communities and NGOs became driving pressure groups towards 
Hoechst as an 'open company'. The demand for more information and understanding about 
the impact of business processes on society drove the company into its `de-frosting and de- 
rusting' strategy. Transparency rather than a Wagenburg mentality' lay at the heart of their 
strategy, and became an integral part of each step on Hoechst's way towards becoming a 
life sciences company. At the same time, social risk management changed from technocratic 
to social demand-orientated. Not only was the new business focus closer to societies' wants 
and needs, but the management processes aligned themselves towards these. Towards 
social reintegration, Hoechst's set course was transparency directed and social demand 
orientated. 
To put this course into action Hoechst needed to be connected to society. Social risk was 
levelled through openness with respect to stakeholders and the endeavour of social demand 
anticipation. Two-way stakeholder communications became a priority for Hoechst rather then 
the circulation of glossy brochures and lobbyism. After an enforced learning process, 
Hoechst began to consider its stakeholders as potential communicators. However, certain 
issues are oriented towards a certain audience. Therefore, efficient communication requires 
a network to place, circulate and receive information as needed. Consequently, elements of 
the social connecting processes from Hoechst were stakeholder communication and 
networking. 
Setting a new course and starting connecting processes were important to generate social 
capital. Hoechst, traditionally a Frankfurt community-linked business, lost its identity. It was 
no longer a polluting chemical giant, but a company which took care of its employees and 
communities for life. Not only did the transition towards life sciences cause part of the 
identity loss. Since Hoechst started to become a global player, stakeholders could not see 
the wider impact. They felt neglected and rejected by them. There was no way back to 
Hoechst's traditional identity. To establish a new identity was not only Hoechst's objective 
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but also a resource generated by and embedded in Hoechst's stakeholder communication 
and network. 
Two main issues emerge: Hoechst's identity, and its interpretation. In the 1980s, Hoechst 
saw reputation as something that could be bought, and essentially, as an add-on. However, 
painful experiences like the aftermath of chemical accidents and positive reputation 
enhancement through experiences such as the sustainability project with the Öko-Institut, 
made Hoechst aware of the importance of reputation. Hoechst recognised reputation and 
identity as a valuable intangible resource on its way towards sustainability and for prosperity, 
not only in critical situations but also in its day-to-day management. Reputation, for Hoechst, 
was linked to its position within society and identity. Its connecting processes managed both. 
Therefore, identity and reputation are interlinked elements of Hoechst's social capital 
generated through social reintegration. 
The following table summarises business social integration features under three headings: 
Set Course Connecting Processes Social Capital 
  Transparency Directed " Stakeholder Communication   Identity 
  Social Demand Orientated   Networking   Reputation 
Table 9 Business's Social Reintegration Features 
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5.2 DEVELOPING A STRATEGY-TOOL WITH AN NGO 
5.2.1 A David and Goliath Relation 
The Öko-Institut was founded in 1977 in Germany. Its foundation was closely linked to the 
conflicts then surrounding the construction of nuclear power plants. Citizen groups involved 
in these conflicts had repeatedly found science and research to be on the side of those who 
were promoting dangerous, large-scale projects. The purpose for setting up the Öko-Institut 
therefore was to create a research institution independent of industry and governments, 
which orients its scientific work to ecological criteria and environmental considerations. The 
Öko-Institut came a long way from a confrontation-orientated environmentalist to be an 
independent and critical, yet solution-orientated research institute. Today, the institute works 
not only on companies and their wider impact; the NGO also works with companies. 
Scientifically, they focus on sustainability issues in six areas: genetic engineering, 
environmental law, nuclear safety, chemistry, energy, and transportation. 
At the time of the major accident at the Hoechst site in Griesheim, a district of 
Frankfurt/Germany, during the height of the German Carnival festivities in 1993, nobody 
would have believed that Hoechst and the Öko-Institut would ever work together. That time 
marks the zenith in the history of intimate enmity, between the Öko-Institut - an independent 
research institute firmly rooted in the environment movement and widely known for its critical 
stance - and Hoechst -a chemical industry giant. Nor would this have seemed likely when, 
with the vigorous scientific support of the Öko-Institut, the production of genetically modified 
insulin, or of the BASTA total herbicide and of CFCs and R134a refrigerants, or the new 
construction of the hazardous waste incineration plant in the Hoechst works were criticised, 
delayed, ecologically optimised, or even prevented. 
Most conflicts arose over facilities and products. At first, the Öko-Institut challenged Hoechst 
primarily on environmental issues. Later social issues played an important role. However, the 
Öko-Institut was well known as a campaigner but not as a constructive partner for 
companies. In 1990, after the Rio conference on globalisation and the environment, a new 
buzzword entered the business world - sustainable development. The question, which 
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became strategic for Hoechst on its way towards a life sciences company, whether one of 
the largest chemical groups in the world can orient itself on the guiding principle of 
sustainable development, goes much further. Not only was the critical public sceptical about 
this, but Hoechst itself remained unsure. The company and the Öko-Institute felt the 
outcome of this important question to be by no means a foregone conclusion, but positive 
results could only be achieved by working in tandem. 
Hoechst was viewed as one of the more intractable chemical multinationals. This certainly 
called for a good deal of pragmatism on both sides, as a precondition for the success of this 
partnership. Both sides could hope for positive side effects: Hoechst had the opportunity of 
mending its dented public image and the Öko-Institut was placed in a position where is could 
prove its ability to deliver not only critical science, but also implementation-orientated 
strategy advice `in the lion's den'. There were hazards, too: Beginning with the risk of early 
failure, which would have confirmed the prejudices of the sceptics in both camps, through to 
the results, which were positive in theory, but probably difficult to implement. 
5.2.2 From Combat to Co-action 
One of the specific outcomes of Hoechst's joint project with the Öko-Institut has been the 
definition of a strategic management tool for sustainable product assessment PROSA 
Product Sustainability Assessment). The project was divided into two phases, each of which 
had a different focus. While the first was concept development orientated, within the second, 
the concept was applied and refined. However, before working together, the partners had to 
leave the battlefield and prepare for joint action. 
The process of partnering begun by the Öko-Institut was followed up by Dormann's public 
declaration about Hoechst's `defrosting and de-rusting strategy'. One year later, Hoechst 
approached the Öko-Institut with the following question: How can the guiding principle of 
sustainable development, which Hoechst views as being decisive for its future development, 
be concretised and integrated into operative management? In the winter of 1995/96, the 
Öko-Institut undertook a pilot study in which the fundamental blueprint for a sustainability- 
oriented corporate management was developed. 
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The results were debated intensively and the decision was taken to test the proposals. This 
is a surprisingly courageous step if one considers that in the meantime (in January 1996) 
Griesheim II had taken place, a new industrial accident liable to arouse nation-wide alarm. 
The Öko-Institut, as before, supplied the public with information and expertise, and strongly 
criticised Hoechst. The second phase of the project went ahead regardless of Öko-Institut's 
criticism; and this was proof that Hoechst was concerned with more than just repairing its 
battered public image with the support of the Öko-Institut. The concept of sustainability 
assessment was not only refined, but also applied practically within two business units. 
Today, the partnership continues on corporate and is replicated on subsidiary level. The 
following five sections describe the partnership building process in detail. 
5.2.2.1 LEAVING THE BATTLEFIELD 
Shortly after Dormann became CEO of Hoechst in 1994, he accepted an invitation from the 
Öko-Institut to participate in a round table discussion. This took place in the castle of the 
head of the Öko-Institut. A round table participant from the Öko-Institut remembers the initial 
reason for inviting Dormann: 
We asked Dormann to participate in our round table because as Hoechst's new 
CEO, he introduced a strategy that promised more ecological and socially 
responsible business activities. 
Hoechst's MD, with responsibility for technique and the environment, conveyed current 
thinking at this time in Hoechst, as follows: 
When I became MD for technique and environment, I was just nominated, together 
with [the] head of corporate communication / decided that we should approach the 
Öko-Institut. In the meantime, unexpectedly, the Öko-Institut invited us with the 
objective of finding out whether there are any commonalties with our agenda. 
The conversation was held behind closed doors and no commitment was required. Dormann 
attended this meeting together with Hoechst's head of corporate communication. Hoechst 
was not the only private company that was invited. Leading representatives from other 
companies and stakeholders were also present. The focal point of the discussion between 
the Öko-Institut and Hoechst was the long-standing dispute with regard to chlorine 
chemistry, its products, and its production. However, the discourse differed from a traditional 
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battle of words. The Öko-Institut did not criticise any specific process or product of Hoechst. 
Rather it was a general discussion, with a strategic character in mind. Participants 
characterised the meeting as open and constructive. 
Hoechst began to align its agenda with the principle of sustainable development. Questions 
about common ground between the Öko-Institut and Hoechst led to the ambition to engage 
in a closer dialogue, and to discuss the possibility of a joint sustainability project. At this time, 
Hoechst could not propose any specific, realisable project, which might be acceptable to the 
Öko-Institut. One year later, in 1995, after Hoechst integrated the guiding principle of 
sustainable development into its policy; Hoechst approached the Öko-Institut with a view to 
co-acting on a concrete project. Hoechst indicated only at the beginning that they wanted to 
discuss further issues. However, their ultimate objective was to gain an understanding of the 
concept of sustainable development and its implications for Hoechst. An NGO representative 
asked Hoechst at the general meeting in 1995 whether the company "would allow an 
independent research institute to assess their business practices, referring social and 
ecological impacts", said Hoechst's MD, with responsibility for technique and environment. 
He added: "This was the best advice that we could get. " Hoechst was looking for an external 
partner able to advise the company on its strategic approach. The management felt that the 
leading consulting firms lacked competence. Hoechst's project leader as leader of the joint 
project with the Öko-Institut, commented on the decision in favour of a partnership with the 
Öko-Institut: 
We needed an external partner who could advise us. One first thinks of consulting 
companies like McKinsey or ADL [... ] We needed someone who was possibly 
loaded with conflict; we needed someone with extreme, enemy perspective. 
The Öko-Institut possessed the necessary professional expertise. In addition, the company 
believed that the reputation of the NGO could have a positive impact on Hoechst's dented 
image. 
However, both partners ensured that this would not just be a Public Relation (PR) initiative, 
in the sense of enhancing the reputation of one partner at the expense of the other. The 
head of the Hoechst Group work council was suspicious of the joint project. 
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Even in retrospect, he saw the situation slightly differently: 
We at Hoechst are three times as qualified as the people from the Öko-Institut. 
However, there is a difference whether someone does it internally or if you 
commission an outside independent institute without a muzzle. 
Finally, the Öko-Institut accepted Hoechst's proposal, despite some internal differences 
about co-operation with the 'enemy'. Hoechst officially commissioned the Öko-Institut to 
develop a product assessment tool in co-operation with company experts. The company 
covered the costs of the project. 
5.2.2.2 PREPARING FOR CO-ACTION 
The aim of Hoechst and the Öko-Institut was to transform any potential conflict between 
them into benefits for both sides, within the context of sustainable development. Looking 
back at the beginning of the partnership, Hoechst's MD, responsible for technique and 
environment said, "one needs at least some polarisation. " It was the first time that Hoechst 
invited an NGO to participate in a joint project. Retrospectively, a corporate communication 
manager from Hoechst AgrEvo described the process of the emerging partnership: 
It was not a very structured process. Most important were the people, the backup 
from the Board of Directors and partners on both sides of the co-operation, that do 
not sit in their showcase waiting for the strengthening of their ego. You need 
reconnaissance, dread reduction [.. ] and most important the building of trust - 
mutual trust. 
The Öko-Institut built a project team with members of its chemical division. This consisted of 
researchers and analysts, as well as senior managers. The only permanent member of 
Hoechst's project team was the project leader, Hoechst's chief economist. All other members 
changed, as they were needed for specific project tasks. 
The project teams had Hoechst's top and senior management back up as long as they were 
operating in the provided corridor. At a strategic level the partners asked each other 
questions about the project and related issues. There was no specific form or forum for it. 
Experiences, perceptions, ideas, and expectations were shared. The impression emerged 
that both sides would gain something out of this partnership. However, this did not help the 
process of focussing on a specific project task. Rather, it enhanced the level of trust at least 
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at the strategic management level. "After a relative short time of about eight weeks, we 
established a certain level of trust, " said Hoechst's project leader, looking back to the 
beginning. A member of the Öko-Institut saw the project not like 
(... ] a project where one says 'ok where do 1 have to sign' and then one goes back 
and puzzles for about two years within its own walls, before one goes to the public 
with an outcome, but it was a partnership project. 
Members of the Öko-Institut team visited Hoechst sites and started to interview operational 
managers without the participation of Hoechst's team. They asked questions that were 
related to the project, but hard to understand by business people who had never really 
thought about these new issues and did not have a clear understanding of the guiding 
principle of sustainable development. This procedure caused some mistrust and 
misunderstanding between members of the Öko-Institut and Hoechst's managers. Being 
asked for the cause of failure, a corporate communication manager compared the beginning 
with a traditional consulting project: 
It was like a bad consulting project: The consultant comes and writes a question 
down; the person who requests the advice responded to the question exactly in the 
way in which he had been asked and says; ok, I have done my duty now go away. 
have more important things to do than answering your questions. 
Without a common base for mutual understanding, the partners felt it was impossible to 
continue. In 1995, a two-day workshop was jointly organised. Participants of this event were 
the project team from the Öko-Institut, Hoechst's MD with responsibility for technique and 
environment, and heads of strategic business units, Hoechst's project leader, corporate 
communication managers, and production and service managers. 
The workshop achieved two things: Firstly, a concept that ensured a better understanding of 
each other -a common language. Secondly, a link between Hoechst's economic issues and 
the issues of sustainable development - the rationale for business people. It was impossible 
to join the specific antagonistic perspectives. However, the partners needed a common, 
mutually understood base. 
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Reviewing the workshop, a senior manager from Hoechst summarised: 
At the end of the workshop we had not reached a consensus but a mutual 
understanding. The problems of disagreements and refusals that we had at the 
beginning disappeared and were replaced with a mutual understanding of the 
economic, ecological and social issues, as well as its links. 
The Öko-Institut re-interviewed production and service managers. They generated interest 
and commitment for the project on Hoechst's operational level. Hoechst established a 
steering committee with members of various areas of Hoechst and the Öko-Institut. This 
committee was under the supervision of Hoechst but it had autonomy, referring the 
realisation of the joint project within the given corridor. Looking backwards, Hoechst's MD 
responsible for technique and environment said: "The Öko-Institut and Hoechst became 
established as evenly matched partners. " 
5.2.2.3 CONCEPTUALISING THE STRATEGY TOOL 
How should Hoechst integrate the principle of sustainable development? There were not 
enough experiences that could have provided a reliable answer to this question. Hoechst 
was not competent in the area of sustainability. Although the company said that it aims 
towards sustainable development, a member of the Öko-Institut complained that Hoechst is 
still mainly profit orientated: 
[The] head of Hoechst's corporate communication is only interested in corporate 
success and the right hand of Dormann who want to enhance the shareholder 
value. 
However, this was not a decisive obstacle for the joint project. On the basis of the agreement 
about the fundamentals of sustainable development and the meaning of the concept, it was 
crucial to set definite boundaries for the project. These were concerned with the depth and 
the width of the task that needed to be accomplished. It was limited both to the competence 
and the resources of the Öko-Institut, and to the extent to which Hoechst would allow and 
could allow the Öko-Institut to look behind its cards. "It was not so much a matter of 
providing insight into dirty business activities rather than the fear to reveal business secrets, " 
commented a Hoechst Corporate Communications manager. 
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The Öko-Institute was an expert in social and ecological issues. Hoechst was an expert in 
financial and business-related issues. The different capabilities of each were reflected in 
their shared and divided competence in decision-making. This approach was accepted from 
both partners. However, they aligned all of the project decisions. Given the project-related 
changes, which needed to be undertaken, the partners took joint decisions to reset the 
project course. 
Phase one, the conceptual phase of the joint project, took place between December 1995 
and March 1996. The Öko-Institut had to address the issue of what sustainable development 
for a global operating chemical company actually means, and more specifically, how the 
guiding principle of sustainable development could be integrated into the SMP of Hoechst 
(c. f. Ewen et al., 1997). The first phase lay in the hands of both partners. Whereas the Öko- 
Institut developed a framework for the adaptation of Hoechst's corporate strategy on a 
corporate sustainability concept, the company worked on possible business implications. 
Experts from Hoechst and the Öko-Institut participated in the final evaluation of the possible 
concept impact on Hoechst's corporate strategy and SMP. 
A further part of the conceptual phase involved Hoechst's strategic management team, with 
consultation of experts from the Öko-Institut, who were given the task of redesigning the 
SMP. This process was aimed at establishing a monitoring and control system for 
sustainability performance. Hoechst's project leader described the intention retrospectively: 
Besides ROI, technology position and other economic indicators, we intended to 
integrate two sustainability indicators, an ecological and a social indicator. 
Furthermore, we intended to change the system character through sustainability 
reports at various levels. 
Both sides experienced difficulties: Hoechst because of the integration of unfamiliar social 
issues into the management process which remained difficult to understand; the Öko-Institut, 
because it worked together with its oldest and most formidable enemy. Internal 
argumentation within the partners prevented a negative impact on the partnership. Phase 
one, ended with a concrete proposal for the integration of a sustainability assessment 
concept. 
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5.2.2.4 APPLYING AND REFINING THE STRATEGY TOOL 
At the end of 1996, phase two of the project began. The proposed corporate sustainability 
concept, together with two operational units from Hoechst, known by the company as 
business lines, should be further developed and applied on a trail basis. First, the corporate 
sustainable development concept was developed so as to enhance product application. This 
was the operationalisation and the test of the concept at a production and market level. The 
Öko-Institut asked Hoechst for two products on which they could test the concept. Hoechst 
without consulting the Öko-Institut decided on the product lines to which the concept would 
be applied and refined. Hoechst's MD for technique and environment justified this decision- 
making retrospectively. He said that he "would like to avoid seeing behind this only a 
dextrous, tactical move. This is more. This is somewhere already an expression of 
knowledge of human nature. " 
Business line managers strengthened the company's expert team, whereas from the Öko- 
Institut the same experts were still involved. The emphasis of phase two was on the 
development of a tool and the realisability of its application. The experiences that were 
gained from this process have been applied in the discussion about the strategic relevance 
and its applicability for Hoechst. The discussion and experience exchange was a continuous 
joint process. 
Besides any further content related development of the concept, the project structure itself 
changed. The difference in comparison with phase one of the project was that operational 
units were very closely involved. The suggestions form the Öko-Institut from phase one were 
applied. The role of the Öko-Institut was now to supervise the process and to integrate 
collected experiences in the suggested concept. At expert level from the 
Öko-Institut and 
Hoechst, the findings of the application at business unit level were reflected on the 
suggested concept. It had been agreed that it was applicable as a product assessment tool. 
Whereas in phase one the work had been done by the Öko-Institut and from Hoechst came 
requested information, at phase two it was the other way around. However, it was 
Hoechst 
who decided not to change its SMP. 
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Recalling the decision, a corporate development manager commented: 
After the Öko-Institut had finished its study, and we had not said anything to the 
public, we concluded that it is not possible to change the SMP, for two reasons: 
First, it is a very complex process [.. ] and with the integration of sustainable 
development, it is likely that the efficiency of this process will suffer. Second, we 
were rethinking what we wanted to add to the SMP, and finally, we added only the 
quantifiable sections of the sustainable development concept. In general, we think 
that sustainable development comes before the SMP, and therefore, may require a 
separate process. 
Hoechst did not want to place the responsibility for decision-making with regards to business 
and market issues into the hand of its enemy, even if had they begun to become partners. 
Meanwhile, the Öko-Institut, for its part currently considers companies lack sufficient 
competence to assess their social and ecological impact. Therefore, they tried to reserve 
sovereignty for social and ecological issues. Hoechst's project manager thought that 
[... ] it would be possible to express the sustainability of a product quantitatively 
with a factor between one and five which could then be applied to categorise 
products or even production facilities and technologies. 
The Öko-Institut made it clear that this would be impossible. Criteria are soft, qualitative, and 
therefore individual. Only the dimensions of sustainable development in the context of 
Hoechst's business activities could be applied across products, facilities, and technologies. 
This is not a basis for benchmarking. The measurement issue led to new tensions between 
the partners. However it was more a measurement that concerned Hoechst's managers. A 
strategic business unit (SBU) leader opened one of the project meetings with: "If this project 
leads at the end to just another audit then I will quit today. " 
Most of the official external communication with the media or the community, like the 
presentation of the project findings, was carried out as a joint action. This was important 
since the partnership began with a fear that it could end in a PR game, - with every side 
fighting for its best value. The partnership with the Öko-Institut does not end at this point. 
Rather, it marks the beginning of a longstanding, fruitful continuing co-operation. 
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5.2.2.5 CONTROLLING AND CONTINUING CO-OPERATION 
Continuation of partnerships often depends on the level of success achieved. However, 
there was no quantitative measurement of effectiveness or efficiency in the case of the 
partnership, - or the joint project, - between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut. Hoechst was 
concerned with the observance of planned milestones. The attainment of these was implicitly 
linked to the adherence to a not given budget. The company felt unable the set quantifyable 
budgets to control the efficiency of the project process. Time was a major issue for Hoechst. 
A most obvious positive impact of the joint project for Hoechst was the polishing influence on 
its public image. 
Hoechst's project leader retrospectively summarised the controlling issues: 
We could not keep the planned milestones. [... J Critical, therefore, was that we 
went far beyond our planned sub-deadlines, which significantly postponed the final 
accomplishment of the project task. The reason was that on one hand we had no 
experiences in this area, and on the other that both business lines were in a phase 
of re-structuring. (... J It was not possible to measure the economic efficiency of the 
partnership because the project was based on three pillars - economical, 
ecological and social. 
It was most important for the Öko-Institut not to lose face, nor to lose its reputation as a 
critical and challenging independent force in the environmental movement. It was critical that 
they monitored Hoechst's activities and its ecological and social impact while working 
together with them. It was agreed at the beginning of the partnership that the Öko-Institut 
would continue to criticise Hoechst if they felt the need for it. In 1996, during phase two of 
the project, Hoechst underwent another major chemical accident, about half a year after they 
began to collaborate with the Öko-Institut. Again, the Öko-Institut practised its well-known 
hard criticism against Hoechst and Hoechst its anti-position. A member of the Öko-Institut 
remembers this time of tension between the partners: 
As I know today, there were misgivings on both sides as to whether the project 
would succeed or fail. We believed at this moment in the seriousness of Hoechst 
for the project when they decided not to quit our co-operation after this massive 
criticism. That Hoechst continued to create these tensions and continued the 
partnership was an indicator of initial success. It also assured us of our endeavour 
to continue the partnership after the accomplishment of the specific project task. 
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However, there was still a certain level of rejection for partnering with Hoechst within the 
Öko-Institut. An analyst for chemical production facilities refused to comment on the co- 
operation: "I do not agree with our approach to collaboration with business. I cannot 
elaborate on this until the internal finding process of the Öko-Institut is over. " The Öko- 
Institut used the partnership with Hoechst to re-orient itself and to align the internal thinking 
and structure with the external demand for business collaboration. 
As Hoechst's Board of Management was already deliberating a realignment of the group, the 
proposals of the Öko-Institut were taken on board in a process of change that had already 
begun. This had implications for the joint project and the application of the developed 
product assessment tool within Hoechst's SBUs. Because of the new corporate structure, 
there were no longer any SBUs. The corporate centre that initiated and led the project can 
only suggest that the affiliated companies should apply new concepts. Dormann introduced 
and explained the project findings at the annual international meeting of Hoechst's affiliated 
companies in 1997. The corporate centre integrated sustainable development in Hoechst's 
group policy and corporate strategy. The link to business strategy needs to be developed 
and integrated separately by Hoechst's affiliated companies. However, they could build on 
the experiences gathered within this partnership and could use this partnership for specific 
business purposes. Some subsidiaries established a regular consultation process, while 
others started with new, more business-specific joint projects. 
5.2.3 Business-NGO Joint Project Features 
The partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut is rooted in conflict. Here, two former 
enemies began to work together. Whereas Hoechst wanted to integrate the principle of 
sustainable development into its business, the Öko-Institut fought to raise the awareness of 
the companies with regards to the connectedness of economic development, social benefit 
and ecological conservation - the balancing elements of sustainable 
development. 
Consequently, the partners discovered that they had a common agenda in promoting 
sustainable development. However, this was not the only purpose for which the company 
worked with one of its major critics, and vice versa. While Hoechst's competence is mainly 
based on business, Öko-Institut's competence is primarily societal-orientated. With regards 
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to the three elements that constitute the principle of sustainable development, the partners 
had complementary competencies with respect to the achievement of a common agenda. 
To establish a partnership, Hoechst and the Öko-Institut had to overcome their suspicion of 
each other's behaviour, and the intention behind it that was generated by past conflicts. 
Before the partners started to talk about co-acting, they came together to get to know and 
understand each other, to gain knowledge of: what, how and why one does things. Talking to 
each other and visiting each other's sites established a climate of rapprochement that was 
accompanied by both understandings and misunderstandings. However, no 
misunderstanding was left unresolved. Both partners were committed to mitigating suspicion 
by filling the gap between them with trust in each other. 
Through this lengthy trust-building exercise, the desire grew in each camp to find out 
whether trust could be the base for partnering. The Öko-Institut wanted to prove that it could 
be constructive, while Hoechst needed the PR challenge and the competence of the Öko- 
Institut. However, at no point in time did the partners consider an official contract through 
traditional business negotiations. Rather, the partners agreed on a project task and 
principles of operations that were not fixed in any way. Both partners contributed to the 
project design. The resulting covenant was mutual trust based with a joint project agreement. 
The project focussed on the impact of Hoechst's products on society. To fulfil the project 
objective it was inevitable that the competencies of both partners should be linked. The 
Öko- 
Institut had the reputation of an independent critical research institute with core competence 
in social and ecological issues, related to various industry contexts. Media and other 
pressure groups helped to raise Öko-Institut's profile. Hoechst had the business competence 
that was needed for this project and the critical business and finance world 
behind them. If 
one of the partners had not accepted and considered the competence of the other, 
the 
project could have failed. Therefore, it was an interdependent power relationship 
that was 
competence based. Whereas Hoechst's Board of Directors provided a corridor 
for the 
project, Hoechst's project managers controlled time and costs as 
far as possible. Members 
of the Öko-Institut continuously observed to what degree 
Hoechst acted as social and 
environmental responsible. They reported their findings internally, 
to other pressure groups 
and to the media, as they did prior to the partnership. 
Both partners accepted this 
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interdependent governance that was competence based and an expression of a reciprocal 
power balance. 
A core element of the partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut was the joint 
project. After formulating the project boundaries, a project plan was developed that divided 
the joint venture into two phases. The final stage of the co-operation was an evaluation and 
information dissemination of the data gathered. Formulating the project task, defining project 
boundaries, developing the project plan, conceptualising and testing, and finally evaluating 
the results were elements that constituted a life-cycle development of the joint project. Within 
its different stages, the partners experienced the limits of a sustainability assessment tool 
that was initially intended to be integrated into Hoechst's SMP. The Öko-Institut learned that 
theoretical, optimal, social and environmental concepts cannot always be integrated into 
business without specific adaptation. Hoechst, meanwhile learned that in order to implement 
the guiding principle of sustainable development, it is crucial to consider secondary and 
tertiary potential, social and ecological risks. By remaining open to mutual learning, the 
partners achieved durability partly, but not exclusively for this joint project evolution. The 
partnership is now continuing with new projects. 
The following table summarises business-NGO joint project features under four headings: 
Purpose 
  Promoting Sustainable 
Development 
  Combination of 
Competence 
Covenant 
  Mutual Trust 
Based 
  Joint Project 
Agreement 
Power 
  Competence as 
Power Base 
  Reciprocal Power 
Balance 
Evolution 
  Life-Cycle 
Development 
  Mutual Learning for 
Durability 
Table 10 Business-NGO Joint Project Features 
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5.3 BUILDING A COMMUNITY DISCUSSION GROUP 
5.3.1 Hoechst and its Neighbourhood 
More than 135 yeas ago, Meister Lucius and its companions founded Hoechst. The 
company was located at Höchst, on the river Main. Only a few people lived near the factory. 
Today, Höchst is a municipal area of Germany's growing financial capital, Frankfurt, and 
Hoechst's Frankfurt site covers more than 4 km2. In 1993 when Hoechst began to renew its 
relations with surrounding communities, the Frankfurt site had a workforce of around 30,000 
employees. The company paid DEM 2 billion is salaries, accounting for approximately 
DEM 600 million income tax. Hoechst paid around DEM 1 billion in corporate tax, of which 
DEM 100 million went to the city of Frankfurt. Thirty kilometres around the Frankfurt site, the 
company had more than 9,000 suppliers (Hoechst Annual Report, 1993). 
Hoechst is one of the most important economic factors in Frankfurt. However, given the 
company's location within the city, it has not only business neighbours, but local authorities 
and local NGOs are neighbours, as well as the church, federations and Hoechst's 
surrounding communities. Community members with an interest in similar issues formed so 
called citizen initiatives or special mother initiatives, with common interests in children- 
related issues. These initiatives were the means of contact of community representatives 
and Hoechst. 
Since its very beginning, Hoechst was involved in urban development, social projects, and 
had an employee responsible policy. However this engagement and commitment diminished. 
The community became increasingly unaware of the nature of the company's products, and 
its selected manufacturing method. Since the 1980s, external pressure on Hoechst with 
regard to social and environmental issues increased on the part of politicians, the media, 
NGOs and especially community groups. The various pressure groups hardly talked to each 
other and did not co-ordinate their actions. Traditionally, communication between Hoechst 
and its stakeholders was only one way. The company did not listen carefully to the concerns 
of its neighbours. Released information was very limited. The company built a `Wagenburg' 
and became less and less transparent. 
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In 1993, the most critical chemical accident in the history of Hoechst in Frankfurt took place. 
The incident had an extensive impact on Hoechst's surrounding communities. This was the 
impetus that forced the company to change its relationship with its neighbours, and to build 
partnerships. Since then, the aftermath of the various breakdowns increased the velocity of 
change and enhanced internal perceptions of the company's social and environmental 
induced risks. The management generation changed and a more open communication 
began. Hoechst developed a management approach to `urban sociable chemistry'. In 
connection with the release of the transition strategy towards a life sciences company, 
Dormann recognised that: "Only that which can be communicated is also realisable. " 
The challenge of repositioning themselves within the community as a risk-preventing 
company was further reaching than Dormann's comments. It certainly called for a community 
partnership with positive effects for both partners: Hoechst learned how to cope with a 
diverse, rather than unified spectrum of social and environmental demands and how to make 
use of the knowledge of the community. The community proved it was capable of acting as a 
valuable partner to solve social and environmental challenges and conflicts. There were 
hazards too; beginning with not finding a proper form for this partnership through to not 
finding agreements and not being able to implement solutions for the concerned issues. 
Consequently, partnership meant the transition from community affairs, a one-way 
management approach, to community relations, a two-way management approach. 
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5.3.2 From Community Affairs to Community Relations 
The partnership between Hoechst and its surrounding communities, which only became 
more prominent in the aftermath of critical chemical accidents, is concerned with more than 
just solving conflicts. Schlimme, spokesperson of the green citizen initiative 'Höchster 
Schnüffler un Maagucker", had the opinion that "Hoechst shall stay in Frankfurt but produce 
in an environmentally friendly and socially responsible way. " Hoechst's Community 
Discussion Group (CDG) was the first of its kind in Germany. Its primary purpose was to 
establish a forum that enables both partners to understand each other better, and on this 
basis, to derive mutual benefit. Rather than solving individual issues of community members, 
the forum's focus was to guide the impact that Hoechst had on its communities in a positive 
direction for society as a whole, leading to positive feedback with regard to the position of the 
company within it. 
The process of partnering began as idea between Hoechst and a green community pressure 
group. At with its North American operations, the company already had experiences with 
Community Advisory Panels (CAP). However, the operational and social conditions between 
the two are so different that no direct transmission was possible. The chemical accidents of 
1993 and 1996 forced Hoechst to undertake immediate action that included a need to 
change its relationship with its communities. The 14 June 1993 saw the beginning of the 
constitution of the CDG. Today, two CDGs exist. The following five sections describe the 
process of building a partnership between Hoechst and its communities. 
5.3.2.1 PREPARING FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
It was at the beginning of the 1990s that a small group of managers from Hoechst, 
deliberately started to build personal relationships with critics from Hoechst's communities. 
They searched for talks, dialogue, discourse, and exchange of information and ideas. At 
Hoechst, top management saw the need to come together with critics and to develop a 
strategy for corporate communication that also encapsulated community relations. 
4 Schüff/er un Maagucker is Hesse dialect and can be translated with investigators and analysts. 
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Between 1993 and 1995, many small citizen initiatives were founded. These focused on 
various issues, caused mainly by the impact of Hoechst on society. Their emphasis was 
often linked to family lives or general concerns of the community. For these groups it was 
crucial to become more widely recognised and to build contacts with Hoechst. The founder 
of a mother initiative described the initial stage: 
Over three years / made myself known. I had many personal contacts with 
managers from Hoechst and they begun to accept our work and me. [.. ] One was 
looking for a group of community representatives that would always be 
approachable. We knew one another already. [.. ] We were sitting opposite 
managers that had a lot of money and that were talking a different language. 
The Höchster Schnüffler un Maagucker is a green citizen initiative that criticised Hoechst's 
impact on the environment. This group searched for ways to challenge the company to 
change its behaviour. A representative described ways the initiative went to achieve its 
objective: 
We brought shares and therefore had a right of speech at the annual shareholder 
meeting from Hoechst. We also raised our voice at public hearings about licences 
for new products or production equipment. In this way we met people from Hoechst 
and made personal contacts. 
Reconsidering Hoechst's chemical accident in February 1993 a member of a green citizen 
initiative said: "After the yellow rain in 1993, Hoechst was very dilettante in its 
communication, and the idea of a discussion group was born. " 
Communities needed support but Hoechst did not know what kind. To help themselves they 
depended on each other. A representative from a citizen initiative remembered that "at the 
time of the chemical accidents, it was good that we knew each other. Everyone knew 
someone who had some information and so we could help each other but not solve the 
problem. " 
Looking back to 1993, the head of communications from InfraServ said: 
/ think that the year 1993 stands for the beginning of a huge change at Hoechst. 
During this year, the company was hit very deeply in its basic values. This was 
especially true of its relationships with its critics. 
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The head of Hoechst's corporate medical services was directly involved in the management 
of the aftermath and remembered: 
Rather fast, we had many meetings and informal discussions with citizen initiatives. 
Also there were many endeavours from certain people to enhance their political 
profile. 
The closest contact between Hoechst and citizen initiatives was at public hearings. After 
these, lawyers from both sides talked about the relationship between Hoechst and its 
surrounding communities. Out of these conversations, they built the idea of a discussion 
forum. An environment-orientated citizen initiative claimed that they were always interested 
in formal dialogue with Hoechst. One of its representatives said retrospectively: "Protest was 
not a solution. A discussion group was always our aim. We collected signatures from 
Hoechst's neighbours to express and emphasise our collective will. " 
Only after the CDG was founded did Hoechst's lawyer, who represented the company at 
public hearings, go to the US to gather information about CAPs that are legally required in 
the US. Today, considering its personal experiences with Hoechst's CDG, he said: "It is 
easier to communicate with stakeholders than to try to analyse them. " 
He also sees himself as the internal father of the CDG: 
/ founded under pressure the Community Discussion Group in co-operation with 
critical groups like citizen initiatives, mother initiatives, environmentalists and 
others. The objective was the enhancement of communication between Hoechst 
and its neighbours. This was an objective on both sides. Together with Höchster 
Schnüffler un Maagucker, we started the process of building this partnership. 
5.3.2.2 SETTING RULES FOR A DISCUSSION GROUP 
In June 1993, four months after the first critical chemical accident, Hoechst was invited to a 
constitutional meeting of the CDG. Hoechst's head of corporate development remembers the 
beginning "as process [that] was embedded in frictions and controversial discussions. " 
Mische, member of the Board of Directors of the Hoechst Group, stated in his opening 
speech at the first CDG meeting that: "Hoechst as the company who invited you, does not 
want to predetermine the co-operation. We see the community and the company as equal 
partners. " At this early stage, the community believed that the only intention of Hoechst to 
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get involved with the community was image improvement -a simple PR intent. A 
representative of a mother initiative said, "companies like Hoechst need enemies. The best 
thing is to keep them happy a round table. We had to ensure that they would not use us as a 
PR instrument. " 
No media was invited at the first meeting. Hoechst asked to attend only the community 
representatives that they knew. This was the first critical issue that hit the agenda of the 
CDG. A community representative remembers: "They thought that they could sit with us at a 
round table, excluding the media but informing them that one sits together and talks with 
each other - but nothing else. " 
Because the community wanted to establish a statute for the CDG they used this situation. A 
citizen requested to invite the press. He asked further whether the CDG could vote on this 
issue. Suddenly, Hoechst realised that without a statute the CDG was not able to work 
effectively. It was especially important to provide a concept for agreement, achievement and 
conflict-solving. In the event of Hoechst not accepting setting up a statute, a community 
representative said: "We would have gone to the press [... ] I am sure that this would have 
damaged its reputation again. " 
A working group of community representatives developed a proposal for a statute and it was 
a matter of course that the CDG was open to the public and the print media as well. 
Members of the CDG were community representatives, representatives from Hoechst and 
advisory members like local authorities. 
The founder of a mother initiative summarised the issues covered by the working group and 
integrated into the statute: 
It was arranged who could attend the meetings, who had right of speech, and 
voting rights. Everybody should have the same rights. One needed to balance the 
difference between the participants -a power balance. We also had to say that we 
wanted a right to give recommendations. 
From Hoechst's perspective it was most important that one could get the major critics 
together around the table, along with competent people able to help the community to 
understand the often technical processes that were at the centre of the discussion. One 
reason why it was not easy to decide which community representatives should attend the 
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meeting was the diversity of the community, and the fact that they were only partly organised 
in terms of citizen initiatives. Another reason was that only few people really stood up to 
Hoechst because of emerging tensions within the community. A community member 
described the situation: 
There was also a tension in the community that women were shouting at Hoechst 
and men could lose their jobs or the company would migrate to another country. 
However, this was never our intention. We were sure that a company making so 
much profit also has a responsibility to ensure that its production and products are 
in such conditions that they do not harm people or the environment. 
There were tensions in the company, too. The head of the work council of the Hoechst 
Group was upset about the exclusion of the employee representatives from this forum. 
Neither could he see enough competence in the community to discuss and comment on 
company issues. He said: 
think [the representative] is a complete idiot. Over time, he achieved a high 
degree of knowledge and competence. Nevertheless, permanent negation does 
not help. [... ] It was all about politics. 
5.3.2.3 DISCUSSING CHEMICAL ACCIDENT AFTERMATH 
In his opening speech, at the first CDG meeting, Mische named limitations of the CDG: 
Sure, we cannot take any decisions at this table. However, we will listen carefully 
to the discussion and consider your recommendations. We will pursue your ideas 
within our business practice. Many questions will be discussed without result. 
Between 1993 and 1997, when the CDG focused on Hoechst's chemical accidents and the 
mismanagement of their aftermath, neither legal nor insurance issues were at the centre of 
the arguments. Longitudinal health investigations and community early warning systems 
were problems that the community wanted to discuss and to solve. Community 
representatives set the agenda for CDG meetings. During the discourse process that led to 
recommendations for Hoechst, the company and the community did not always understand 
each other. Technical issues, in particular, caused communication problems. 
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A member of a mother initiative blamed Hoechst for its hegemony: 
We always call the child by its name. [... ] Others tried to focus on terms that we did 
not use properly. They could not come back to the point and tried to destroy our 
arguments. They always tried to show us that we were incompetent, and do not 
know what we were talking about. 
At the beginning of the partnership, the CDG had no structure; no one knew who was 
responsible for what. Hoechst and the community did not have any experience in how to 
organise these kinds of meetings. The company became responsible for administration and 
organisation. Hoechst circulated invitations to CDG meetings. They were also responsible for 
organising the meeting room and writing the minutes. A representative of a green citizen 
initiative believed that, "Hoechst is the cause of the problem so it is only normal that they 
should be responsible for the costs. However, we had interesting pro Hoechst protocols that 
we could accept only on occasions. We can criticise or even reject them. " Hoechst was 
required to cover the costs that were created in the context of the CDG activities. It was only 
reasonable for community representatives that the company should be responsible for these. 
However, some community members and employees saw it differently. A citizen initiative 
representative remembers arguments: 
Some people asked us whether Hoechst would buy us because we were working 
with them so closely. Are you still free? However, suddenly my words had impact. 
The Community Discussion Group has power and powerlessness. 
Experts from various areas were invited to the CDG meetings. The statute regulates the 
membership of and participation in CDG meetings. According to these, CDG members have 
differing status. Members of the community are proportionally represented and the only ones 
that have voting rights. Members of municipal and governmental bodies have a consulting 
function and are invited if their competence and action is needed. Hoechst's role is one of 
communicator, information provider and administrator. A neutral moderator brings all parties 
together, steers the discussion, and helps in critical situations as a neutral person to achieve 
consensus. 
Within working groups CDG members with voting rights searched for concepts on which 
community representatives could agree before they entered into discussion with 
Hoechst. 
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These groups are not open to the public. If the community needed further competence to 
develop concept suggestions for the discussions, they asked for outside support, mainly 
from NGOs like Greenpeace or the Öko-Institut. Independent research institutes were 
commissioned with special expertise. Hoechst had to pay for the costs. However, the head 
of corporate medical services said that some actions were not supported by Hoechst, but at 
a certain time, were inevitable: 
To my regret, we had to do things that were not needed. They were against our 
conviction. However, at this time we had a woman from the green party heading 
the environment department from the city of Frankfurt. It was a political game. [... J 
We have consciously thrown away about DEM 1.6 Mio. 
A further part of the political game was that politicians did not always support Hoechst. As a 
Hoechst manager remembers, the head of the environmental municipal council argued that 
"she would not be stupid to see what is the right thing to do. " He added "nor could she see 
any political benefit in accepting suggestions from Hoechst. She wanted to pay lip service to 
the community. There is potential for her re-election and political future. " 
Before CDG meetings, Hoechst managers held a co-ordination meeting. They discussed 
positions, and agreed on a strategy for the meeting. The participating Hoechst managers at 
the discussion group meeting, mainly heads of departments were committed in advance to 
an agreed internal position. The head of InfraServ criticised the process at this time: "We 
were very inelastic. We could move neither forwards nor backward. This brought a lot of 
tension and dissatisfaction in the dialogue. " After the head of the Frankfurt site became 
Hoechst's leading representative at CDG in 1996; an authority decided now on issues and 
could change them immediately. The discussion process gained flexibility. 
Hoechst provided the community with wider access to the company and gave more insight 
into the company's production and products. When Hoechst had its second major critical 
chemical accident in 1996, the communities already had a forum in place to discuss resulting 
problems. However, issues are changing and after discussion of the critical aspects of 
Hoechst's chemical accidents, the CDG began to widen the spectrum of the discourse. 
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5.3.2.4 ACHIEVING A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOURSE 
Because of the chemical accidents and the aftermath that characterised the relationship 
between Hoechst in Frankfurt and its surrounding communities, the partnership began with 
mistrust and low acceptance on both sides. Consequently, on one side, community 
representatives tried to control every move from and information given by the company. On 
the other hand, Hoechst wanted to control the behaviour of community members in response 
to their business practice. At the beginning, community representatives were mistrustful of 
the company, questioning everything and suspecting manipulation that might divert their 
concerns from the critical issues. However, the discussion of chemical accidents and their 
aftermath provided the very basis for continuing, constructive discourse. The head of 
corporate communication from InfraServ reflects the present state of the partnership on the 
past: 
Today, members of the discussion group do not start right at the beginning of a 
meeting with the insinuation that we want only bad things. [.. ] The Community 
Discussion Group is satisfied with the way in which it operates. Members told us 
that they achieved certain things only because of our partnership. They also told us 
that we should also be happy because it helped us to reposition ourselves 
positively within community's mind. 
Although community representatives felt that the CDG achieved a constructive base, the 
back door was still left open. If one were to experience strong and not solvable misbehaviour 
on the part of Hoechst, the ultimate consequence would be a broken partnership. 
The speaker of the 'Höchster Schnüffler un Maagucker' clarified this by saying: 
At the moment when Hoechst might persistently withhold information that was not 
confidential or to undermine our integrity, we would stop co-operation. If they 
refused to talk about certain issues or broke the statute, we would not continue this 
partnership. We carefully monitor Hoechst's behaviour and are still suspicious. 
The partnership building never finished and satisfied neither partner's expectations. In 1997, 
after the main discussion of the chemical accidents, further issues were added to the agenda 
items that were discussed by the CDG. These issues were, for instance, the discussion of 
huge investment projects with an impact on the community, CDG member access to 
licensing documents, employability and general community improvement. Specific issues 
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were suggested partly by community representatives, and partly by Hoechst. At the end of 
each CDG meeting the agenda for the following was discussed, and finally decided. 
Community representatives mainly proposed discussions about issues that they were aware 
of and Hoechst only those that could become critical. A community representative said that, 
"Hoechst have never behaved so truthful as they do today and they gave the public the right 
to criticise the company. " He added "that before they thought they would be absolute angels 
and everyone who criticised them was seen as someone from Moscow. " 
Hoechst was aware of the importance of the CDG. They saw a positive impact on Hoechst's 
long-term success. The Hoechst Group MD for technique and environment commented on 
the CDG as the basis for constructive discourse: 
In this context we have developed the term 'urban sociable chemistry' and tried to 
use the advantages of a partnership between a company and its community. We 
achieved this because of the endeavour to establish trust through dialogue. 
5.3.2.5 REPLICATING THE COMMUNITY DISCUSSION GROUP 
Results of Hoechst's restructuration to a management holding were many autonomous 
operating companies - also at the Frankfurt site. InfraServ, the operating company of the 
Industriepark Höchst, took over the responsibility to co-ordinate the CDG on behalf of 
Hoechst's represented subsidiaries. This restructuration caused some problems for the 
CDG. Community representatives asked for separate representation at the CDG. A Clariant 
communication manager commented on the situation: "Who is Hoechst? Is there anybody 
outside the fence who can answer this question? Consequently, there is a communication 
problem. Every company wants to built its image. " 
In 1998, when Hoechst's main industrial chemical business was transferred to Clariant, a 
circumstance emerged that made it clear that it would be problematic for the CDG to 
communicate with 35 different companies. The advantage of this restructuring for the CDG 
could have been a more transparent Hoechst Group but internal CDG problems arose. The 
CEO from Clariant stimulated the impression among the CDG members that there was a 
discussion as to whether the company should be part of CDG meetings or not. Community 
representatives got upset about this impression since the industrial chemical business was 
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the business that caused most of the problems in the past. Another reason was that there 
were different communities that were affected by Hoechst and Clariant. If Clariant were not 
to participate in a CDG the respective communities would have no person to turn to. The 
following statement from a community representative illustrates the emerging problems. 
The CEO from Clariant tried to leave the Community Discussion Group. 
Fortunately, Clariant had an accident. We had a crisis meeting and the CEO 
expressed his excuse and asked for a continuation of the Community Discussion 
Group. [.. ] They tried to set up a new statute but we would never have accepted 
this. 
The following timeline provides an overview of the history and the activities of the CDG 
'Höchster Nachbarn' - the CDG of Hoechst's subsidiaries: 
14.06.1993 - Constitutional Meeting 
09.09.1993 - Rules for CDG; Breakdown Brochure § 11 
19.01.1994 - Longitudinal Health Investigation in Schwanheim; Open Access to Licensing Documents; Siren Warning 
19.05.1994 - Exposition Register ; Warning Systems for Schools; Copying of Licensing Documents 
22.09.1994 - Longitudinal Health Investigation and Exposition Register; Site Question of Griesheim and Höchst and 
Presentation of the new CEO from the Frankfurt Site about the Future of the Site; Open Access to 
Licensing Documents; Siren Warning of Neighbourhood 
26.01.1995 - Exposition Register; Emission at Höchst and Griesheim; Gene-Technology at Hoechst; Demolition 
Procedure; Siren and Information System 
04.05.1995 - Vocational Training Situation in Frankfurt West 
05.05.1995 - Transportation of Dangerous Goods; Site Traffic; 15th Anniversary of 'Höchster Schnüffler un Maagucker 
19.10.1995 - Special Session on the Chemical Accident in Azo II 
25.01.1996 - Actions for Azo 1I; Energy Supply; Audit Programme; Air Pollution; Employee Safety Education 
29.01.1996 - Special Session on the Chemical Accident (Isoproturon) (Frankfurt's Mayor 
Mrs Roth and MD Wäsche) 
29.02.1996 - Elucidation of Isoproturon Accident; Emergency Manager 
09.05.1996 - Exposition Register; Test of Sirens 
06.09.1996 - Results of Health Investigation; Project Hoechst and Eco-Institute ; 
Breakdown Brochure 
23.01.1997 - Inquiryfor Information Referring Isoproturon Breakdown 
1996; Safety Audits; PREPH; Women Promotion 
24.06.1997 - Final Report about Health Investigation 
18.09.1997 - Organisational Changes at Hoechst 
10.10.1997 - Special Session on the Chemical Accident Azo I 
15.01.1998 - Rules for CDG; Presentation about the Partnership with the 
Öko-Institut; Information about a new Products 
23.09.1998 - Vocational Training; Breakdown 
Brochure; Community Behaviour in Case of a Chemical Accident 
Figure 16 Timeline and Major Themes of CDG Meetings (Source: CDG Meeting Protocols) 
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It seemed that some trust was lost between the partners, since the communities could not 
satisfactory differentiate between the new Hoechst and Clariant. However, Clariant's 
intention was to search for answers as to how they could become a more effective part of the 
CDG. Their belief was that solutions could only be achieved together. The company asked 
the existing CDG for their opinion on how one should proceed with the CDG. A working 
group developed a proposition on which the company stated its view. After intensive 
discussion, the CDG decided on the final concept. The CDG replicated constructive 
dialogue. Today, there are two CDGs. One discusses issues concerning Clariant's business 
impact and the other the business impact of the rest of the companies operating at the 
'Industriepark Höchst'. 
5.3.3 Community Discussion Group Features 
Hoechst minimised its community affairs activities and increased its negative social and 
environmental impact on its surrounding communities. The tensions between Hoechst and 
its communities grew to conflicts that harmed Hoechst's business in various ways. Chemical 
accidents were not only the final reason for building a partnership with the community; they 
were also for a long time at the core of the discussion of CDG. Hoechst recognised that its 
denial and information withholding strategy harmed its business more than it helped it. The 
company knew that it needed the support of its communities if it wanted to stay and to 
prosper in the region. Therefore, active conflict management was required and the primary 
purpose was to build a CDG. The communities requested information and transparency 
about products and production facilities. Hoechst saw in the fulfilment of these demands the 
key to conflict solving and prevention. Communication improvement was part of Hoechst's 
corporate strategy and the way in which community representatives wanted to get involved 
in the discussion of Hoechst's impact on society. 
There was already some personal communication between managers of Hoechst and 
community members. Some of it was based in Hoechst's legal affairs; others emerged from 
the involvement of Hoechst's managers in community issues that were not part of their job. 
Community representatives deliberately used these communication channels to gather 
information about Hoechst's business activities and to gain support for community projects. 
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Personal contacts enabled Hoechst and the communities to form a partnership. The 
company knew who they had to involve and the community representatives knew who they 
where talking to. However, regardless of the trust between individuals, the community was 
suspicious because now they faced Hoechst as an institution. Formal rules were developed 
that regulated the constitution of the discussion group, rights and responsibilities of its 
members as well as the procedure for discussions. Personal contacts together with formal 
discussion regulations built the covenant of the partnership. 
Community representatives felt handicapped because of their limited understanding of 
Hoechst's technological business practices that were often at the centre of arguments of the 
CDG. In addition to this, the small, unknown community representative had to argue with the 
well-known powerful Hoechst manager. Only one green citizen initiative representative had 
the knowledge that was needed to understand and translate managers' language into 
communities' language. One representative from a mother initiative had the needed 
charisma. These two often acted as spoke-persons. Managers sometimes misused their 
knowledge as a source of power by presenting information in highly technical language or by 
playing with social status. Community representatives anticipated this power relationship and 
forced the CDG to regulate the use of knowledge as power base as much as possible in the 
statute of the CDG. This regulated power balance provided an interdependent power 
relationship between Hoechst and the community that was crucial for constructive 
discussions. If managers did not follow these regulations by presenting open and 
understandable to non-experts information without any social pressure, community 
representatives reported immediately after the CDG meeting to the print media. 
For the community to learn that business is not a welfare institution but also not evil and for 
Hoechst to learn that its surrounding communities are not only critics but an integral part of 
its business environment is an outcome of a continuous trust building exercise. The partners 
learned that they could work together for mutual benefit. Therefore, trust building was part of 
every discussion, but from changing perspectives, and remained unfinished. 
A continuous 
process rather than stages, characterises the evolution of the partnership. 
After discussing 
and solving most of the issues resulting from the aftermath of Hoechst's chemical accidents, 
the CDG renewed itself and began to focus on both related and new issues. Renewal 
in this 
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context means continuous application of the same procedures but with new issues for 
discussions. In addition, a replication of the CDG became inevitable because of Hoechst's 
restructuring and the fact that the potential for conflict became linked to autonomous 
companies. Positive experiences with the first CDG helped to set-up a second one. 
The following table summarises the CDG features under four headings: 
Purpose Covenant Power Evolution 
  Social Conflict   Personal Contact   Knowledge as   Renewal and 
Management Based Power Base Replication 
  Communication   Formal Discussion " Regulated Power   Continuous Trust 
Improvement Regulations Balance Building 
Table 11 Community Discussion Group Features 
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Part III Conceptualising 
Stakeholder Partnership Building 
Partnerships are essential to creating the human relations needed to damp the 
social amplification of minor risks - as well as to generate concern where it is 
warranted. Often controversies over risk are surrogates for concern over 
processes. 
Baruch Fischhoff (1998) 
There are many kinds of partnerships. Companies, for example, may come together to drill 
for oil or to share airline codes. NGOs may join forces to campaign for new legislation to 
secure environmental improvements, and governments may join with each other to fight 
wars and to provide humanitarian aid. This research, however, focuses on a particular breed 
of partnership, one that engages business and its stakeholders - here NGOs and 
communities - in specifically addressing societal goals. The following part of this thesis 
conceptualises the four processes of stakeholder partnership building that were described 
chronologically in part two, to identify and define the elements of partnership alchemy. 
The conceptualising of stakeholder partnership building comprises three sections. The first, 
that of navigating social risk, focuses on the policy, processes and social capital of the two 
analysed companies. The second section, that of partnership alchemy analyses the 
variables that describe similarities and differences between stakeholder partnerships. Finally, 
inferences for partnership building identifies and defines the elements of partnership 
alchemy with regard to the four different analysed stakeholder partnerships. 
Part III: Conceptualising 
Stakeholder Partnership 
Building 
6. Navigating Social Risk 7. Partnership Alchemy 
8. Inferences for 
Partnership Building 
6.1 Setting Course for 
Social Risk Management 
6.2 Connecting with 
Social Players 
6.3 Building Social Capital 
7.1 Distinguishing 
Ends and Means 
7.2 Half Way between 
Handshake and Contract 
7.3 Harnessing Power for 
Partnerships 
7.4 Developing 
Partnerships over Time 
8.1 Purposes of Partnerships 
8.2 Pacts for Partnerships 
8.3 Power Relations in 
Partnerships 
8.4 Processes of 
Partnership Evolution 
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Chapter 6 NAVIGATING SOCIAL RISK 
In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically 
accompanied by the social production of risk. Accordingly, the problems and 
conflicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the problems 
and conflicts that arise from the production, definition and distribution of techno- 
scientifically produced risk. 
Ulrich Beck (1992) 
In this study, the purpose is to analyse stakeholder partnerships from two different 
companies within different organisational and industrial settings, and which produce different 
kinds of social risk. In particular, it is important to understand BP's and Hoechst's social risk 
management approach to describing differences and similarities of firms' stakeholder 
partnership-building characteristics. The risk management approach is called navigating 
social risk, so as to emphasise three contexts: the set course for social risk management, 
the connecting processes of BP and Hoechst with their respective societies, and social 
capital that is built by these processes. 
The set course focuses primarily on policy issues, and describes the normative context - 
that is, what is the right thing to do. The behavioural context - how did the companies do it - 
is described by focusing on the analysis of BP's and Hoechst's connecting processes with 
society. Finally, social capital building reflects the instrumental context - what is the impact 
of BP's and Hoechst's' behaviour. Taken together, the normative, behavioural and 
instrumental contexts set the boundaries for the analysed stakeholder partnership building 
characteristics from BP and Hoechst. 
By way of summary, BP and Hoechst adopted two different approaches to navigating social 
risk. Although both companies had a similar strategic intent, the way in which they sought 
dialogue with society was fundamentally different. However, interestingly, despite differences 
with regard to policy and processes, social capital features remained similar. 
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6.1 SETTING COURSE FOR SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
6.1.1 Directing the Company 
BP already had a formal policy when it changed from a technology to a society driven 
company. Although, the company revised these guidelines, its primary purpose and 
development, as well as its method of applying this to business practice remained 
unchanged. The policy provides codes for behaviour and benchmarks for accountability. The 
main guidance was on ethical behaviour, as well as on laws and regulations. BP's policy 
needed to be complied with at all times by employees or representatives. All guidelines were 
developed at the corporate centre, and then forwarded to BP's operational units for comment 
and elaborating implementation issues. A managing director and specialists at various 
company levels were assigned the ongoing task of managing policy. In the 1990s, the 
company set out detailed guidelines with regard to the application of the policy, and further 
issue-related policies such as health, safety and the environment, and social policy, were 
developed. BP's policy documents are printed as glossy brochures and circulated widely, 
both internally and externally. The company had a formal compliance-directed policy. 
As a chemical company which transformed to become a life sciences company, Hoechst did 
not have a formal policy on which employees should orient their behaviour and against which 
behaviour should be assessed. Throughout the history of Hoechst, the board of directors and 
senior management were seen by employees as paternal figures, always knowing the right 
thing to do. Employees associated policy issues with the board, and often with CEO priorities 
for the company that were widely communicated within and outside the company. However, 
the board of directors did not consider policy issues as decisive. Indeed, strategy was the 
crucial factor in determining policy. The market determined Hoechst's strategy and, hence, 
its policy as well. In the' 1990s, Hoechst in Germany was forced to become an 'open 
company' applying a 'de-frosting and de-rusting' strategy. The CEO made corporate 
communication into a priority. Policy issues such as providing insight and information, and 
communicating as widely as possible derived from the need for a corporate communication 
strategy. Hoechst became transparency-directed. 
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6.1.2 Providing Orientation 
BPX entered a developing society and initiated widespread social changes. The company 
was a wealth producer in Colombia's most underdeveloped and poorest department. 
Society's expectations needed to be met, and BP was forced to recognise its role as an 
agent in social change. For instance, the wealth produced by BPX in Colombia attracted 
many Colombians. They moved near to the operation sites so as to benefit from BP's 
presence. However, because of the underdevelopment of the region, this migration caused 
many social hazards such as crime, infrastructure deficiency and guerrilla movements. BP 
had to face accusations of human rights abuses and environmental damage before it turned 
appropriately towards social risk management. Ethical and legal compliance was not 
sufficient. The company recognised that to navigate social risk, the course also needed to be 
responsibility-orientated. The added policy dimension was social responsibility. Recognising 
the potential social risk that BP had brought to Colombia, the firm set up a fixed code for the 
responsible behaviour of a company operating within social sensitive areas. Managers and 
employees were required to orientate their behaviour towards these responsibility guidelines. 
Meanwhile, Hoechst in Germany became detached from the society because it neglected 
society's needs and wants and therefore not only its reputation suffered but also its business 
performance. However, the life sciences industry sector directly affects and is affected by 
society. Thus, transforming into a life sciences company implied the necessity to be much 
more integrated into society than it is the case with chemical companies. In addition, the aim 
of aligning business with the guiding principles of sustainable development also urged 
Hoechst to become part of society. A successful life sciences business and an effective 
sustainable development approach can only be achieved through a focus on social demands 
with regard to a variety of issues such as product innovations and use of natural resources, 
or product and production implications for future generations. Hoechst has already opened 
up to become more transparent. However, a focus on social demands would go much 
further, and would require achieving formulated objectives. Hoechst's social demand 
orientation had a dynamic link to social issues that were part of a firm's strategy. The 
company considered social demands as embedded within the strategic direction of the 
company. Consequently, social demand orientation is an outcome of Hoechst's strategy. 
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6.1.3 The Normative Context 
The normative context of navigating social risk was fundamentally different in BP and 
Hoechst. The distinction between the two set courses might be described in the following 
way: whereas BP strove to comply with laws and regulations, as well as to consider 
corporate social responsibility to achieve long-term performance, Hoechst focused on 
openness and social expectations embedded in corporate strategy, leading them to the 
statement that only that which can be communicated will be realised. Five distinctive policy 
features can differentiate the normative context of managing social risk between BP and 
Hoechst: direction, orientation, structure, performance and environmental adaptation. 
As analysed, BP had a published code of conduct and various sub-policies that were 
primarily compliance-directed and responsibility-oriented. In order to become accountable, 
the company produced formal, widely circulated policy documents. However, because the 
code was fixed, no environmental adaptation was possible. Hoechst's informal course was, 
rather, transparency-directed and social-demand-orientated. The company did not consider 
transforming policy issues into a code of conduct. Existing policies such as environmental 
management guidelines were dynamic outcomes of Hoechst's strategy, and in a state of flux. 
Hoechst did not intend its policy to be applied for accountability purposes. 
Policy Features BP Hoechst 
Direction Compliance 
Orientation Responsibility 
Structure Formal 
Environmental Adaptation Fixed Code 
Transparency 
Social Demand 
Informal 
Dynamic Strategy Outcome 
Accountability Accountable Not Accountable 
Table 12 Normative Context of Navigating Social Risk 
There was some evidence that the differences between the fixed strict policy of BP and the 
more dynamic, laissez-faire policy of Hoechst derived from firms' different history, 
governance and leadership, and were embedded in the different social risks that the 
companies induced. No evidence could be found that policy differences might be linked to 
industrial or regional distinctions. Industrial issues influencing policies were similar, and both 
companies were global operators with global policies. 
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6.2 CONNECTING WITH SOCIAL PLAYERS 
6.2.1 Becoming Part of Society 
In the early 1990s, BPX was granted a licence to act as operator of explored oil fields in 
Colombia. The company was aware that it was only a guest in the country. As such, BP had 
to adapt to regional behaviour, to contribute to social development and to comply with 
Colombian laws and regulations. The firm's overall strategy can be seen to have been 
integration into the society. A high percentage of BPX's oil revenues were royalties that were 
only partly returned to the Department of Casanare, but were inefficiently used. The 
company recognised this, and set up its own community affairs team, with an impressive 
social investment budget, for initiating and managing community projects. In addition to this, 
BPX had extensive environmental programmes and a controversial security system. The 
overall objective of the various programmes and projects was to make a positive contribution 
to the social development of Casanare. In the late 1990s, the company revisited its social 
investment practice and embedded its revised activities into an internally developed strategic 
social development programme, called Casanare 2000. This was followed by BP's ambition 
to integrate its social engagement into its business activities. 
Hoechst in Germany had a long history of being part of society. However, in the early 1980s 
the company began to reduce, without any explanation, its social contribution to a minimum 
and did not engage in new areas. In addition, Hoechst's reaction to constant criticism about 
its products and production had the effect of detaching the company from society. In the 
early 1990s, Hoechst announced a reintegration strategy. Because the company's critics 
blamed Hoechst for not providing insight into internal production and licensing processes or 
information about products, production and social implications, the company made corporate 
communication a priority on the way towards social reintegration. Hoechst developed a 
strategy and set up a corporate communication department at the corporate centre and at 
the operational levels. At the core of this approach was the objective to establish targeted 
communication. Because of the nature of identified strategic issues, certain stakeholders 
could be associated with them and, thus, targeted stakeholder communication was applied 
to reintegrate Hoechst into the society. 
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6.2.2 Connecting Processes 
To put its desire for social integration into action, and to achieve sustainable social 
development, BPX in Colombia first developed all programmes and projects internally, with 
only little external expertise. Project management procedures were used for social 
investment considerations that resulted in planned social development processes. The 
annual budgeting was presented as a social investment plan. BP tried to rationalise social 
investment in the same way as it rationalised business investments. However, the company 
treated social and business investments as two separate issues. This approach thus did not 
allow for satisfactory consideration of society's expectations of BPX's contribution to social 
development. The company recognised that it did not have the expertise to achieve its social 
development targets without sufficient support from stakeholders. BP thus began to engage 
with stakeholder at various levels. For instance, the company consulted NGOs referring 
policy issues and members of communities, as they needed their expertise to plan and 
manage community projects. The company integrated stakeholder consultation as core 
process of its planned social development commitment for Casanare. 
For Hoechst, social reintegration meant that the company had to re-establish a 
communication link between the company and its relevant stakeholders. Since effective 
stakeholder communication was the strategic objective of Hoechst, the company used 
corporate communication as the basis for achieving set targets within the context of 
navigating social risk. Hoechst's issue management approach allowed the company to 
prioritise the various social issues that the company faced. The prioritised social issues for 
corporate communication changed as Hoechst's business issues changed or critical 
incidents happened. In this way, social and business issues were always connected. 
However, in order to achieve effective stakeholder communication, the company needed to 
link the prioritised issues with the relevant stakeholders. Most of Hoechst's managers were 
members of Hoechst's surrounding communities, members of political parties or had other 
existing relationships to stakeholder groups. Thus, managers build personal contacts 
for 
stakeholder communication. Hoechst constantly extended its stakeholder contacts and 
linked them. The intent behind this behaviour was that this emerging networking would 
support Hoechst's endeavour to achieve effective stakeholder communication. 
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6.2.3 The Behavioural Context 
Two questions were answered in order to describe the behavioural context of navigating 
social risk of BPX in Colombia and Hoechst in Germany: What did the companies do to 
become part of the society? And, how did they do it? Five process features are applied to 
compare the behavioural context of the two studied companies. Intent, actions, method, 
objective and procedure are the context variables that help to determine similarities and 
differences of firms' connecting processes with the society. 
BP's search for integration and Hoechst's desire for reintegration had a similar strategic aim: 
connecting the firm with the society. However, as the other process elements show, the way 
in which the two companies put their intent into action was different. For BP social integration 
was achieved through social investment, and supported by stakeholder consultation, in order 
to accomplish sustainable social development. This was a planned process. Hoechst 
achieved its social reintegration through an emerging process. Networking was the method 
for corporate communication, built-up for effective stakeholder communication. 
Process Features BP Hoechst 
Intent Social Integration Social Reintegration 
Actions Social Investment Corporate Communication 
Method Stakeholder Consultation Networking 
Objective Social Development Stakeholder Communication 
Procedure Planned Emerging 
Table 13 Behavioural Context of Navigating Social Risk 
Although the two companies had a similar strategic intent, their actions and the connecting 
processes were fundamentally different. There is evidence that these differences derive from 
the differential nature of the induced social risk and from the regional differences of the 
operations. Some differences are also linked to industrial characteristics such as social 
issues that derive from royalty systems. No evidence could be found that similarities or 
differences are based on firm specific characteristics. The similarity of the strategic intent is 
based on a similar approach to stakeholder engagement that both companies pursued. 
Being part of society is the most effective way of navigating social risk (Franklin, 1998). 
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6.3 BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL 
6.3.1 Achieving Social Status 
Although, BP carried out social impact assessments, the company had only limited 
understanding of the social change that its business had initiated. Thus, early social 
development projects did not sufficiently consider societies wants and needs. Moreover, 
most projects were locally focused and did not allow building value creation links with other 
social projects. However, BPX recognised that it needed to build social capital that would 
help to ensure a positive return on its investments. The firm therefore began to prioritise 
stakeholders for consultations because they were seen as a knowledge resource for 
managing social investment projects. Stakeholders' knowledge enabled the company, for 
instance, to assess project priorities and possible impacts, and to establish links with other 
social development initiatives. This not only provided society with the perception that it 
participated in the development process, but it also assisted the company in meeting 
society's expectations. Consequently, society granted BPX the social licence to operate, 
which can be seen as complementary to the legal licence to operate that the Colombian 
government gave BPX. Hence, the company achieved the legitimacy for its operations. 
In contract, a lack of communication with its stakeholders left Hoechst in a position where it 
was problematic to understand a firm's business practice and the nature of its induced social 
risk. Hoechst lost its identity as a caring chemical company, and began to build its identity as 
sustainable life sciences company. Because of its targeted communication the company was 
able to prioritise stakeholders. Consequently, Hoechst focused on those stakeholders that 
were most important, notably involving building social capital. Prioritised stakeholders were 
receivers, as well as providers of knowledge. They had access to business knowledge while 
Hoechst had access to stakeholder knowledge. For instance, by communicating with NGOs 
Hoechst provided insight into business processes, whereas the company gained insight into 
the way in which the guiding principles of sustainable development could be applied for its 
business. Hence, stakeholder knowledge was considered as a resource for navigating social 
risk. Hoechst's stakeholder networking enhanced the capacity of social capital and resulted 
in a new identity and thus, a reestablishment of firm's legitimacy. 
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6.3.2 Building Intangible Assets 
After BP faced accusations of human rights abuses and environmental damages in 
Colombia, shareholders called BP's investor relations office, worried about their investments 
in Colombia and the possible, negative effects of the critical incident on other investments. 
Meanwhile, NGOs asked BP to terminate its operations in Casanare because of its 
reputation of being a negative force in Colombia's social development process. Although, no 
evidence could be found to support accusations against the company, BP's reputation 
suffered, not only in Colombia. However, by achieving a social licence to operate and thus, 
the legitimacy for its business, BPX created an assurance for its business investment. BP's 
achieved legitimacy was an assurance because on the basis of being given a social licence 
to operate, society would not obstruct BPX's business activities. However, legitimacy as an 
assurance can be given or taken away. In addition, BP had to restore its reputation through 
sustainable social development and stakeholder consultation. The company began to 
consider reputation as an important asset. To enhance its value, BPX developed a 
reputation strategy. Reputation was considered as an intangible asset that increases or 
decreases in value, depending on the impact of BPX's social integration process. 
Already before Hoechst in Germany faced the aftermath of various chemical accidents 
during the 1990s, the company was known as an environmental polluter and a closed 
company that did not care about communicating with its stakeholders. The community could 
not understand that Hoechst was not supporting social development as they used to do. 
Consequently, Hoechst had a bad reputation and lost its identity before it began re- 
connecting with society. Stakeholder communication and networking assisted the company 
in achieving a new identity and thus, legitimacy for its business. As long as stakeholders 
identified Hoechst as a sustainable company, they legitimated its products and production 
and hence, approved its operations. Legitimacy, therefore, had implications for business 
assurance. However, perceiving Hoechst as a sustainable company did not immediately 
imply that Hoechst could see itself as a positive force within the society. Rather, the 
company saw reputation as the amount of support that it received from stakeholders for its 
operations. Therefore, reputation, as an intangible asset, was considered as having a direct 
impact on business performance. 
176 
6.3.3 The Instrumental Context 
Within the exception of strategic intent, the normative and behavioural contexts of navigating 
social risk differed substantially between BP and Hoechst, particularly with regard to the 
instrumental context is surprisingly similar. Social capital was built by connecting with 
society. Achieving a positive social status and building intangible assets was equally 
important. Five social capital features - focus, resource, outcome, implication, and assets - 
were analysed to highlight similarities between BP's and Hoechst's instrumental context. 
Whereas BP used social development and stakeholder consultation, to connect with society, 
Hoechst applied stakeholder communication and networking. However, in both companies 
the focus of social capital building was on prioritised stakeholders. For BP, stakeholder 
knowledge was a resource embedded in stakeholder relationships and called for a social 
licence to be established so as to operate legitimately. In order to build its new identity 
Hoechst also depended on stakeholder knowledge as a resource that assisted the company 
to gain legitimacy for its operations. Moreover, both companies considered legitimacy as 
having business assurance implications. Building social capital also meant for BP and 
Hoechst to restore its reputation - building an intangible asset that adds value to business. 
Social Capital Features BP Hoechst 
Focus Prioritised Stakeholders Prioritised Stakeholders 
Resource Stakeholder Knowledge Stakeholder Knowledge 
Outcome Legitimacy Legitimacy 
Implication Assurance Assurance 
Assets Reputation Reputation 
Table 14 Instrumental Context of Navigating Social Risk 
Social capital of BP and Hoechst is not characterised by intrinsic differences. Rather, the 
social capital features of the two companies are similar. The similarities are based on critical 
incidents that BP and Hoechst faced, in firms' set course for navigating social risk and in 
their connecting processes with society. Social capital was for BP and Hoechst a resource 
embedded in stakeholder relationships and comprised access to information as well as a 
social status for the companies. Because social capital is affected by the behavioural 
context, firms' processes of connecting with society, it sets the instrumental context. 
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Chapter 7 PARTNERSHIP ALCHEMY 
People and organisations from some combination of public, business and civil 
constituencies engage in voluntary, mutually beneficial, innovative relationships to 
address common societal aims through combining their resources and 
competencies. These dynamic relationships are the essential alchemy of 
partnership. 
Jane Nelson & Simon Zadek (2000) 
The Oxford English dictionary describes alchemy as the chemistry of the Middle Ages and 
16th century, applied specifically to the extraction of gold from base metal. In this chapter, the 
notion of alchemy is adapted to stakeholder partnership building. Partnerships unlock, 
combine and leverage the creativity, insight, energy and resources of their participants. 
Purpose, pact, power relationships, and the process of partnership development are the 
ingredients that define the quality and quantity of stakeholder partnership building. 
Therefore, these dynamic features compose the essential alchemy of stakeholder 
partnership building. 
This chapter is an attempt to analyse stakeholder partnership building. Four stakeholder 
partnerships will be analysed in order to describe the elements of partnership alchemy: two 
business-NGO and two business-community partnerships. Two different companies and four 
different stakeholders were involved. Each company engaged in an NGO and a community 
partnership. The chapter is structured as follows: 
  Ends and means of partnerships; 
  Partnership agreement; 
  Harnessing of power for partnerships; and 
  Development of partnerships over time. 
In each subsection, the four different stakeholder partnerships are described and analysed 
according to the aspect of alchemy that they demonstrate. The defining characteristics of 
stakeholder partnerships are elaborated. Chapter eight will then evaluate these features in 
terms of their relevance for stakeholder partnership building. 
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7.1 DISTINGUISHING ENDS AND MEANS 
7.1.1 Acquiring Knowledge for Changing Policy 
Despite obvious environmental changes, BP did not modify its business policy. Only after the 
company faced criticism and lost corporate reputation did it begin to revise its guidelines. By 
adapting its business policy to the changing environment, the firm was reliant on its internal 
competence and advice from management consulting companies, although through internal 
dialogue, it reviewed its business policy. However, a lack of understanding of issues such as 
human rights and business practice in less developed countries limited the extent to which 
the company was able to adapt business policy. 
BP's policy was written by business for business, but without consulting the company's 
stakeholders. However, the firm recognised that it did not have the knowledge to revise and 
implement its policy, as it was socially required to do. To incorporate social demands, BP 
needed a partner able to assist the company by adapting its business policy to the changing 
environment around them. Since NGOs, the spokespersons of society, expected 
multinational companies to contribute to the greater awareness of human rights in socially 
unstable countries, BP and NGOs had a joint interest in improving the human rights records 
of Colombia and in particular in BPX's operating environment. This joint interest became a 
precondition for collaboration between BP and NGOs with regards to social issues. 
NGOs are experts in social and environmental issues, and have built up a knowledge base. 
Various human rights NGOs and development agencies aimed to design human rights 
guidelines for transnational companies, operating in less developed countries. Also, the IAG 
itself set this objective, which, to a certain extent, was similar to BP's endeavour to 
implement human rights in their business policy. To fulfil the strategic objective of 
incorporating human rights into business practice, BP needed a partner like the IAG to gain 
understanding of the situation in less developed countries, multinational corporations' social 
impact and resulting business policy implications. Whereas the IAG required 
knowledge from 
companies like BP in order to assess business practice and accomplish its aim of 
developing 
human rights guidelines for the excavation industry in less developed countries. 
For 
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instance, BP needed to understand the social risks that its business was inducing, and the 
IAG assisted the company by providing insight into these impacts, while at the same time the 
company enabled the IAG to gain understanding of how and why BP operated in the way it 
did. The opportunity for BP and the IAG to acquire knowledge from each other was seen by 
BP and the IAG as a basis for a partnership. Therefore, the purpose of the partnership 
between BP and the IAG was to acquire knowledge that would help to achieve the strategic 
objective of changing business policy. However, each partner had a different strategy for 
developing new guidelines and putting them into practice. 
7.1.2 Co-financing Investments for Social Development 
BPX recognised its community responsibilities, and accordingly, committed itself to 
community development. This commitment was based on the company's strong desire to 
manage its social impact. Communities' expectations were centred around BPX's 
contribution, and by implication, on its impact on societal improvements. Hence, the 
company and the society around it had a joint interest in social development. BPX benefited 
in various ways, such as through an improvement in its reputation and fewer interruptions of 
its operations, whereas the community improved its standard of living. Both BPX and the 
community were thus convinced that social impact management was the key to sustainable 
development. 
Because of the wide area that was affected by BPX's presence in Casanare, various 
communities needed to be involved, and complex development issues needed to be 
considered. BPX's initial strategy for social investment was similar to those who were 
successfully applied in Western countries. However, scattered and unlinked social 
development projects where not a solution for Colombia. The company could not mitigate 
critical social conflicts and risk potentials. Communities' needs and wants had to be analysed 
and to be understood in order to meet social expectations, while social investments had to 
be aligned with and integrated into community development plans. 
The arrival of BPX in Casanare raised people's hopes for better employment prospects, 
more investment in the economy and social infrastructure, and other direct benefits arising 
from royalties and tax revenues. 85 per cent of BPX's oil revenues went to the Colombian 
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government, of which some was earmarked for social development in Casanare, and was, 
therefore given to the local municipalities to put community development plans into practice. 
However, often the financial budget was insufficient or inefficiently spent. Here, BPX was 
able to help with its social investment budget and social development was co-ordinated in 
partnership. However, further partnership development was only possible through a tripartite 
co-ordination partnering between the company, communities and local authorities. 
BPX, together with communities and local authorities, were in a position to prioritise social 
investment projects, to manage these effective and efficiently, to bring consistency into 
community development plans and, more importantly, to co-finance social investments. For 
instance, to build a new school, BPX paid for the material and provided technical support, 
whereas the community and the local authorities were responsible for the construction and 
maintenance. Hence, the community took over ownership, and this resulted in long term 
stability. Co-financing social investment was considered by the involved partners as a means 
to the end of managing social impact for sustainable community development. 
7.1.3 Combining Competence for Strategy-Tool Development 
While Hoechst wished to integrate the principles of sustainable development into its 
business, the Öko-Institut fought to raise the awareness of companies with regard to the 
connectedness of economic development, social benefit and ecological conservation - the 
balancing elements of sustainable development. Nevertheless, Hoechst and the Öko-Institut 
discovered that they had a common agenda in promoting sustainable development, 
although, the partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut is rooted in conflict and 
suspicion. Here, two former enemies began to work together. 
As Germany's most influential green NGO, the Öko-Institute is one of the leading 
independent research institutes for environmental studies. Traditionally, the institute was not 
working for or co-operating with business. Independent competence was a first priority 
for 
effective campaigns against business practice that was considered as destroying the 
environment. Scientists and industry specialists analysed and evaluated environmental 
problems, produced environmental and social assessments, and developed strategies 
for 
improvements. Referring to the principles of sustainable development, the 
Öko-Institute 
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developed competence in the ecological and social area, but this did not extend to the 
financial and business area. However, to provide evidence of its competence as an 
independent research institute rather than just a campaigning NGO, the Öko-Institut decided 
to co-operate with business, although not allowing this to influence its independence. 
Because of its position as a leading chemical company having transformed into a leading life 
sciences company, Hoechst was an expert in business strategy, market development and 
entry, production and project management, finance and all other traditional business areas. 
Since the 1980s, the company began to build up ecological competence, but this was still in 
its early stages when Hoechst committed itself to sustainable development. However, their 
understanding of the social environment was underdeveloped. In addition, Hoechst's 
assessment and planning capabilities were limited in time and space to their business 
horizon. To achieve its strategic objective, and to become a sustainable company, the 
guiding principles of sustainable development needed not only to become part of Hoechst's 
corporate strategy, but to be integrated in strategy tools such as product assessments. 
Traditional management consultants did not have the competence that Hoechst required to 
fulfil its strategic objectives with regard to sustainable development. This, therefore, 
presented an opportunity for the Öko-Institut to co-operate with Hoechst, and to develop a 
product sustainability assessment instrument, as a joint project. The two partners combined 
their competence - Hoechst contributed its business and finance competence and the Öko- 
Institute its ecological competence and understanding of the social environment. 
Consequently, to promote sustainable development, Hoechst and the Öko-Institut combined 
competence to develop a strategic tool for assessing products in terms of their sustainability. 
7.1.4 Improving Communication for Social Conflict Management 
While Hoechst in Germany minimised its community affairs activities, it also enhanced its 
negative social and environmental impact on its surrounding communities. Hence, critical 
tensions between Hoechst and its communities grew into social conflicts that harmed 
Hoechst's business in various ways such as a loss in share price. For the community, this 
social conflict was associated with issues such as insecurities relating to community 
prospects and risks with regard to health, safety and environment. 
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Consequently, a mitigation of these tensions was in the interest of the two opposed parties. 
Hoechst and its surrounding communities recognised that social conflict management was 
the solution to the problem, and was prepared to act jointly in this area. This readiness to 
engage in managing the conflict established a precondition for the partnership between 
Hoechst and its communities in the context of social risk management. 
Hoechst's communities were very diverse. Citizen groups and local NGOs, together with the 
church, became opinion leaders and representatives of the communities and society's needs 
and wants. Critical incidents such as Hoechst's chemical accidents placed pressure on the 
community to protest against the company. The media and local authorities also supported 
this. Only a relatively small amount of information was available with regard to critical these 
incidents, and even less was available about Hoechst's products or their plans for the future. 
Negatively affected as they were by the company, and not receiving any help, widespread 
protests began. The communities recognised that such protests could raise attention and 
awareness, although they did little to initiate any changes. Protest and criticism were not 
seen as the preferable solution for resolving social conflict. Achieving transparency and 
being consulted about society-related decision-making were the objectives of the 
communities. Therefore, community opinion leaders sought to establish communication links 
with Hoechst, so as to retrieve information and become more involved in internal processes. 
After announcing its 'de-rusting' and 'de-frosting' strategy, Hoechst began to evolve as an 
open company, aiming to make corporate communications one of its priorities. This is 
because the company recognised that its denial and information withholding strategy harmed 
its business more than it helped it, and it knew that it needed the support of its communities 
if it wanted to stay and to prosper in the region. Therefore, active conflict management was 
sought, and corporate communication was seen as the way forward. The communities 
requested transparency with regard to products and production facilities, and Hoechst saw in 
the fulfilment of these demands the key to social conflict solving. Communication 
improvement was part of Hoechst's corporate strategy and the way in which the community 
wanted to get involved in the discussion of Hoechst's impact on society. A partnership 
between Hoechst and its surrounding communities in the form of a discussion group was the 
logical way to improve communication with regard to social conflict management. 
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7.2 HALF WAY BETWEEN HANDSHAKE AND CONTRACT 
7.2.1 Consultation Dialogue for Business Policy 
Central to an effective partnership between BP and the IAG were conversations about BP's 
business policy and the company's business practice in less developed countries. These 
conversations developed into consultations designed to develop business policy. The co- 
operation was highly informal, with no specific objectives in mind, and as such, evaluation of 
the partnership was problematic. However, the partnership constituted more than merely a 
conversation with a competent partner. BP's dialogue with the IAG enabled it to adapt its 
policy to the social environment of Casanare, as well as to integrate human rights issues into 
its business practice. Indeed, the IAG was able to develop guidelines for the excavation 
industry in less developed countries. 
When BP faced accusations of human rights abuses, the company carefully tracked those 
who criticised BP's business, and what might have been the ambition of the critics. Equally 
important was the expertise behind the criticism and whether the attacker carried weight. On 
this basis, BP had a limited selection of potential partners. Often, BP phoned their critics and 
asked for a conversation about issues relating to criticism in general. The intention was to 
find out whether the censurers were a valuable source of knowledge. BP's managers met 
their critics, which were primarily NGOs, on neutral territory such as conferences, workshops 
or similar gatherings. 
Development agencies agreed to engage in a conversation process about policy issues, but 
refused to become involved in specific projects. Before the consultation dialogue began, the 
IAG was founded. The reason why development NGOs congregated in the IAG was to 
support each other in the partnership with BP. NGOs were aware of the power that the 
company had and sometimes applied. Based on these circumstances, and together with 
assumed neglected human rights, the IAG became suspicious with regard to BP and its offer 
of conversations about conflicting issues. NGOs considered the IAG as an assurance of their 
involvement with BP, whereas the company engaged with various NGOs and on various 
levels to get assurance for the case of new accusations. Therefore, both partners considered 
and established assurance as a basis for a partnership agreement. 
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A characteristic of the dialogue was that no rules or procedures were defined, no contract 
was signed, no regular meetings were scheduled and no agenda was laid out. However, 
primarily because of the sensitivity of the discussed issues, a memorandum of 
understanding was worked out. The IAG expressed concerns about confidentiality, and 
asked for a written proposal. Finally, both partners agreed on principles that defined how the 
consultation dialogue should be organised. An informal agreement developed out of 
partnering practice, as well as from experiences, but was never written down. 
7.2.2 Joint Venture for Social Investments 
When BPX began its operations in Colombia they had only a limited understanding of the 
social environment and the company's effects on it. However, the firm recognised that to link 
social development with a positi 
had to keep social ex 
company and the commu 
on its business, the partnership which BPX created 
These expectations became more visible as the 
focus more on concrete projects and joint actions that 
were central elements of tffe- partnership. Because BP already had a social development 
plan, and the community had a community development plan, and both an associated 
budget, it was deemed preferable to come to an agreement about investment priorities that 
could be even more efficiently achieved by co-financed investments. However, these joint 
investments gave no assurance of success, but rather, were joint ventures which had the 
interest of social investment in mind. 
BPX contacted local authorities and community opinion leaders to discuss how and to what 
extent the company's social development activities could be integrated into the community 
development plan. Therefore, partner selection was predetermined. The company became a 
member of the community planning board, and received invitations to community meetings. 
These meetings were regularly planned. The way in which the company co-operated with the 
local authorities and community representatives was pre-arranged. In addition, BPX set up 
community meeting points outside but near their operating areas. These houses were not 
only the offices of company's community affairs staff, but also a place for meeting community 
members on a day-to-day basis. 
185 
Informal meetings with members of the community were important in allowing BPX to obtain 
access to information about society's wants and needs, so vital in setting up a social 
development plan. Workshops and open forums were established so as to analyse and 
understand social expectations in general and implications for social investment. Meanwhile, 
social demands continued to determine the community development plan as well. 
Having prioritised community development issues, specific project planning began. For each 
project a formal agreement between the involved partners was signed. Every social 
investment project was part of, or closely linked to, the agreed community development plan. 
However, discussions around the plan emerged, and became determined by, day-to-day 
issues and current environmental changes, as well as local cultural issues. Therefore the 
covenant for the social development of Casanare was informal and based on expectations, 
but in addition, formalised, for every specific community development project into a signed 
formal project agreement. Consequently, the partnership between BPX and the community 
can be seen as an open joint venture for formalised social investments in Casanare. 
7.2.3 Joint Project for Strategy-Tool Development 
The outcome of Hoechst's partnership with the Öko-Institut has been the definition and 
development of a strategic management tool for sustainable product assessment. This co- 
operation was divided into two phases, each of which had a different focus but involved both 
the Oko-Institute and Hoechst. While the first was concept-development orientated, within 
the second, the concept was applied to two products, and further refined. This strategic tool 
aimed to become part of Hoechst's management system. Hence, the partnership had a 
specific target to accomplish that was defined as a joint project agreement. 
The Öko-Institut was the only critic able to listen to Hoechst's justifications, and carefully 
considered its approach towards a sustainable company. No other national NGO opened up 
to co-operate with Hoechst on the issue of sustainable development. 
However, it was not 
Hoechst who approached the Öko-Institut. The process of partnering 
began by the Öko- 
Institut was followed up by Hoechst's CEO public declaration to 
become an open and 
transparent company. One year later, Hoechst approached the 
Öko-Institute with a project 
suggestion. Both partners agreed on an objective for a joint project proposal. 
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To establish a partnership, Hoechst and the Öko-Institute had to overcome their historical 
suspicion of each other's behaviour. Before, the partners started to talk about co-acting, they 
came together to get to know and understand each other, to gain knowledge of what, how 
and why one does things. Talking to each other and visiting each other's sites established a 
climate of rapprochement that was accompanied by both understandings and 
misunderstandings. However, no misunderstanding was left unresolved. Both partners were 
committed to mitigating suspicion by filling the gap between them with trust in each other as 
a basis for the joint project. 
Through a lengthy trust-building exercise, the desire grew in each camp to find out whether 
trust could form a basis for partnering. The Öko-Institut wanted to prove that it could be 
constructive, while Hoechst needed the public pressure and the competence of the Öko- 
Institut. This was an emerging process which finally ended with the joint project agreement 
for developing the sustainable product assessment tool for Hoechst. Because Hoechst and 
the Öko-Institut had no experiences with similar partnerships, they did not intend to control 
the co-operation by a formal agreement or by any other constraints. 
At no point in time did the partners consider an official contract through traditional business 
negotiation. Rather, they agreed on a project task and principles of operations that were not 
fixed in any way. Both partners contributed to the project design. However, there was no 
specific project plan or project management. Because the joint project agreement was very 
informal and developed with the learning of the partnership, there was at no point in time any 
written or signed agreement. The resulting covenant was based on mutual trust. Hoechst 
and the Oko-Institute were thus able to maintain their independence. 
7.2.4 Communication Alliance for Conflict Management 
The partnership between Hoechst in Germany and its surrounding communities, which only 
became more prominent in the aftermath of critical chemical accidents, is concerned with 
more than simply solving social conflict between those partners involved. The primary 
purpose of the CDG was to establish a forum that enabled Hoechst and its communities to 
understand each other better, and on that basis, to derive mutual benefits. Rather than 
solving individual issues of community members or company representatives, the focus of 
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the partnership was to make Hoechst's impact on its communities more a positive, leading to 
an improved perception of the company within it. Hoechst and its communities sought to 
establish an alliance which, through communication could manage the social conflict that 
derived from the chemical accidents and any potential conflicts in the future. Within this 
context, the environment in which Hoechst was operating and the specific issues of the 
social conflict predetermined the partner selection. 
At the beginning, a small group of managers from Hoechst purposely started to build 
personal relationships with critics from Hoechst's community. They searched for talks, 
dialogue, discourse, and exchange of information and ideas. At Hoechst, senior 
management recognised the need to come together with critics and to develop a strategy for 
corporate communication that also encapsulated community relations. Community 
representatives deliberately used communication channels with Hoechst to gather 
information about Hoechst's business activities and to gain support for community projects. 
In the aftermath of the chemical accidents, the communication between the company and 
community representatives was formalised into the CDG. Later, the restructuration of 
Hoechst created the need for a second discussion group, and the CDG was replicated. 
The personal contact between Hoechst and community members established a secure basis 
for partnership. The company knew who they had to involve and the community 
representatives knew who they where talking to. Regardless of the trust between individuals, 
however, the community was suspicious, because they now faced Hoechst as an institution, 
associated as it was with powerful influence in various social, political and economical areas. 
However, the company was unsure to what extent a formalised CDG could positively assist 
corporate communication. 
Formal rules were developed and these regulated the constitution of the CDG, the rights and 
responsibilities of its members as well as the procedure for discussions. Hence, Hoechst and 
community representatives developed guidelines that codified the practice of the 
CDG. A 
formal agreement was established -a communication association between 
Hoechst and its 
surrounding communities - to achieve a particular aim: the management of social conflict. 
Personal contacts, together with formal discussion regulations, built the covenant of 
the 
partnership, but also enabled the involved partners to maintain their independence. 
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7.3 HARNESSING POWER FOR PARTNERSHIPS 
7.3.1 Critical Incident Driven Dependency 
Human rights accusations, inevitably, had a negative influence on BP's reputation. This is 
because although oil is not a commodity good, the company has a very strong brand identity. 
Not only were BP's employees and managers deeply hurt by the fact that they might work for 
a company that harmed human rights, but other stakeholders put further pressure on the 
company. The accusations that BP faced were initiated, as well as driven, by the media. 
NGOs were recognised and accepted as opinion leaders and fighters for human rights and 
responsible development on behalf of society. BP had to accept its own negative reputation, 
and NGOs' positive one, as the power source of the partnership between the company and 
the IAG. However, regardless of the damages derived from human rights accusations 
regarding the company's corporate reputation, in 1998, BP received an award from the 
Financial Times, naming it as the most respected company in the UK. This esteem was a 
resource for the company that also played a vital role in the business-NGO policy dialogue. 
After it faced the human rights accusations in Colombia, BP's damaged corporate reputation 
was source of power for the IAG. The group of development NGOs used this circumstance 
to utilise the media and other public contacts, and to put BP in a position where it was forced 
to rethink its entire business policy. The implications for the partnership were that BP could 
not reject proposals from the IAG without considering that this omission could damage PR. 
By the same token, BP's outstanding reputation in the business world derived from power 
that could ultimately be utilised against the NGOs. However, BP could not convince the 
NGOs to become involved in a specific project. The primary concern of the IAG was based 
on the link that this kind of partnership would create between NGOs and one of their 
enemies, a transnational company. 
The only commitment of the partnership was honesty and openness. BP was in a much 
stronger position to defend its policy and action when no critical incidents damaged their 
reputation. The IAG was in a much stronger position when BP faced human rights 
accusations because this situation provided them with the opportunity to defend those that 
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might suffer from BP's negative social impact. This can be seen as cyclic dominance, where 
one of the partners was always in a better reputational position than the other. 
Consequently, power relationships can be described as interdependent. However, if the 
reputation became balanced in the long-term and BP acquired all the required knowledge 
that NGOs could contribute to adapt business policy, there are indications that BP will not 
continue the partnership with the IAG in the way they did. That leads to the conclusion that 
there is an incident driven power balance between the company and the partnering group of 
development agencies, with reputation as an independent power base. 
7.3.2 Mutual Dependence on Social Commitments 
As can be seen, BPX committed itself increasingly to community development, which implied 
a community policy, a social development plan, a community affairs team and a social 
investment budget. The commitments of the company changed over the years. While at the 
beginning BPX in Colombia focused much more on specific local issues, later, the company 
moved towards a more integrated social development approach, with more strategic 
foresight. However, the company experienced difficulties in achieving sustainable community 
development because it lacked the additional commitments of the communities. It is not true 
to suggest that the community remained against social development issues, rather than that 
communities' commitments sometimes fail to correlate with BPX's social development 
commitment. 
BPX aimed to transfer the ownership of community development projects to the affected 
community members and local authorities. This was the only way to achieve sustainability. 
The company's early, paternalistic approach meant that many projects were inefficient, or 
indeed, failed. However, BPX's primary commitment was one of social investment, and their 
financial contribution combined with expertise knowledge. The communities' commitment 
was based on active engagement and participation in so as to enable the project to succeed. 
Lack, or indeed misuse of commitment on at least one side of the partnership often resulted 
in criticism about, and failure of the partnership projects. Hence, commitment was the power 
source for the community development partnership, and this was used either consciously or 
unconsciously. 
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BPX was not always able to analyse and prioritise societies' needs. However, consulted 
community members sometimes represented only a minority of the society and local 
authorities sometimes pursued political interests rather than community interests. Hence, if 
all involved partners were committed to the joint venture of co-financed community 
development projects in order to meet prioritised social expectation and therefore, enhance 
the quality of life, the power relationship between the involved partners remained in balance. 
Because the success of community development in general and certain projects in particular, 
depended on the full commitment of both partners to achieve an appropriate ownership 
structure, BPX and its communities reached a balanced power relationship that led to an 
interdependent partnership, based on commitment. A community ownership, the only way to 
achieve sustainable community development, was achieved because all involved partners 
sought to meet the same, or at least similar, social expectations. Jointly prioritising social 
expectations was an efficient way to balance community commitments. 
7.3.3 Reciprocal Competence Dependency 
The joint project partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut focused on the impact of 
the company's products and production on society. To fulfil the project objective, it was a 
precondition that the competencies of both partners should be linked. The Öko-Institut had 
the reputation of an independent critical research institute, whose areas of competence lay in 
social and ecological issues, related to various industry contexts. Media and other pressure 
groups helped to raise Öko-Institut's profile. Hoechst had the business competence that was 
required for this project and the critical business and finance world behind them. Therefore, 
the carefully combined source of power was the partners' competencies. 
If one of the partners had not considered, accepted and integrated the competence of the 
other, the project could have failed. By the same token, if one partner had utilised 
its 
competence to control the other, it is likely that the project would also have 
failed. This 
mutual dependence on competence for successful accomplishment of a given project 
objective established a power balance mechanism based on the partners' recognition 
and 
acceptance of the necessity to combine each other's competence. 
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Whereas Hoechst's board of directors provided a policy for the project, Hoechst's project 
managers controlled time and costs. Members of the Öko-Institut continuously observed to 
what degree Hoechst acted as a socially and environmentally responsible organisation. They 
reported findings internally, both to pressure groups and to the media, as they did prior to the 
partnership. Both partners accepted this reciprocal governance as being balanced and 
competence-based. Consequently, Hoechst and the Öko-Institute depended on each other 
for the fulfilment of the joint project task, and sought to make sure that the partnership would 
not be converted into a PR hunting expedition so as to enhance reputation. 
The same reciprocal governance mechanism allowed both partners to maintain their 
autonomy. This was important for business-NGO partnership in general, because an NGO 
does not want to be seen as being influenced by, or being dependent on, business, whereas 
business does not want to be seen to 'give shareholder money away' to support NGO 
movements that are often antagonistic to transnational business. For the Öko-Institut this 
meant maintaining an independent research institute that only engages with business to 
enhance the quality of life for society without compromising business. Hoechst, as a 
company committed to producing shareholder value, needed to provide evidence that the 
engagement with the Öko-Institut added some value to company's business. 
In practice, Hoechst and the Öko-Institut planned the joint project together in a detailed way. 
Job sharing was organised due to the competence properties of the partners. While one 
partner was leading a project job, the other acted as an advisor. There was thus a balance 
between leading and advising. To summarise, the success of the partnership is based on 
balanced competence interdependence. 
7.3.4 Regulated Knowledge Dependency 
Community representatives felt handicapped because of their limited understanding of 
Hoechst's technological business practices, which were often at the centre of arguments 
within the CDG. Chemical, and later life science products, and their production, were 
complex in nature, described by very specific terminology, and required specific scientific 
knowledge in order to argue about potential or induced social risks. 
Even deeper knowledge 
and understanding was required to analyse the social and environmental 
impacts or to 
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interpret analysis about effects on the environment and the society of Hoechst's products 
and production. In addition to this, the small, unknown community representatives had to 
argue with the well-known, powerful and often scientifically educated Hoechst managers. 
Managers sometimes misused their knowledge as a source of power by presenting 
information in a highly technical way by using incomprehensible language, by playing with 
social status. Community representatives anticipated this power relationship, thereby forcing 
the CDG to regulate the use of knowledge as a power source as much as possible in the 
statute. This regulated power balance was a prerequisite for a constructive discussion 
between Hoechst and its surrounding communities. When being confronted with scientific 
jargon by Hoechst's managers, community representatives often felt embarrassed, and did 
not fully participate in the discussion. Only one green citizen initiative representative had the 
expertise that was needed to understand and translate a manager's language into a 
community's language. 
At the beginning, if managers did not follow the CDG discussion guidelines by presenting 
open information and knowledge understandable to non-experts, without any social 
pressure, community representatives reported immediately after the CDG meeting to the 
media. CDG members knew who to contact and how to present the case to the public so that 
it would assist them in achieving discussion objectives with Hoechst. However, the 
participation of the media and the public presentation of the content and decisions of CDG 
meetings became part of the statute. Hence, although the use of Hoechst's specialist 
knowledge that was needed for constructive CDG meetings was regulated, there was no 
dominance of one partner. Rather, there was interdependence between Hoechst and its 
communities, because of communities' regulated use of knowledge about how to unitise the 
public for their benefits. Consequently, the application of Hoechst's and the communities' 
knowledge as a power source was guided and balanced by a statute. 
The main reason for applying for a guided discussion approach was that both partners were 
interested in a constructive long-term discussion forum, but they worried about the misuse of 
power of knowledge. CDG's regulated knowledge interdependence provided 
Hoechst and 
the communities with a kind of assurance for constructive discussions. 
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7.4 DEVELOPING PARTNERSHIPS OVER TIME 
7.4.1 Incremental Partnership Development 
When BP approached development NGOs to discuss human rights, it was not clear whether 
BP and the NGOs would be ready to engage in a dialogue, and the directions of these 
conversations were unpredictable. On both sides, partners had different expectations and 
objectives. They did not know what one could expect as an outcome of this dialogue, 
although there were set objectives on both sides. At the beginning, no one thought about 
institutionalising the conversations. The partners did not have a plan for the development of 
the business-NGO policy dialogue. All that they were certain about was that a joint positive 
contribution to the human rights in Colombia was required. Hence, the direction of the 
partnership development was defined in terms of the target to be achieved, but emergent 
with respect to the way in which the target should be accomplished. 
However, no serious conflicts between BP and the IAG interrupted the partnership. BP's and 
the IAG's co-operation continued to improve. BP and the IAG were able to enhance the 
quality of policy conversations by gradually increasing an understanding of each other's 
concerns and practices by regular degrees of added knowledge, acquired through the 
partnership. Every critical social issue was discussed when it emerged. This incremental 
evolution was long-term orientated. At no point in time was a partner trying to achieve short- 
term success at the expense of the long-term relationship. However, at no stage was this co- 
operative behaviour imposed by the necessity for BP and the IAG to be partners indefinitely. 
BP was forced to engage with development agencies. A permanent adaptation process 
determined actions and therefore the evolution of the partnership between BP and the 
IAG. 
Both partners were open collaboration and saw it as a purpose of the 
dialogue to acquire 
each other's knowledge. The development of the partnership was unpredictable and 
anarchic, but static rather than dynamic in its development over time. 
Permanent adaptation 
of BP and the IAG to the changes in partnership was a precondition 
for sustainable, 
evolution since it was a reactive process of business-NGO policy 
dialogue rather than 
proactive. 
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The partnership between BP and the IAG was also determined by the company's reputation 
and was, indeed, incident driven. Because BP lost its reputation on the strength of human 
rights accusations in Colombia, the company felt that it had no alternative but to engage with 
critics. By the same token, from BP's perspective, a restored reputation implied that there 
was no need to continue the partnership other than by maintaining the relationship for facing 
new accusations. In addition, since the IAG refused BP's offer to participate in or lead 
specific community projects in areas in which BP operates, indications emerged that the 
company might not be willing to continue its partnership with the IAG as was the company's 
habit. Hence, these circumstances do not guarantee durability, but lead to predictions of an 
unstable, uncertain future with regard to the current partnership. 
7.4.2 Stepwise Partnership Development 
While BPX integrated and developed its business within Casanare, social and environmental 
issues changed. However, most of the changes that BPX were concerned about were linked 
to the company's operations and were therefore, at least to a considerable extent, 
predictable. BPX developed a social policy and programmes, and set up a social investment 
budget that guided and influenced its engagement with Casanare's social development. 
However, at the beginning of the partnership, the company's approach was somewhat 
reactive, and only later did BPX begin to think strategically about social impact management. 
Local authorities and community representatives were restricted with regard to community 
development, to the extent to which the national government provided the region of 
Casanare with a financial budget for social investments. Community development also 
needed to be aligned with the development plans of local authorities. However, because of 
various inconsistencies in the government mechanism these often changed, and BPX had to 
adapt its development activities. Moreover, communities' needs based on social 
development changed over time, and this called for a revision of BPX's community 
involvement. While the company had a continuous consultation process with its community 
partners, every concrete project required a separate, quite specific negotiation. 
Consequently, because the community development programme for Casanare was long- 
term orientated, the plan was adjusted on a project-to-project basis. 
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The experiences from community projects and the analysis of social impacts, together with 
the criticism that BPX faced from NGOs about its social development activities, influenced 
the company to change its social investment approach to meet societies' expectations. 
Based on achieving project objectives and deriving mutual learning the community 
development partners who were collaborating enhanced the process of re-negotiating that 
was required for every new project. The evolution of the community partnership was linked to 
in a step-by-step re-negotiation and integration process of development projects and 
community affairs professionalism that developed by strategizing social investments. 
Guerrilla movements and inconsistencies in the Colombian governmental system have 
negative effects on the longevity of the partnership between BPX and the communities in 
their operating areas. Transferring the ownership of community projects from BPX to the 
affected communities was used to counteract the durability of this partnership. The 
application of a long-term perspective towards a community development partnership 
ensures positive social impact even for the time when BP will be long gone. 
7.4.3 Life-Cycle Partnership Development 
When Hoechst and the Öko-Institut initially approach each other, both institutions were keen 
to talk about social and ecological risks that were induced by production from companies 
such as Hoechst. Soon thereafter, recognising the potential and openness for collaboration 
on specific issues, the partners jointly defined a project task that was embedded in each 
other's strategy. Hence, the core element of the partnership became a joint project for which 
an effective project planning and management system was established and put into practice. 
Hoechst and the Öko-Institut applied project management tools as far as possible. The joint 
project was carried out as planned. 
At the beginning of the partnership, the precise formulation of the project task was of 
importance. This step was resource-intensive because of the different approaches of the 
partners to the development of a sustainable product assessment tool. The following step, 
the definition of the project boundaries, was a very sensitive one. Whereas the 
Öko-Institut 
wanted to involve Hoechst's most critical businesses, the company was more interested in 
conceptualising the assessment tool, without any frictions. After formulating the project 
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boundaries, the project was divided into two phases, each of which had a different focus. 
While the purpose of the first was to develop a concept, within the second, the concept was 
applied and refined. The final project stage was the evaluation of the project results. 
Formulating the project task, defining project boundaries, developing the project plan, 
conceptualising and testing, and finally evaluating the results were the elements that 
constituted the life-cycle of the joint project between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut. After the 
successful completion of the development of the product assessment tool, the partners 
began to think about new projects that might involve other subsidiaries from Hoechst and 
focus on new project tasks. A new project life-cycle thus began. 
Within the different life-cycle stages, the partners experienced the limits of a sustainability 
assessment tool that was initially intended to be integrated into Hoechst's SMP. The Öko- 
Institut learned that theoretical, optimal, social and environmental concepts cannot always be 
integrated into business without specific adaptation. Hoechst, meanwhile learned that in 
order to implement the guiding principles of sustainable development, it is crucial to consider 
secondary and tertiary potential, as well as social and ecological risks. The company was 
able to build competence to understand and apply social and environmental impact 
assessments, whereas the Öko-Institut developed capabilities to consider business and 
financial concerns for the assessment of companies' induced risks on society. 
There were no milestones for the development of the product assessment tool. However, the 
partnership agreement was limited to a specific project task. Therefore, the co-operation 
between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut was bounded with regard to the time horizon. For the 
same reason, the durability of the partnership was pre-limited to the time of the specific 
project accomplishment. However, new joint projects will be planned. 
7.4.4 Spiralling Partnership Development 
The process of developing partnership between Hoechst and 
its surrounding communities 
began as a joint idea between the company and a green community pressure 
group. At with 
its North American operations, Hoechst already had experiences with community advisory 
panels. However, the operational and social conditions of 
the two are so different that no 
direct transmission was possible. A series of chemical accidents 
finally forced Hoechst to 
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undertake immediate actions that included a need to change its relationships with its 
communities. Consequently, Hoechst and its communities set up a Community Discussion 
Group (CDG). However, the partners did not know in which way this discussion group could 
work so that it was not possible to pre-determine issues such as the constitution of the CDG 
or the process of decision-making. The discussion began with a focus on the aftermath of 
Hoechst's chemical accidents, but it was not predictable which issues would follow. Hence, 
the partnership was emerging, rather than planned. 
For the community to learn that business is not a welfare institution, but not evil either, and 
for Hoechst to learn that its surrounding communities are not only critics but an integral part 
of its business environment, is an outcome of a continuous trust-building exercise. The 
partners learned that they can work together for mutual benefit. Therefore, trust building was 
an activity which operated at every discussion, but from changing perspectives, and 
remained unfinished. Consequently, the success of the CDG depended on the extent to 
which the partners were able to build trust and repeat this behaviour for every emerging 
social and environmental conflict issues. Hoechst and its communities recognised this and 
embedded the partnership building in a long-term horizon. 
A spiralling process rather than an incremental, stepwise or life-cycle process characterises 
the evolution of the partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut. After discussion and 
solving of most of the issues resulting from the aftermath of Hoechst's chemical accidents, 
the CDG renewed itself and began to focus on both related and new issues. In addition, with 
a new discussion round, the statute of the CDG was revised as well. However, there were no 
gradual qualitative improvements or defined stages. Renewal in this context means 
continuous application of the same procedures but with new issues for discussions. At the 
centre of these discourses lies a continual trust building exercise. 
In addition, a replication of the CDG became inevitable because of Hoechst's restructuring 
and the fact that the potential social conflict between the company and its surrounding 
communities became linked to autonomous companies. Positive experiences, learning and 
trust built up, with the first CDG assisted in setting-up a second one. The continuous 
successful renewal of the first and flourishing establishment of a second CDG provides 
evidence that the durability of the CDG may be certain. 
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Chapter 8 INFERENCES FOR PARTNERSHIP BUILDING 
A new paradigm of innovation is emerging: a partnership between private 
enterprise and public interest that produces profitable and sustainable change for 
both sides. 
Rosabeth Moss Kantor (1999) 
This chapter presents the inferences for stakeholder partnership building. It is the reasoning 
involved in making a logical judgement on the basis of circumstantial evidence and prior 
conclusions rather than on the basis of direct observations. The defining elements of 
partnership alchemy are transformed into the 4-Ps for stakeholder partnership building and 
provide the framework for this chapter: 
  Purpose of partnerships; 
  Pacts for partnerships; 
  Power relationships in partnerships; and 
  Processes of partnership developments. 
These four elements of partnership alchemy are part of an emerging paradigm of social 
innovations. Each analysed stakeholder partnership represents a diverse purpose, pact, 
power relationship and process of partnership development. Therefore, all analysed 
stakeholder partnerships are fundamentally different in every defining partnership alchemy 
element. For each element, five describing variables have been identified which enable the 
similarities and differences between various purposes, pacts, power relationships, and 
processes of stakeholder partnership developments to be analysed. 
The similarities and differences between the variables of the elements of partnership 
alchemy thus identified are applied to analyse and describe their diversity. The examined 
characteristics of BP's and Hoechst's practice of navigating social risk are utilised as firm 
specific context variables, to explain the variance among the partnership alchemy elements. 
This approach provides the opportunity to identify whether the analysed stakeholder 
partnership building features are firm-specific, or rather, partnership-specific. 
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8.1 PURPOSE OF PARTNERSHIPS 
The purpose of partnerships is the first defining element of partnership alchemy. It is the 
anticipated outcome that is intended, and guides stakeholder partnership building actions. 
For this analysis, the purpose of stakeholder partnership building is defined as the internal 
function of a partnership. Moreover, it is the synergy potential that describes the intent for 
stakeholder engagements. Each analysed stakeholder partnership serves a different 
purpose. The interpretations of the four functions of the examined stakeholder partnerships 
are the outcome of the analysis of the ends and means of stakeholder partnership building. 
Five variables are applied to describe the four different purposes: strategic objective, 
context, content, joint interest, and source for benefits. Acquiring knowledge, co-financing 
social investment, combining competence, and improving communications are the analysed 
stakeholder partnership building functions. 
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE - is the process of coming into possession of concrete or abstract 
information that adds value. Within stakeholder partnerships, business and stakeholders 
gain knowledge from each other. The partners require the acquired knowledge to accomplish 
their strategic targets. BP aimed to adapt its policy to environmental changes. The target of 
the IAG was to develop guidelines for the excavation industry in less developed countries. 
Hence, the strategic objectives were similar. Based on this similarity, BP and the NGOs had 
a joint interest in improving the human rights records of Colombia and in particular in BPX's 
operating environment. However, business policy issues comprised the context of the 
partnership. Consequently, the content, the actions of the BP and IAG partnership was 
conversations that composed a dialogue. The source of benefits for both partners was the 
potential to exchange knowledge. Therefore, the purpose of the partnership between BP and 
the IAG was to acquire each other's knowledge that assisted to achieve the strategic 
objective of changing business policy. 
CO-FINANCING SOCIAL INVESTMENT - is the process by which two or more partners provide 
resources for a joint investment. Within the context of stakeholder partnership building, the 
notion of resources for co-financing social investments is broad and comprises 
besides the 
primary financial resource also managerial resources. For the partnership between 
BPX and 
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its communities it was crucial to transfer the ownership of social development projects to the 
communities that were involved and affected. Co-financed social investment was an effective 
approach for social impact management. Both, the company and the communities were 
convinced that social impact management was the key to sustainable development. On that 
basis, BPX and its communities not only had a similar strategic objective, but also a joint 
interest in social development. Consequently, the partnership's context was social 
investment. Because these investments are managed on a project-by-project basis, various 
community development projects represented the content of the co-operation. Enhancement 
of social investment efficiency was the consequent source of benefits for both partners. Co- 
financing social investments as the purpose of the partnership was considered as the ends 
to the means of managing social impact for sustainable community development. 
COMBINING COMPETENCE - is the process of joining competencies for a common purpose or 
in a common action. Competencies are defined by the quality of being adequately or well 
qualified, physically and intellectually, to fulfil a set target or achieve an objective. 
Competence is the product of the compounding of resources and skills. Combining 
competence, therefore, requires similar strategic objectives, which was the case in the 
partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut. It was not only the objective of developing 
a product assessment tool that the partners shared; in addition, they pursued a joint interest 
of promoting sustainable development. The developed tool for measuring product 
sustainability was designed to be strategic in nature. Hence, the context of the partnership 
was the strategy for sustainable development. However, a specific project composed the 
content of the partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut - the development of the 
product assessment tool. The source of benefit was the building of joint competence to fulfil 
the project task, but also to build new internal competence in each partner institution. 
Consequently, the purpose of the partnership was to combine competence, so as to develop 
a strategy tool for sustainability product assessment, to promote sustainable development. 
IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS - is the process of ameliorating the quantity and quality of 
communication between a sender and a recipient of information. Communication 
is a 
connection which allows access between persons or places. Within the context of 
stakeholder partnership building, improving communication is the enhancement of 
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information exchange between business and stakeholders as well as the active participation 
of stakeholders in this process. To become an open company - Hoechst's strategic objective 
- and to gain access to information - the strategic objective of Hoechst's community - were 
similar to a certain extent because both partners aimed to exchange information with each 
other. This exchange of information was seen as an effective approach to social conflict 
management, Hoechst and the communities' joint interest. Communication was the context 
of this partnership, and the rules for communicating with each other were the content. 
Community communication was the source of benefit for both partners. 
Business-NGO 
Policy Dialogue 
Community 
Development 
Business-NGO 
Joint Project 
Community 
Discussion Group 
Strategic Similar Similar Similar Similar 
Objective 
Joint Interest Improving Social Sustainable Conflict 
Human Rights Development Development Management 
Context Policy Social Investment Strategy Communication 
Content Conversations Various Projects Specific Project Communication Rules 
Source for Knowledge Investment Building Joint Community 
Benefits Exchange Eff iciency Competence Communication 
Purpose Acquiring Co-financing Combining Improving 
Knowledge Social Investment Competence Communication 
Table 15 Purpose of Partnerships 
With regard to the five variables that have been applied to describe the purpose of 
partnerships, there is only one similarity between the four stakeholder partnership building 
purposes. The strategic objectives of the partners within each partnership were equivalent. 
However, each partnership pursued different strategic objectives. All other variables are 
different. The distinctions between the partnerships cannot be linked to firm specific features 
such as policy, processes or social capital. Hence, there is no evidence that the context - 
BP's and Hoechst's navigating of social risk - caused the differences between the purposes 
of partnerships. However, based on the fact that each variable that describes the partnership 
purposes is different in content, with the exception of the strategic objectives that are similar 
within but also different between the partnerships, there is evidence that the purpose of 
partnerships is partnership-specific. 
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8.2 PACTS FOR PARTNERSHIPS 
The second defining element of partnership alchemy is the pact for partnership. A pact may 
be defined as a written or unwritten agreement between at least two partners from 
government, society or business. For the purpose of this analysis, the pact for stakeholder 
partnership building is defined as the agreement between the involved partners that was 
aimed to serve the purpose of the stakeholder partnership. It is the core activity of the 
stakeholder engagement that describes the pact for partnerships. Each analysed 
stakeholder partnership represents a different pact. The interpretations of the four pacts of 
the examined stakeholder partnerships are the outcome of the analysis that is entitled: half 
way between handshake and contract. Five variables are applied to describe the four 
different pacts: basis, partner selection, structure, agreement, and independence. Dialogue, 
joint venture, joint project, and alliance are the analysed pacts for partnership building. 
DIALOGUE - was originally a literary composition in the form of a conversation between two 
people or, in other words, the lines spoken by characters in drama or fiction. In the context of 
stakeholder partnership building, a dialogue is conversation between business and at least 
one of its stakeholders. Through dialogue it is possible to exchange information and acquire 
knowledge. The basis of the pact between BP and the IAG was based upon mutual 
assurance. BP needed the approval of the IAG, while the IAG in turn had to assure that it 
would maintain its integrity. The agreement of the partnership did not involve actions, only 
conversations. The structure of the dialogue was very informal. For instance, meetings were 
not planned, and no rules for conversations were fixed. Because only a few NGOs were 
experts in developing areas, the partner selection was limited. The agreement between BP 
and the IAG was an unwritten memorandum of understanding and, therefore, a verbal 
agreement. However, at all times, the partners were able to maintain their independence. 
The pact between BP and the IAG was an exclusive agreement for policy dialogue. 
JOINT VENTURE - is a venture by a partnership or conglomerate 
designed to share risk or 
expertise. Joint ventures may well prove to be a useful, and indeed necessary, way 
to enter 
some new markets, especially for multinational firms. In terms of integrating 
its business into 
Colombia, the only way in which BPX could achieve effective social 
investment was through 
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joint ventures with the affected communities, this being the only way to mitigate social risks. 
Hence, the basis of the pact between BPX and its communities in Colombia lay in the field of 
social expectations. The company's only partners were the surrounding communities and 
local authorities of its operating sites in Casanare. Therefore, the partnership selection was 
predetermined. The structure of the pact between BPX and its community was formal. 
Regular meetings were held and every investment project was renegotiated. For each social 
investment project an agreement was signed. Within joint ventures, clear equity positions are 
usually taken by the participants. However, BPX and its community partners as the only way 
to maintain its independence and integrity considered a formal pact structure and a separate 
signed agreement for each investment project. Consequently, a joint venture for social 
investments was the pact for the partnership between BPX and its surrounding communities 
to achieve sustainable social development. 
JOINT PROJECT - is a combined, planned undertaking between at least two or more involved 
partners. It is a partnership in which a task is carried out together. Often resources, skills or 
competence are combined to achieve the joint project objective. The agreement is limited to 
the project task. In the context of stakeholder partnership building, a joint project is defined 
by partnering between a company and at least one of its stakeholders for the 
accomplishment of a joint-task. Within the partnership between Hoechst and the Öko-Institut, 
this task was the development of a sustainability product assessment tool. However, 
because the history of the two partners was conflict-loaded, mutual trust had to be built and 
established the basis for the partnership pact. The Öko-Institut was not the only competent 
critic that could assist Hoechst in developing the product assessment tool. However, it was 
the only stakeholder that was willing to engage in this joint project with the company. 
Therefore, the partnership selection was predetermined. Since the rules of the agreement 
were based on the differing competence that the partners contributed to the joint project, the 
structure of the partnership pact was informal. Hoechst and the 
Öko-Institut maintained their 
independence by a verbal agreement for this joint project. 
ALLIANCE - is the state of being allied or confederated. 
It is a connection based on common 
interest. An alliance is an organisation of people involved in a pact or 
treaty. It is often a 
formal agreement establishing an association between nations or other groups 
to achieve a 
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particular aim. Alliances are a lesser form of participation when compared with joint ventures, 
which may or may not involve equity participation. With regard to stakeholder partnership 
building, an alliance is defined as a formal agreement between a company and at least one 
of its stakeholders to establish an association with a particular aim. The aim of the pact 
between Hoechst and its surrounding communities was the improvement of communication. 
Because Hoechst's managers and community representatives already had personal contact, 
they established the basis of the pact for the partnership. In addition, because company's 
partners could only be its surrounding communities, the partnership selection was 
predetermined. The community discussion group had a very formal structure. The statute 
was negotiated, and composed a codified but unsigned pact agreement. On that basis 
Hoechst and the involved community representatives were able to maintain their 
independence within the alliance for a community discussion group. 
Business-NGO 
Policy Dialogue 
Community 
Development 
Business-NGO 
Joint Project 
Community 
Discussion Group 
Basis Mutual Social Mutual Personal 
Assurance Expectations Trust Contacts 
Partner Limited Predetermined Predetermined Predetermined 
Selection 
Structure Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Agreement Verbal Signed Verbal Codified 
Independence Maintained Maintained Maintained Maintained 
Pact Dialogue Joint Venture Joint Project Alliance 
Table 16 Pacts for Partnerships 
With regard to the five variables that have been applied to describe the pacts for 
partnerships, there is only one similarity between the four diverse stakeholder partnership 
building pacts. Each partnership pact was designed to maintain the partners' independence. 
However, there were also partial similarities with regards to stakeholder partner selection, 
structure and agreement. The only stringent difference exists in terms of 
the basis for the 
partnership pacts. No links between the differences or similarities of 
the stakeholder 
partnership pact variables and the context of BP's and Hoechst's risk management approach 
could be established. Hence, there is no evidence, that the pacts 
for partnerships dependent 
on the are social risk management context. Consequently, 
the four different pacts for 
partnerships analysed are partnership-specific. 
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8.3 POWER RELATIONSHIPS IN PARTNERSHIPS 
Power relationships in partnership constitute the third defining element of partnership 
alchemy. The preferred linguistic usage of relationship is for human relations. It defines a 
state of connectedness between people, where mutual dealings between people, parties or 
countries are involved. In the context of stakeholder partnership building, power relationships 
form an important consideration. Power is the possession of controlling influence, so power 
relationships can cause dependence on a partner if one partner to influence the other 
exercises power. If power relationships are balanced, they lead to interdependence or 
independence. Each partnership is characterised by a different power relationship. The 
interpretation of the power relationships is direct outcome of the partnership alchemy section 
entitled 'harnessing power for partnerships'. Five variables are applied to describe the four 
different power relationships: source, balance mechanism, dominance, consequence, and 
application. Cyclic reputation, balanced commitment, balanced competence, and regulated 
knowledge interdependencies are the analysed power relationships. 
CYCLIC REPUTATION INTERDEPENDENCY - is a relationship of power within a stakeholder 
partnership that is defined by recurring unilateral dependency of the involved partners. The 
partners' growth and lost of reputation is determining the cycle of the dependency. However, 
over time the power relationship is balanced and the partners are interdependent. Therefore, 
the source of power is reputation, as was the case in the partnership between BP and the 
IAG. Because the degree of reputation depends on the effect of incidents such as PR 
initiatives or crises, the power balance mechanism can be seen to be incident 
driven. Hence, 
the dominance of BP and the IAG in their partnership was cyclic depending on critical 
incidents. Because the partnership was long-term orientated rather than designed to manage 
one specific incident, the consequence for the power relationship was 
interdependency. 
However, BP and the IAG were aware of how to apply reputation as a source. of power 
and 
exercised their power to gain access to each other's knowledge. 
Consequently, the power 
relationship of the business-NGO policy dialogue was a cyclic reputation 
interdependency. 
BALANCED COMMITMENT INTERDEPENDENCY - is a power relationship 
of a stakeholder 
partnership that is defined as the equilibrium of engagements 
by agreement involving 
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financial or other obligations. Interdependency is maintained as long as the equilibrium of 
engagements is obtained. The commitments with regard to the partnership between BPX 
and its surrounding communities were linked to community development projects. If not all 
involved partners were committed to a specific social investment project, as their 
commitment was needed to achieve the project objective, projects failed, were inefficient or 
not put into practice at all. Hence, the source of power within this stakeholder partnership 
resisted in commitments for community development projects. The partners' search to meet 
social expectations composed the power balance mechanism. If all partners were committed 
to meet the same social expectation, the power relationship remained balanced. The 
consequence for the power relationship of the partnership between BPX and its communities 
was interdependence. The balanced commitment interdependence assisted the partners by 
transferring the ownership of social investment project to the involved communities. 
BALANCED COMPETENCE INTERDEPENDENCY - is a power relationship of a stakeholder 
partnership that is defined as an equilibrium of the involved partners' quality of being 
adequately or well qualified, physically and intellectually, to achieve partnership objectives. 
Interdependency is maintained as long as the involved partners contribute high quality 
competence that is required to fulfil the partnership task and establish a competence 
equilibrium. That way a reciprocal dependency is achieved. In the case of the partnership 
between Hoechst and the Oko-Institut, the partners were required to combine their 
competence, so as to achieve influence. Consequently, competence became the source of 
power of this stakeholder partnership. However, Hoechst and the Öko-Institut tried to avoid 
exercising the source of power because to achieve the joint project task the partner needed 
each other's competence. This mutual need for competence established a power balance 
mechanism that ultimately led to a balanced dominance between Hoechst and the 
Oko- 
Institut and as consequence to interdependence. Both partners were aware of the balanced 
competence interdependence and applied a power relationship to maintain autonomy. 
REGULATED KNOWLEDGE INTERDEPENDENCY - is a power relationship of a stakeholder 
partnership that is characterised by controlled or governed usage of 
knowledge of the 
involved partners. The use of knowledge can be regulated 
formally or informally. 
Interdependency is based on the regulation for the application of 
knowledge. In the case of 
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the CDG between Hoechst and its surrounding communities, knowledge was the source of 
power. The company could have used its specialist knowledge to mislead or confuse the 
community representatives. Whereas the community representatives could have used their 
knowledge about how to use the public for its purpose, in order to manipulate or control the 
company. Therefore, a power balance mechanism needed to be established that would 
regulate the use of Hoechst's and community representatives' knowledge. The statute for the 
CDG was the solution that also led to a regulated dominance of the involved partners. As a 
consequence of the applied statute, interdependence was created. Hoechst and its 
surrounding communities applied this regulated knowledge interdependency as a discussion 
assurance. The power relationship limited the misuse of the partnership. 
Business-NGO 
Policy Dialogue 
Community 
Development 
Business-NGO 
Joint Project 
Community 
Discussion Group 
Source Reputation Commitment Competence Knowledge 
Balance Incident Driven Social Expectation Competence Need Statute 
Mechanism 
Dominance Cyclic Balanced Balanced Regulated 
Consequence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence 
Application Gain Access to Community Maintain Discussion 
Knowledge Ownership Autonomy Assurance 
Power Cyclic Balanced Balanced Regulated 
Relationships Reputation Commitment Competence Knowledge 
Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence Interdependence 
Table 17 Power Relationships in Partnerships 
With regard to the five variables that have been applied to describe the power relationships 
in partnerships, there is only one similarity between the four diverse stakeholder partnership 
building power relationships. The consequence of the power relationships in all stakeholder 
partnerships was interdependence between the involved partners. However, 
because of 
various sources of power, power balance mechanisms, dominance, and power application 
the power relationships are different in at least one defining feature. 
There is no evidence 
that the similarities or differences of the power relationships are 
driven by the firm specific 
context of BP's and Hoechst's management of social risk. 
Consequently, because all 
partnerships are different in nature, it can be assumed that 
the power relationships in 
partnerships are partnership-specific rather than firm-specific. 
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8.4 PROCESSES OF PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENTS 
The process of partnership development is the fourth defining elements of partnership 
alchemy. A process is a sequence of individual and collective events, actions and activities 
unfolding over time and in a set context. It is a particular course of action intended to achieve 
certain results. Development is a process in which something passes by degrees to a more 
advanced or mature stage. It is an act of improving by expanding, enlarging or refining. For 
this analysis, the process of partnership development is defined as the course of action by 
which a stakeholder partnership passes by degrees to a more advanced or mature stage, 
unfolding over time and context. The advancement can be measured by the fulfilment of the 
partnership objectives. Each analysed stakeholder partnership can be seen to develop in a 
different way. The interpretation of the four diverse processes is an outcome of the analysis 
of the development of stakeholder partnerships over time. Five variables are applied to 
describe the four different processes: direction, evolution, time horizon, actions, and 
durability. Incremental adaptation, stepwise strategizing, life-cycle learning, and spiralling 
trust building are the building processes of the stakeholder partnerships analysed. 
INCREMENTAL ADAPTATION - is a process of partnership development characterised by 
gradually increasing, by regular degrees of adjustments on the environment. It is a uniform 
linear process by which the involved partners adapt to each other. For the partnership 
between BP and the IAG, this adjustment was crucial to provide the partners with the ability 
to acquire each other's knowledge. However, it was not clear in which direction this 
partnership would develop. Nor was it possible to plan its development. The direction of BP's 
and the IAG's partnership was emergent. Every conversation enhanced the partnership 
quality by regular degrees. There were no sudden drops or increases. Hence, it was an 
incremental evolution aiming to build a long-term partnership. BP's and the IAG's behaviour 
was orientated on this time horizon. The actions of the partnership were 
driven by 
adaptation. The company and the NGOs had to adjust their behaviour not only 
to the 
changed environment but also to meet expectations of the respective partner. 
However, this 
was no guarantee for endurance. Durability of the partnership was uncertain, since 
the co- 
operation depended on partners' reputation, and was incident driven. 
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STEPWISE STRATEGIZING - is a process of partnership development that is defined by the 
sequence of events, actions and activities that puts strategy into practice. The succession of 
process elements is determined by proceeding in steps, one thing at one time. Hence, the 
process can be depicted as a staircase. Every step is a process element and the level of the 
step is the extent to which the strategy was put into practice. A strategy is an elaborate and 
systematic plan for interacting with the environment to achieve set goals. BPX had its social 
development plan and the communities a community development plan. These were brought 
together to set up a strategy. Therefore, the partnership between BPX and its surrounding 
communities was planned but embedded in a long-term perspective as time horizon for this 
co-operation. However, since the strategy comprised various projects over a long period of 
time, every project was renegotiated before the partners started to put it into practice. 
Consequently, strategizing was the primary action of the partnership, leading to a stepwise 
evolution. The durability was dependent on various factors such as political issues and the 
lifespan of BPX's operations in Colombia. 
LIFE-CYCLE LEARNING - is a process of partnership development that is characterised 
by a 
series of stages through which a partnership passes between recurrences of a primary 
stage. Learning, the cognitive process of acquiring skill or knowledge, is the driver of this 
development. Partners begin to co-operate with different competencies, learning from each 
other, building new and joint competencies, and finally entering a mature stage where further 
learning with regards to the partnership objective would not add significant value. 
The 
objective of the partnership between Hoechst and the 
Öko-Institut was to develop a product 
assessment tool. Since this joint project was specifically designed to fulfil a 
defined task, the 
direction of the partnership development was planned and its time 
horizon bounded. The 
partners composed the project in stages. Whereas learning from each other was 
important at 
the beginning, later competencies were developed and applied until the project objective 
was 
accomplished. Hence, it was a life-cycle learning partnership. 
Because the time horizon was 
bounded, the durability of the joint project was pre-limited. However, new projects 
are 
underway and new life-cycle learning begins. 
SPIRALLING TRUST BUILDING - is a process of partnership 
building that is characterised by a 
recurring course of establishing faith into the 
involved partners. It is a process of constant 
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renewal but covering different issues. Consequently, since the partnership is progressing 
over time, it can be portrayed like a spiral rather than a circle. Trust is something held by 
someone for the benefit of another. For the partnership between Hoechst and its surrounding 
communities, trust building was certainly in the centre for the activities of the CDG. However, 
because none of the partners knew how to set up a discussion group and the issues that 
were covered by the CDG changed depending on Hoechst's business practice and critical 
incidents, the direction of the partnership development could not be planned and was 
therefore rather emergent. The discussion of each covered social conflict issue by the CDG 
was associated with a trust building circle. However, because the issues discussed by the 
CDG change over time, the CDG renewed itself by beginning a new trust building circle with 
a new discussion round. Since one discussion led to the next, the circles of trust building 
were connected and conducted to a spiralling evolution of the partnership, emphasising a 
long-term horizon. With this spiralling trust building development, the CDG created certain 
durability for which the replication of the CDG provides some evidence. 
Business-NGO 
Policy Dialogue 
Community 
Development 
Business-NGO 
Joint Project 
Community 
Discussion Group 
Direction Emergent Planned Planned Emergent 
Evolution Incremental Stepwise Life-Cycle Spiralling 
Time Horizon Long-term Long-term Bounded Long-term 
Actions Adaptation Strategizing Learning Trust Building 
Durability Uncertain Dependent Pre-limited Certain 
Process Incremental Stepwise Life-Cycle Spiralling 
Adaptation Strategizing Learning Trust Building 
Table 18 Processes of Partnership Developments 
With regard to the five variables that have been applied to describe the processes of 
partnership developments, there are no stringent similarities between the four divers 
partnership development processes. Two process directions were planned and two 
emergent. Three partnerships were long-term orientated, whereas one bounded at the 
beginning. The partnership evolution, development actions and the durability of 
the 
partnerships are most fundamentally different. However, no evidence could 
be found in the 
firm specific context of BP's and Hoechst's social risk management that could explain 
the 
similarities and differences. Consequently, it can be assumed that the analysed processes 
of 
partnership developments are partnership-specific rather than firm-specific. 
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Part IV Research Synopsis and Reflection 
Philosophy have / digested, The whole of Law and Medicine, From each its secrets 
/ have wrested, Theology, alas, thrown in. Poor fool, with all this sweated lore, 
stand no wiser than / was before. (... I All plague of doubts and scruples I can quell, 
And have no fear of devil or of hell, And in return am destitute of pleasure, Knowing 
that knowledge tricks us beyond measure, That man's conversion is beyond my 
reach, Knowing the emptiness of what I teach. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1949) 
The remaining issues, namely the research synopsis and the research reflection, form the 
contents of the final part of this thesis. 
The research synopsis summarises the characteristics of stakeholder partnership building 
and, on this basis, presents propositions that can be applied to stakeholder partnering. Both 
parts represent the contribution of this research to the extension of the behavioural 
stakeholder theory, by introducing a stakeholder partnership building theory. The final 
section of the synopsis focuses on the limitations of this research project. 
The research reflection aims to put the contribution of the stakeholder partnership building 
research into a wider context. The research findings are embedded in stakeholder theory. In 
addition to the contribution of this thesis to stakeholder theory, the empirical data constitutes 
a contribution to knowledge in its own right. Further research directions are presented and 
implications for policy and practice are suggested. 
Part IV: Research 
Synopsis and Reflection 
9. Research Synopsis 
9.1 Characteristics of 
Stakeholder Partnership Building 
9.2 Deriving Propositions 
for Stakeholder Partnering 
9.3 Limitations of the Research Project 
10. Research Reflection 
10.1 Contribution to 
Stakeholder Theory 
10.2 Further Research Directions 
10.3 Implications for Policy and 
Practice 
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Chapter 9 RESEARCH SYNOPSIS 
Always aim at the entirety, and, if you itself cannot become entirety, as serving link 
join the entirety. 
Friedrich Schiller (1957) 
Nowadays business, society and government are learning to live with the realities of 
economic globalisation, technological transformation, demographic changes and political 
transitions. These new realities are creating unprecedented opportunities for institutions, 
groups and individuals, but increased insecurity and inequality for others. In almost every 
country, it is possible to find cosmopolitan pockets of growing affluence, high technology, 
world class social service and increased economic competitiveness existing side-by-side 
with rising unemployment, inadequate skills, low incomes, poor housing, family breakdown, 
crime, ethnic conflict and environmental deterioration. 
Business is a driving force for positive change, but may also be a direct cause of social 
conflict. To develop an improved relationship with society, one way for companies is to 
engage with prioritised stakeholders. Accordingly, managing social risk through stakeholder 
partnership building has been the focus of this research project. The present chapter 
provides a research synopsis, a summary of the main points of the empirical descriptive 
process analysis of stakeholder partnerships from BP in Colombia and Hoechst in Germany. 
First, the characteristics of stakeholder partnership building are summarised before, five 
propositions derived from such a process are presented. The final part reflects on limitations 
of this research project. 
Partnership alchemy and propositions for stakeholder partnership building do not only 
provide the main contribution of this research, they also serve as a link to existing knowledge 
within the fields of business and society, stakeholder theory and strategic relationships. 
This 
is achieved by introducing stakeholder partnership building as a behavioural stakeholder 
theory. 
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9.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIP BUILDING 
This research has sought to locate stakeholder partnership building within the context of 
managing social risk. Two companies were studied and two stakeholder partnerships of 
each company were analysed. BP was engaged in a partnership with a group of 
development NGOs in the United Kingdom and BPX, BP's exploration subsidiary, was in 
partnership with its surrounding communities in Colombia. Hoechst in Germany was involved 
in a partnership with a green NGO but also with its surrounding community. For this 
research, the practice of firms' social risk management was described chronologically. The 
diversity of the cases was deliberately chosen to increase the variance between the cases 
and thus to enhance the validity of the data collected and analysed. 
To answer the leading research question of how firms build stakeholder partnerships, first, 
the features of BP's and Hoechst's social risk navigation were analysed with regard to policy, 
the connecting of processes with the expectations of society, and social capital. These social 
risk management characteristics served as control variables for the interpretation of 
similarities and differences of the four analysed processes of stakeholder partnership 
building. For each of the three social risk navigation contexts, the normative, behavioural and 
instrumental context, five different descriptions were identified. BP and Hoechst developed 
two distinguishing approaches to navigating the social risk that their activities brought about. 
The differences were caused by the operational context of the companies rather than 
organisation's specific characteristics. However, for the interpretation of the analysed 
variables of stakeholder partnership building, the features of firms' approach to navigating 
social risk represent firm specific contexts. 
The second part of the research question concentrated on identifying the main elements 
of 
partnership alchemy. These elements are categorised in terms of purposes of partnerships, 
pacts for partnerships, power relations in partnerships, and processes of 
partnership 
developments. To analyse each element of partnership alchemy with regard 
to four 
partnerships, five variables are identified to enable description and 
differentiation among and 
between the elements of partnership alchemy. Each of 
the four analysed stakeholder 
partnerships represents a different purpose, pact, power relation, 
and process of partnership 
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development. These four are the defining elements of partnership alchemy and entitled as 
the 4-Ps for stakeholder partnership building. Since every analysed stakeholder partnership 
represents a different set of the 4-Ps of stakeholder partnership building, there are four 
distinctive clusters of the elements of partnership alchemy. The table below shows the 4-Ps 
of stakeholder partnership building and the diverse aspects of each of the analysed 
stakeholder partnerships, whereas the rows represent the four different partnerships and, 
therefore, the four deriving patterns of stakeholder partnership building. 
Purpose Pact Power Relations Process of Development 
" Acquiring   Dialogue " Cyclic Reputation 
Knowledge Interdependency 
  Co-financing   Joint Venture " Balanced Commitment 
Social Investment Interdependency 
  Combining   Joint Project   Balanced Competence 
Competence Interdependency 
  Improving   Alliance   Regulated Knowledge 
Communication Interdependency 
  Incremental Adaptation 
  Stepwise Strategizing 
  Life-Cycle Learning 
" Spiralling Trust Building 
Table 19 4-Ps of Stakeholder Partnership Building 
The final part of the research question focuses on the similarities and differences of 
stakeholder partnership building. The firm specific context variables were applied to find 
evidence for possible links between the four analysed patterns of stakeholder partnership 
building and BP's and Hoechst's approach to social risk management. Since no correlation 
could be made, it is evident that the partnerships, and therefore its similarities and 
differences, were partnership-specific rather than context driven. However, no evidence 
could be found that the stakeholder partnership building patterns are partnership-specific 
with general regard to business-NGO or business-community partnerships. 
9.2 DERIVING PROPOSITIONS FOR STAKEHOLDER PARTNERING 
On the basis of the analysed context of navigating social risk and 
the four different 
processes of partnership building that are described by the 4-Ps of stakeholder partnership 
building, five propositions are developed. Four theories propose patterns of 
stakeholder 
partnership building: dialogue partnering, joint venture partnering, 
joint project partnering, 
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and alliance partnering. The fifth proposition suggests a determination mechanism for 
stakeholder partnership building patterns. 
1. DIALOGUE PARTNERING: If a stakeholder partnership's purpose is to acquire knowledge, it is 
likely that the involved partners will engage in a pact for dialogue. Cyclic reputation 
interdependency is the power relationship that influences the dialogue and leads to an 
incremental adaptation as process of the partnership development. 
2. JOINT VENTURE PARTNERING: If a stakeholder partnership's purpose is to co-finance social 
investment, it is likely that the involved partners will engage in a joint venture pact. Balanced 
commitment interdependency it the power relationship that influences the joint venture and 
leads to stepwise strategizing as an integral process of partnership development. 
3. JOINT PROJECT PARTNERING: If the purpose of stakeholder partnership is to combine levels 
of competence, it is likely that the involved partners will engage in a joint project pact. 
Balanced competence interdependency is the power relationship that influences the joint 
project and leads to life-cycle as process of the partnership development. 
4. ALLIANCE PARTNERING: If the purpose of stakeholder partnership is to improve 
communication, it is likely that the involved partners will engage in an alliance pact. 
Regulated knowledge interdependency is the power relationship that influences the alliance 
and leads to spiralling trust-building as process of the partnership development. 
5. PARTNERSHIP BUILDING DETERMINATION: If a stakeholder partnership fits into one of the 
above proposed stakeholder partnership building patterns, and assists a company in its 
management of social risk, stakeholder partnership building and, therefore, the 
determination of the stakeholder partnership building pattern is partnership-specific rather 
than firm-specific. 
The propositions are the outcome of the study of stakeholder partnership 
building in the 
context of social risk management, and these can be further examined. 
Four underlying 
mechanisms of stakeholder partnership building and the context that 
determines the process 
of stakeholder partnership building are suggested. The 4-Ps of stakeholder 
partnership 
building, together with the descriptive variables of each partnership alchemy 
element, 
provide the basis for the fives theses and for further research. 
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9.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The present study aims to give a representative picture of managing social risk through 
stakeholder partnership building, and seeks to analyse the defining characteristics of the 
process of partnership building. However, the findings should be read with a number of 
methodological reservations borne in mind. Social reality is not steady. It is, rather, a 
dynamic process. What is true today may be false tomorrow, or at different places in different 
contexts. Therefore, studying processes necessitates thinking about time, history and 
processes. Just as actions are embedded in contexts which limit their information, insight 
and influence, so actors are producers and products, and language becomes an analytical 
prison. However, there are some more specific limitations to this research project. 
To study stakeholder partnership building, four partnerships were selected from two 
companies. This can be seen as a process of empirical sampling. However, cases were not 
selected to fit the argument, rather theories evolve on the basis of the framework for studying 
stakeholder partnerships. Companies were chosen that were involved in social dramas and 
engaged in stakeholder partnerships to manage deriving challenges. Although the research 
did not study crisis management, it may be that the aftermath of critical incidents not only 
highlighted, but also influenced the stakeholder partnership building process. In addition, 
because the research was an in-depth, qualitative case study, only four stakeholder 
partnerships could be analysed. An analysis of partnerships in different context might 
present further patterns of stakeholder partnership building. 
The quality of the collected data by interviews may be limited because interviewees were 
influenced by critical incidents. For instance, NGOs were probably even more critical about 
business and business was more critical about the NGOs. Also, it is likely that when 
the 
interviewer conducted the fieldwork that recommend potential interviewees were sometimes 
in line with the thinking of those who recommend them, rather than critical and 
reflective. 
Data triangulation was applied for the data collection and analysis to 
level this limitation. 
Because of the sensitive nature of the critical incidents that 
the companies faced, it was 
sometimes hard to get access to interviewees. In the case of the partnership 
between BPX 
and its community in Colombia, it was necessary to visit country 
to collect interview data. 
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Due to the political situation, only a few community representatives could be interviewed that 
were involved in the partnership with BPX. For this reason, third party representatives were 
also interviewed such as researchers that had access to community representatives or 
people that worked for or with community representatives but were not an employed by BPX. 
However, because this research focuses on the macro level of stakeholder partnership 
building rather than on the micro level, the data that could be collected were sufficient for the 
analysis of stakeholder partnership building. 
Another limitation of the data collection was that in order to gather data about the past by 
interviews, interviewees had to remember those practices that predated actual processes. 
Often people change their job title and, at the time of the interview, they were thus detached 
from their former responsibilities and sometimes developed a different thinking about their 
past involvement and performance. Further limitations are based on institutional or inter- 
personal politics that sometimes limited access to data. Because some data were 
confidential, the way it could be presented in the thesis without harming institutions or 
individuals that provided the information needed to be negotiated. 
Data was collected over a period of more than a year, so the resulting close involvement that 
such work leads to might have influenced the analysis and interpretation of the collected 
data. Furthermore, since three languages were needed to collect, analyse and interpret the 
data, language was probably an analytical limitation and some data or meanings were lost in 
translation. 
It is hardly possible to talk about processes without discussing human agents in context. 
However, regardless of whether researchers focus on the micro or macro level of analysis, 
some data may not enough be considered for the interpretation of the research 
findings. A 
final limitation of this research is based in the search for multiple inter-setting conditions 
that 
link features of context and process to a certain outcome. Since no outcome variable 
was 
selected for this study, there is no evidence that the deriving patterns of stakeholder 
partnership building represents success or failure with regard 
to certain partnership 
performance. 
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Chapter 10 RESEARCH REFLECTION 
The creation of an economy where we are inventing and producing goods and 
services of quality needs the engagement of the whole country. We need to build a 
relationship of trust not just within a firm but within a society. By trust / mean the 
recognition of mutual purpose for which we work together and in which we all 
benefit. It is a Stakeholder Economy in which opportunity is available to all, 
advancement is through merit and from which no group or class is set apart or 
excluded. 
Tony Blair (1996) 
The last 20 years have seen stakeholder theory come to cover a large and multifaceted area 
of management research. Beginning with an obscure reference in Igor Ansoff's book on f 
corporate strategy in 1965 (Freeman, 1984) and growing to its current position in the popular 
media, the stakeholder idea has become a mainstay of management theory. For the entire 
analytical power stakeholder theory offers and its narrative refocusing on sets of stakeholder 
relationships rather than a narrow set of purely economic relationships, there is relatively 
little agreement on the scope of this theory. 
Recent years have seen escalating support for the formation of stakeholder partnerships, 
and these have been seen as able to underpin a vast range of business activities and public 
interest agendas. Partnership models have been advocated, and these can be viewed as 
addressing a variety of social, ecological and economic jV sues. There is, furthermore, a 
growing recognition of the value of stakeholder partnerships. Opinion is divided, however, as 
to their broader impacts and potentials. With evolving partnership experience, it is now 
becoming possible to distinguish success from failure, and opportunity from threat. 
One size 
clearly does not fit all, and there is a need to encourage a more refined process of 
partnership development. 
This research offers specific descriptive stakeholder partnering knowledge. 
The final chapter 
of this thesis provides a reflection on the analysed partnership building elements 
at a 
broader level. First the research findings are linked to stakeholder theory and 
the area of 
contribution is elaborated. Based on this reflection and on the outcome 
of the research 
project, a road map for further research is provided. 
Finally, suggestions for possible 
implications for policy and practice are given. 
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10.1 CONTRIBUTION TO STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristics for describing the management 
environment for years, but it has not attained full theoretical status. As a theory the 
stakeholder approach is still based on normative thinking and explanations, which lack 
empirical evidence about the actual behaviour of companies and the conditions under which 
firms behave in the way, they do. This research emphasises the behavioural perspective of 
stakeholder theory. Therefore, the central research question is how firms behave with regard 
to their stakeholders. However, the intention of this research has not been to improve the 
reactive management approach of stakeholder analysis or influence strategies. The research 
outcome, rather, contributes to stakeholder theory extension by proposing a proactive 
management approach to stakeholder engagement. Hence, co-operations between business 
and stakeholders were the research focus for developing a concept of stakeholder 
partnership building. Existing stakeholder theory did not provide descriptions or explanations 
for stakeholder partnership building. The need for such an extension of the behavioural 
stakeholder theory derives from the demand of firms' environment for new forms of 
strategizing and economizing. Stakeholder partnership building is considered as one 
possible response to this environmental challenge. 
1970 Time 2000+ 
Reengineering/TQM/ 
Reputation and Corporate Citizenship/ 
Corporate Philanthropy 
Transparency Sustainable Development/ 
Management Strategic Partnering 
Low Degree of Complexity High 
1 
Stakeholder Partnership Building: 
A new Form of Strategizing and Economizing 
Figure 17 A new Form of Strategizing and Economizing 
This research focuses on the specific application of stakeholder partnership building 
for the 
management of social risk. To describe such a phenomenon, three conceptual areas - 
business and society, stakeholder theory and strategic relationships - are combined 
to 
compose a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis. Interestingly, 
the conceptual 
competition within stakeholder theory is between power and legitimacy 
that reflect in virtually 
every major theory of the firm, particularly in agency, behavioural, 
institutional, population 
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ecology, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories. Two complementary 
perspectives - resource dependence and institutional theory - are applied for this 
stakeholder theory research within the context of social risk management. With regard to 
these theoretical foundations there is a dichotomy within the description of the management 
of social risk through stakeholder partnership building that has been incorporated into the 
development of the concept of partnership alchemy. Some researchers consider that the key 
to organisational survival can be found within the adaptation to institutional pressure, 
whereas others consider it within organisation's ability to acquire and maintain resources. 
This research does not make this distinction. Rather, it combines both perspectives. 
However, the following graph depicts the dichotomy and issues that are taken into 
consideration for the research on stakeholder partnerships building. 
Institutional 
Environment 
I Instilling Values and 
Meaning etc. 
Institutional Processes 
Structural 
Characteristics 
Managing Social Risk Organisational Change 
through Stakeholder 
Partnership Building 
r-º Power and Politics 
Task Environment j .j Organisational Control 
Environment Design 
Figure 18 Stakeholder Partnership Building Environment Dichotomy 
The specific contribution to behavioural stakeholder theory is the development of a theory of 
stakeholder partnership building in the context of social risk management. This theory is an 
extension to stakeholder theory rather than a testing, revision or expansion of existing parts 
of stakeholder theory. Stakeholder partnership building is a descriptive theoretical concept, 
developed out of empirical research and embedded in a specific context. The concept needs 
to be further developed, tested and its context extended. The 4-Ps of stakeholder 
partnership building, the descriptive variables and the deriving propositions 
for stakeholder 
partnering are the beginning of a new more proactive, engagement orientated 
behavioural 
stakeholder theory. 
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In addition to the contribution of this thesis to stakeholder theory, the empirical data forms a 
contribution to knowledge in its own right. This study provides a detailed insight into the 
practice of stakeholder partnership building in the context of social risk management. The 
quality of the data derives from five areas of empirical relevance. 
First, social dramas are analysed rather than day-to-day business processes. The critical 
incidents that BP and Hoechst faced and the management of the aftermath had implications 
on firms' performance. Hence, social issues and stakeholder partnership building became 
part of business processes and integral element of firms' strategy. Studying social dramas 
highlights defining characteristics more than the study of day-to-day business processes. 
The second empirical feature is the analysed time horizon. Instead of taking snap shots, this 
research studied longitudinal processes. Developments over time and the chronological 
analysis of stakeholder partnership building provide detailed historical validated accounts 
that enhance the quality of the empirical data. 
The practice of social risk management as the context of this research establishes the third 
area of empirical relevance. Rather than focusing on legitimacy and power issues, this study 
incorporates both perspectives by concentrating on firms' navigation of social risk. On this 
basis, a holistic picture of the relevance of social issues in management is provided. 
Fourthly, cases with high variance and similar outcomes are studied in detail, rather than 
similar cases with a high variance in their outcome. A balance between case similarities and 
differences was achieved by the case study sampling strategy. This approach enabled a rich 
comparative analysis and contributed to the four different identified patterns of stakeholder 
partnership building. 
Finally, stakeholder partnerships are analysed rather than stakeholder characteristics, 
networks or influence strategies. The analysis of stakeholder partnership 
building 
encapsulates stakeholder characteristics, networks and influence strategies 
and, thus, 
provides a comprehensive picture of the participation of stakeholders 
in firms' strategizing. 
Consequently, the contribution of this research did not only extended stakeholder 
theory and 
expanded the empirical evidence, but also provided the 
basis for further research in 
stakeholder theory and applications in the wider field of business strategy. 
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10.2 ROAD MAP FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study of managing social risk through stakeholder partnership building could be 
continued and extended in several ways to add fu r substances to the research findings. 
Three roads for further research can be approachnfýo three different research directions to 
achieve descriptive, explanatory or prescriptive research outcomes. 
This research project is empirically descriptive. The 4-Ps of partnership building, descriptive 
variables and five propositions are the outcome. To continue this research it would be 
interesting to describe the links between the four analysed patterns of partnership building 
and the performance of the four partnerships. Performances can be social or financial 
outcomes. To take this research further, performance causalities could be tested to explain 
whether links between partnership building patterns and partnership performance exist and if 
so to what extent these patterns affect performance. Furthermore, explanations about 
context and partnership-specific causalities would contribute to the understanding about the 
variance between partnerships and the effects on performance. Finally, prescriptive research 
can incorporate context, partnership building patterns and performance of partnerships into a 
framework to determine boundaries of stakeholder partnership building. 
Further descriptive research that analyses partnerships with other stakeholders than NGOs 
and communities and partnerships that focus on other than social issues can extend this 
research. Partnerships from companies that operate in other industries or other countries 
might also add further substances to this research. Since the cases of this analysis were 
critical incident driven, it is interesting to compare them with cases that were not embedded 
in social dramas. A comparison of good and bad performing partnerships can add 
knowledge as well. Further partnership alchemy elements or further partnership building 
patterns might be discovered. Explanatory and prescriptive research directions of this 
extension of the partnership building research are similar to the continuation road. 
Apart from the continuation and extension of this research project that emphasised 
the 
macro level of stakeholder partnership building, a third research road points towards a micro 
perspective of partnership building that focuses on issues such as perceptions, motivations 
or learning of the individuals that are involved in stakeholder partnerships. 
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10.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
After the Rio summit of the UN in 1987 and the Brundtland Report, sustainable development 
became a guideline for future development of business, government and society. New 
governance mechanisms, partnership building, and accountability are integral parts of this 
concept. The mobile information society is in the process of forming a new global reality, is 
initiating a new phase of social transformation and intensifying the process of international 
networking. "There appears to be a need to redefine the relationship between society and 
communit ound the world. " (Weidendeld 1998, p. 63) The findings of this research provide 
poli ks wi driving characteristics of partnership alchemy that need to be incorporated 
into policy in order to pave the way for practice that leads to sustainability. 
Globalisation offers opportunities for stakeholder partnership building, but it also represents 
a challenge, since international networking entails an increased measure of interdependence 
and susceptibility to disturbances, generates interactions between societies. Corporations, 
societal groupings, governments, and non-government institutions must develop into 
learning organisations and built stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. 
Unfettered competition amongst ideas, intellectual freedoms, and responsible attitudes are 
what is required to achieve economic, political and societal sustainability. The strategic 
essential concept lies in combining awareness of the challenges with well-founded thinking 
on how we want to live tomorrow. Partnerships support the process of joining forces for 
sustainable development and this research offers four alternatives, depending on the specific 
purpose of the stakeholder partnership. 
The descriptive patterns of stakeholder partnership building are of interest 
to the thinking of 
strategists of business that is or will moving to organise itself 
into a network corporation: 
/r 
fungible modules built around information networks, flexible work 
forces, outsourcing and 
webs of strategic partnerships. Organisational boundaries are becoming 
fuzzy. Traditionally 
external stakeholder groups such as suppliers, customers, 
NGOs and communities are 
included in policy making, strategy formulation, product 
design and other formerly 
confidential internal processes. Purposes, pacts, power relations and 
processes are 
becoming more important than strategies, styles, skills, staff, systems 
and structures. 
C 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Glossary of Selected Termss 
Business & Society - Business and society has two meanings. (1) It refers to the 
relationship that business firms have with society's institutions and nature's ecosystems. (2) 
The term also refers to the field of management study that describes, analyses, and 
evaluates these complex societal and ecological links. 
Corporate Philanthropy - Philanthropic business activity is the distribution of excess profits 
after other claimants, such as shareholders, have been paid. It is a voluntary activity on the 
part of business and is normally part of everyday business functioning. 
Corporate Social Responsibility - The term refers to an organisation's obligation to 
maximise its long-term positive impact, and to minimise its negative impact on society. The 
idea pre-supposes that the corporation has not only economic and legal obligations, but also 
certain responsibilities to society, which extend beyond these obligations. It implies bringing 
corporate behaviour up to a level where it is congruent with the prevailing social norms, 
values, and expectations. 
Licence to Operate - This is a concept which determines the organisation's right to 
continue conducting business. It is often used to gauge the level of consumer satisfaction 
and to understand customer needs. A firm's members or stockholders decide whether to 
award the licence after reviewing the different aspects which affect a firm's performance. A 
considerable emphasise is placed on the ethics of the organisation, which includes its 
awareness of environmental issues, its involvement in the community, its impact on society 
and its attitude toward its employees. 
Partnership - Partnerships are trust-based collaborations between 
individuals and/or social 
institutions with different objectives that only can be achieved together. The basis for 
successful partnerships is an agreement about rules for co-operation. A higher consensus 
means less regulated partnering because of a minimised conflict potential. 
5 These are the Author's definitions applied for this study. 
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Social Capital - This is the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and desired from the network of relationships possessed by an individual 
or social unit. Social capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be 
mobilised through that network. 
Social Investment - Social investment is a way of spending money responsibly. Major 
application areas are stock market investments, which exclude unethical business and 
promote ethical ones; shareholder and consumer activism; and community finance 
initiatives, such as credit unions, which promote investment in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. 
Social Risk - Risk can be simply defined as exposure to change. It is the probability that 
some future events, or set of events, will occur. Risk is a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation. 
Stakeholder - The broadest definition of stakeholder brings in anyone who affects or is 
affected by a company's operations. The key new perception is that companies need to 
expand the range of interests considered in any new development from customers, 
shareholders, management, and employees to such people as suppliers, governments, 
communities, and pressure groups. 
Sustainability - There are over hundred definitions of sustainability and sustainable 
development, but the best known is that of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development. This suggests that development is sustainable where it 'meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. 
Triple Bottom Line - Sustainable development involves simultaneous pursuit of economic 
prosperity, environmental quality, and social equity. Companies aiming for sustainability 
need to perform not against a single, financial bottom line but against the triple bottom line. 
Values Shift - Over time, human and social values change. 
Concepts that once seemed 
extraordinary (e. g., emancipating slaves, enfranchising women) are now taken for granted. 
New concepts (e. g., responsible consumerism, environmental justice, intra- and 
inter- 
generational equity) are on the agenda towards sustainability. 
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Appendix B: Interview Schedule 
The interview schedule in phase one involved discussion with key managers and 
stakeholder opinion leaders of British Petroleum and Hoechst. The interviewees were 
involved in relationship-building activities between the company and its stakeholders. 
Managers' involvement varied according to their responsibilities within the company, while 
stakeholders' involvement varied according to the social context. The interviews lasted 
between one and three hour. A variation of the following questions was asked, depending on 
interviewees' involvement in the issue of interest: 
  Could you tell me something about your job and your responsibilities? 
  What do you think about the company and its responsibilities? 
  Is there conflict potential between the company and its environment? 
  What factors instigated social risks? What was the social challenge? 
  Can you identify the variety of stakeholders engaged in risk management? 
  What factors made these stakeholders so important? 
  Were some more important than others? 
  Could you describe the process of stakeholder partnering? 
  To what extend did firm's objectives and those of the stakeholders come into conflict? 
  What were the process characteristics of stakeholder engagement? 
  What was the role of stakeholders? 
  What was the role of the firm in these processes? 
  Which factors were more important than others in dealing with stakeholders? 
  How did the nature of stakeholder relationships influence risk management? 
  What did you learn from stakeholders for the management of social risk? 
Internal ýºý Driving Forces ý-ý External 
Synergies 1111 Partner Selection III Balance 
Foundation 
Taxonomy III Form & Formation Agreement 
Attitudes Management Mechanisms 
Success Evolution Learning 
Figure 19 Interview Framework (Faulkner & McGee, 1997) 
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Appendix C: List of Contacts for the Hoechst Case 
Interviewees within the Company: 
Clariant; Board of Directors, Head of Politic/Society 
Hoechst and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Head of Union Representatives 
Hoechst and InfraServ Höchst, Head of Environment and Safety 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Corporate Communications Manager 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Health Safety Environment Advisor 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Public and Governmental Affairs Manager 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Vice President, Policy and Politics 
Hoechst Schering AgrEvo, Corporate Development, External Affairs Manager 
Hoechst, Chief Economist, Project Co-ordinator PROSA 
Hoechst, Emergency Manager 
Hoechst, Head of Corporate Controlling and Development 
Hoechst, Head of Hoechst Foundation 
Hoechst, Head of Public and Government Affairs 
Hoechst, Investor Relations Manager 
Hoechst, Managing Director, Director Personnel, Messer Group and Hostalen PE 
Hoechst, Public and Government Affairs Manager 
Hoechst, Senior Executive 
InfraServ Höchst, Chief Executive Officer 
InfraServ Höchst, Head Corporate Communications 
InfraServ Höchst, Head of Fire Brigade 
InfraServ Höchst, Head of Medical Service 
Interviewed Stakeholders: 
B. U. N. D., Local Co-ordinator 
Bürgerinitiative Hoechster Schnüffler un Maagucker, Co-ordinator 
City Council Frankfurt am Main, Head of Health Department 
Degussa, Head of Board Office 
Department for Environment Stadt Frankfurt am Main 
Federation of the Chemical Industry, Head of Technique and Environment 
Federation of the Chemical Industry, International Affairs, Head of External 
Relations 
Federation of the Chemical Industry, Member of Board of Directors 
Goldsteiner Umweltschützer, Co-ordinator 
Greenpeace, Hamburg, Head of Chemistry Division 
Head of 'Chemical Industry' at the Federal Ministerial for Environment 
Hesse 
Kreis Schwanheimer Mütter, Co-ordinator 
Local Agenda 21 - Head of Department for Environment, 
Frankfurt am Main 
Local Agenda 21, Speaker for Environment, Liberal Democrats Frankfurt 
Magistrat Frankfurt, Head of Education, Health, Safety and Environment 
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Moderator Local Agenda 21 - Hessischer Rundfunk 
Mütterinitiative Heriette-Fürth-Straße, Co-ordinator 
Oko-Institut, Co-ordinator Chemistry Division 
Öko-Institut, Head of Chemistry Division 
Oko-Institut, Manager with Responsibility for Safety of Production Equipment 
Öko-Institut, Member of Chemistry Division 
State Ministerial for Environment, Co-ordinator 
WBCSD, Corporate Social Responsibility, Co-ordinator 
WWF-Panda Fördergesellschaft, Head of Business Partnerships 
Observations: 
Hoechst Schering AgrEvo, Strategy Meeting 
Two Community Discussion Group Meetings 
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Appendix D: List of Contacts for the BP Case 
Interviewees within the Company: 
BP Archive, Group Archivist 
BP Conservation Programme, Programme Manager 
BP Group, Director Regional Latin America 
BP International Representative at the WBCSD 
BP International, Community Affairs Advisor for Mozambique, Nigeria, Angola 
BP International, Community Affairs Manager 
BP International, former Head of Community Affairs 
BP International, Group Vice President - Regions & Policies 
BP International, Head of Community Affairs 
BP International, Head of Investor Relations 
BP International, Head of Recruitment 
BP International, Health Safety Environment Advisor 
BP International, Legal Advisor 
BP International, Manager Government & Trade Affairs 
BP International, Manager, External Environment 
BP International, Managing Director with Responsibility for Regions and Policies 
BP International, Media Relations 
BP International, Policy Advisor 
BP International, Regional Advisor 
BP International, Senior Policy Advisor 
BP International, Senior Political Advisor, formerly BPX Colombia Head of Legal 
BPX Colombia, former President 
BPX Colombia, Governmental and Public Affairs, Co-ordinator 
BPX Colombia, Governmental and Public Affairs, Economical Analyst 
BPX Colombia, Governmental and Public Affairs, Political Analyst 
BPX Colombia, Head of External Affairs 
BPX Colombia, Head of Governmental and Public Affairs 
BPX Colombia, Head of Security 
BPX Colombia, Health Safety and Environment Manager 
BPX Colombia, Legal Advisor, External Affairs Advisor 
BPX Colombia, Senior Environmental Advisor, Planning and Permissions 
Interviewed Stakeholders: 
Amnesty International UK Business Group, Chair 
BT, Head of Corporate Reputation & Social Policy Unit 
CAFOD, Policy Advisor 
Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), Co-ordinator 
Christian Aid, Co-ordinator 
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Coalition against BP in Colombia, Co-ordinator 
Colombian Business Council for Sustainable Development, Executive Director 
Corporate Citizenship Company, Director 
Council on Economic Priorities, Director Europe 
Department for International Development, Business Development Advisor 
Guardian, Journalist 
Human Right Watch, Policy Advisor 
INTRAC, Co-ordinator 
INTRAC, Head of Research 
Judge Institute of Management Studies, University of Cambridge, Research Fellow 
Mayor of Bogota-Suby, formerly BPX Colombia, Head of External Affairs 
New Economics Foundation, Research Director 
Oxfam, Policy Advisor 
Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, Director Policy & Research 
Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, Policy Co-ordinator 
Rio Tinto, Environmental Policy Advisor 
Safe the Children Fund, Co-ordinator 
Shell International, External Affairs, Head of Corporate Relations 
World Bank, Business Partners for Development, Co-ordinator 
World Bank, Environmental Consultant 
WWF-UK, Corporate Partnerships, Co-ordinator 
WWF-UK, Director of Programmes 
Observations: 
BP Corporate Policy Department, Office Observation 
BP Senior Policy Advisor, Case Study Presentation BPX in Colombia 
BPX Head of Community Affairs and Associate President BPX Angola, Presentation 
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